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LABOUR,, MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
ABSTRACT 
In 1977, South African subsidiaries of 
multinationals with parent companies in the United States 
and the European Economic community became subject to 
codes of conduct on labour practice (known respectively as 
the "Sullivan principles" and the "EEC code"). This was 
the outcome of the policy of "constructive -engagement" 
favoured by Western goverments in preference to fullscale 
economic sanctions against the Republic. The activities 
of labour and management were seen as crucial to political 
change inside the country. 
In previous epochs of the twentieth century, the 
South African government had shown itself vulnerable to 
employer and trade union pressure. Between 1910 and 1924, 
organised white workers demonstrated considerable 
political clout, though after that, employer influence 
began to be effectively asserted. once the Nationalists 
had gained office in 1948, however, the power of both 
groups waned sharply, and unions of all racial composition 
(except those exclusively of Afrikaners) were subject to 
repression of varying intensity. But the assumption that 
the government had total control over the industrial 
parties was called into question by the Natal strikes of 
1973, which served to raise events in South African labour 
- management relations to world attention, resulting 
x 
directly in the Sullivan and EEC codes. 
Natal began the process of mobilising black labour 
in the modern era. Yet the government responded, not by 
repression but by ushering in a "new dispensation" towards 
organised black workers. By 1980, South African labour 
law had been liberalised to permit the participation of 
trade unions for blacks in the process of collective 
bargaining and worker representation for the first time on 
an equal basis with whites, indicating some response by 
the authorities to international pressure. Significant 
employers, both foreign and indigenous, adopted new 
strategies of accommodation, rather than the traditional 
stance of downright hostility in the face of black 
unionisation; and large domestic companies adopted similar 
codes to those covering American and European firms. 
Inevitably, the result of this process has 
produced quite different responses. This study analyses 
these differences and tries to acount fo ,r them. it 
reports case studies of eleven major companies, eight of 
them overseas subsidiaries and three locally owned. it 
concludes that the black unions are unlikely to mobilise 
an a scale sufficient to topple the apartheid system 
unaided, yet will remain a critically important factor in 
the political change process. 
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PREFACE' 
1. The Sense of Guilt 
Like many British subjects of liberal persuasion, I 
attribute my deep interest in the processes of political 
change in South Africa partly to a sense of guilt 
implanted at a tender age. When the massacres at 
Sharpville and Langa townships in 1960 brought the evils 
of apartheid into the conscience of the world, the 
apparent complicity of British people over generations 
in the emergence of this odious and repressive system 
was not overlooked. High expectations, especially among 
the younger age group, had accompanied the transition 
from British colonial rule to national independence in 
much of Africa, a process that was then gathering pace. 
Great moral value was attached to a multiracial block of 
states organised under the concept-ý'of the British 
Commonwealth. 
The shootings appeared to render the British 
government impotent. of course, radicals accepted that 
the government of South Africa was and had been from 
1948 in the hands of 'isolated extremists' who, it 
seemed, still lived in the nineteenth century. But was 
there not something the British government could do? 
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There appeared to be little, as the message of 
repression continued. Bannings, detentions, imprisonment 
without trial, the ludicrous D'Olivera. affair, poverty 
wages and the role- of British firms - all were 
extensively reported in the British media, the appalling 
minutiae of apartheid laid bare for inspection. Any 
discerning reader of The Guardian, The Times, The 
observer and The Sunday Times could in the 1960s and 
170s learn more about the inner workings of South 
Africa, despite extensive limitations on press freedom, 
than about Japan and the whole of Western Europe put 
together. I attribute this close attention by the 
British press partly to the innate guilt feeling it 
shares with at least some of its readers. 
But the plethora of news stories surely built up to 
a pattern. It developed the conviction in me that 
something could be done: the power basis for apartheid 
was too flimsy to withstand constant external criticism 
and internal pressure, and therefore the system could 
not last. But the problem also appeared to be 
intensifying, so that the longer apartheid persisted, 
the greater was the prospect of a Obig bang, ' 
blood-letting explosion rather than a process of gradual 
reform. South African news stories have an inescapable 
apocalyptic aura about them. It is increasingly 
xvi 
impossible to read of or discuss South Africa without 
the notion of the ultimate crisis intruding. The 
journalist Simon Jenkins has termed this the "Apocalypse 
School". instanced by publications such as "Waiting for 
the Apocalypse in Southern Africa", "Time Running out 
for South Africa", "South Africa at Five Minutes to 
Midnight" and "South Africa in Crisis". 
It is not intended to demean the factually accurate 
and extensive journalistic and academic attention paid 
to South African matters to assert that it arises from 
the I'Sarajavo principle". It was in Sarajavo, a "far 
away Balkan town", that an assassin shot dead the 
Archduke Ferdinand, thus - so some historians have 
claimed - unleashing a chain of events that culminated 
in the dreadfull slaughter of World War I. At the time 
of the assasination, its significance was simply not 
apparent, and the commentators of the day missed it. By 
analogy, it seemsto this author that coverage has been 
so extensive precisely because there is no telling, 
within the 
'ruling 
apocalyptic framework, where an 
isolated strike, the stoning of a police 'hippol or a 
death in custody, might eventually lead. 
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2. The South African Visits 
When in 1976 1 received an invitation to visit 
South Africa to study developments in industrial 
relations, it will come as no surprise to learn that I 
initially declined it. In view of apartheid's 
inevitable collapse, there seemed little point in 
furthering the guilt by associating with the political 
system itself. 
The invitation came about by chance. As an 
academic in a British university, I had occasionally 
played host at the request of the British' Council to 
visiting South Africans. In preparation for one such 
visit in 1976,1 had swotted up in advance on labour 
developments in the Republic. Before my visitor had 
chance to launch on the (usual) attack on the nature of 
Britain's industrial relations, I opened up a broadside 
on the place of trade unions as a stabilising factor in 
social change and offered a blueprint for reform of 
South African management practices in the labour 
relations area. I then learned that certain individuals 
in the country were working on similar ideas, and the 
invitation to visit came. 
Two events served to change my mind about the 
invitation. Firstly, both the Foreign and Commonwealth 
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office and the Trades Union Congress were encouraging, 
and suggested that my observations might be interesting 
to them. Professor Roux van der Merwe, (then head of 
the Industrial Relations Unit at the University of Port 
Elizabeth), who was to repay my hectoring hospitality 
with the more conventional, generous Afrikaner kind, had 
established eclectic contacts with both management and 
labour, so the programme he arranged was most 
interesting. 
Secondly, I had a meeting in London with Drake 
Koka, then newly arrived in self-imposed exile from the 
1976 Terrorism Trial. Koka had been a founder-member of 
the Black People's Convention. He was general secretary 
of the Black Allied Workers' Union which (I later 
discovered) was less than successful as a trade union 
but nevertheless was an important milestone in the 
development of ideas along the road to black 
consciousness. 
Koka asked me to tell him my motives for visiting 
the Republic. I outlined my own experience of 
labour-management relations in Britain. I revealed the 
little I had then learned about South Africa. I 
expressed my view that in respect of labour, South 
Africa, despite its obvious problems, was not sui 
generis. White management had to come to terms with 
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blacks as workers and trade unionists sooner rather than 
later. Trade unions were an inseparable part of the 
process of social change, and British firms in South 
Africa had to act with rather, than against them. After 
a thoughtful pause, Koka quickly told me I should banish 
my doubts and go. He gave some messages of support to a 
few contacts, most of which I delivered. I have not 
seen him again to this day. 
I visited South Africa for a month in 1977 and 
again in 1980, funded by British Council Travel 
Scholarships. I lectured at several universities, 
including the black University of Fort Hare in the 
Ciskei 'homeland' and the pukka Afrikans-speaking 
University of Stellenbosch. I visited many companies 
and spoke at several management seminars (the fees from 
which paid hotel bills and other living expenses). I 
sought out union officials of every hue and was 
sometimes invited to address them at private gatherings. 
I made courtesy calls on the Department of Labour and 
spent some time with Professor Nick Wiehahn who in the 
year of my first visit, 1977, had been appointed 
Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into Labour 
Legislation and was seeking evidence at home and abroad. 
It seemed at last as if something might be done. 
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From choice on that 1977 trip I travelled by train, 
the better to appreciate the scale of the country and to 
relax a little between meetings. For one such journey - 
from Port Elizabeth to Cape Town, two nights and a full 
day -I was loaned a precious first edition in two 
volumes of Anthony Trollopefs book "South Africa", 
published in 1878.1 discovered that the great 
chronicler of Barsetshire, post office administrator and 
inventor of the red pillar box, had first traversed the 
country in 1877, exactly one hundred years to the very 
month before me. I was enthralled by his writing. Much 
later I bought a reprinted edition, and have selected 
several quotations to begin some of the chapters. His 
account was optimistic particularly about the prospects 
of expanded trade on the country's fortunes, though he 
was critical of many of the settlers' attitudes towards 
the native population, towards whom he developed 
considerable respect. 
3. The Genesis of the Thesis 
The idea of turning the study into a thesis arose 
in discussion with the Centre of Southern African 
Studies at the University of York where I presented a 
seminar paper in February 1981. On the second visit to 
South Africa in 1980,1 had done some research with 
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employers and unions which served as a useful pilot 
study for the main fieldwork reported here. The 
Director of the Centre, Christopher Hill, agreed to act 
as supervisor (until he resigned from the post) and 
provided needed support and excellent contacts. 
Holding a full-time university post at Durham, 
where I carried a large administrative job managing a 
full-time MBA course, in addition to a full teaching 
load, meant that I did not use the Centre as much as I 
might have wished. Some Durham colleagues thought I was 
profligate to pay part-time tuition fees at York when 
in-house fees at Durham were waived for staff 
candidates. But there were significant advantages. 
Firstly, there was the range of contacts available 
through the academic staff at York. Anne Akeroyd, 
Landeg White and Harry Wilson were especially helpful. 
Secondly, there was the anonymity of York University's 
library (which has much more relevant South African 
material than Durham's) where I could work all day 
without distraction - no student of my own to plead for 
a late submission of an essay; no colleague to check my 
view of some burning campus issue brought on by the 
University's intensifying financial crisis. 
The main fieldwork for the thesis was done over a 
nine-month period in 1982/3, when I was able to take 
xxii 
advantage of that privileged opportunity of the 
academic, paid research leave. I again received a 
British Council travel grant for work specifically with 
black trade unions (which gave me the contacts necessary 
for research); and small grants for specified purposes 
from the Rowntree Charitable Trust (for a report on 
Wilson Rowntree), the British Academy (for a visit to 
the United States) and the University of Durham (for 
visits to Brussels, Geneva and Germany). 
This thesis reports that research. It deals with 
four themes which are inexorably interlinked: 
the political policy of Western governments known 
as "constructive engagement"; 
the responses of multinational companies to that 
policy; 
iii) the "new dispensation" of the South African 
government on labour matters that emanated from 
the Wiehahn report; and 
iv) the consequential growth of the black trade union 
movement. 
Robin Smith 
Durham 
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CHAPTER I 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
"He who would give the black man the vote is generally 
the black man's most advanced friend, the direct enemy 
of the iron-rodder'l and is to be found in London 
rather than in South Africa. To such a one I would 
certainly say let the black man have the franchise on 
the same terms as the white man. In broadening or 
curtailing the privilege of voting there should be no 
expressed reference to colourve. 
Anthony Trollope 1878 
South Africa V01.2 Chp. 17 
I'South African society is in a state of flux. old 
alliances and loyalties are breaking down,, powerful new 
social forces emerging. Change is the talk of the day - 
and indeed there is little that is static in a volatile, 
unstable and conflict-ridden environment". 
South African ReVieW 1983 
. Editorial p. 1 
1 
Introduction 
The notion of change is clearly no stranger to 
South Africa. At the time of Trollope's visit in 1877 
he found it the most fascinating and the most diverse of 
all the British colonies, and he had visited many: 
Canada, the West Indies, Australia and New Zealand, and 
the eastern seaboard of the United States which he still 
regarded as exhibiting colonial features. The reason 
for this was that he recognised the intractability of 
the "question of the coloured peoples". Unlike Canada, 
Australia or New Zealand, South Africa could not exist 
solely for the colonists. Resolving what is termed "the 
national question" is still top of the agenda over a 
century later. 
This chapter introduces a study of labour and 
management in the modern context of change. The purpose 
is to set out the author's objectives in carrying out 
such a study; to describe the organisation of the 
subsequent chapters; and to give an account of the 
methods used to gather information. The research 
conducted by the author inside companies and with trade 
unions is best described as 'action research' - 
gathering information in exchange for participation in 
training and development work. 
2 
PART I: OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT OF THE THESIS 
1.1 The Nature of the study 
Nineteen seventy-seven was an important year for 
industrial relations in South Africa. At home, it was 
the year the government appointed the Wiehahn Commission 
to examine all aspects of labour legislation. Abroad, 
it was the year the European Council of Ministers urged 
the nine Community members to adopt a code of conduct on 
labour matters for European-owned subsidiaries of 
multinationals, and the year in which the Reverend Leon 
H. Sullivan, of Philadelphia, USA, published his 
principles for American multinationals. Labour 'issues 
were high on both the domestic and the international 
political agenda. The whites talked easily of change, 
of the ending of institutional apartheid, with 
employment being the first arena for experiment. 
The idea of Western governments using 
multinationals as vehicles for political change was 
intriguing. The economic power of these corporations, 
relative to that of sovereign states, had become an 
increasingly important socio-political topic during the 
1970s. At the beginning of that decade, Fortune had 
estimated the sales revenue of the largest 
multinationals General Motors, Exxon, Ford, Royal 
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Dutch Shell - to be equal to or greater than the gross 
national product of middle-ranking European powers such 
as Denmark, Norway, Austria, Finland and Greece. They 
were supranational in a political as well as an economic 
sense. By 1977 they were perceived by Western 
governments as ideal conduits for promoting acceptable 
values of fair treatment between the races at the place 
of employment in the troubled country of South Africa# 
what Jackson termed "the need for prodding from without" 
(Jackson 1974). This was sold to the world as a policy 
of "constructive engagement". 
This thesis is about power: the power to'influence 
the course of events. The principal actors in'the study 
are the subsidiaries of, multinational corporations 'and 
the emerging unions for black workers they faced. 'To 
understand how and why a relationship developed between 
the principal actors, ' it-is necessary to consider the 
roles of the supporting cast: the head offices of 
multinationals; the international trade union movement; 
other international agencies; foreign governments; the 
established employers' organisations and trade unions in 
South Africa; and, not least, the government of the 
Republic itself. All of these parties had a stake in the 
process of change: all attempted to influence the 
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outcome. 
Following Knorr's definitions of power (1973) it 
can be seen that power may be lactualised' or 
'putative'. Putative power resides in the capabilities 
of a party to make effective threats: such a party must 
therefore have the capacity to execute the threat if 
necessary, otherwise the gesture is empty. Actualised 
power resides with the already powerful, those who have 
already exercised effective influence and can do so 
again. The wielding of power can be done coercively 
(when fear is used to compel acquiescence) or 
non-coercively by negotiation or trade off. The thesis 
is an analysis of the relationship between those with 
actualised economic power (the employers), those with 
actualised political power (governments) and those with 
putative power (organised labour) challenging for the 
first time on a serious scale the actualised power of 
the others. 
1.2 seven objectives 
The author. identified seven objectives in preparing 
this thesis. They are listed below in sequence: 
i) to consider why South Africa became the 
object of the constructive engagement policy 
of labour codes; 
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to trace the history of labour and 
management's attempts to exert influence on 
South Africa's industrial relations; 
iii) to determine the relationship if any between 
the codes and other forces pushing-for change 
inside the country; 
iv) to find out the attitudes of the parties to 
the codes and their assessment of the part 
the codes played in the process of change; 
V) to examine what the operation of the codes 
reveals about relations between head offices 
and subsidiaries of multinational companies; 
vi) to evaluate the part the codes actually 
played in the process of change; and 
vii) to form a judgement about whether the 
putative power of black trade unions is 
likely to be sufficient for them to succeed 
in challenging the hegemony of the 
white-ruled state. 
1.3 The Content of the Thesis 
The thesis presents the findings on these seven 
objectives in sequential order. Chapter 2 ("Labour, 
Management and Political Chancre") traces the, outline of 
events between 1910 and 1977 when the emolovers and 
unions attempted with varying success to exert power not 
only against each other but in relation to the South 
African government. Chapter 3 ("Codes and Sanctions") 
examines why particularly the labour codes policy 
emerged, referring to South Africa's diminishing world 
status and to the debates about sanctions. 
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The significance of multinationals in the South 
African economy, and the nature of control in these 
companies, are the subjects of Chapter 4 ("Employers and 
Capital"). The theories of organised worker power and 
of union growth, and their relevance to the South 
African case, are considered in Chapter 5 ("The 
Mobilisation of Labour"). This chapter also outlines a 
model and four hypotheses on mobilisation. In Chapter 6 
("The New Dispensation") the significance of reforms in 
the labour field following the enactment of most of the 
recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission is considered. 
The findings of the company case studies and 
interviews with management, trade unionists and others 
are presented in the next three chapters. Chapter 7 
("Employer Attitudes to Change") looks at the influences 
on policy making inside the case study companies. 
Chapter 8 ("The Saaa of Wilson Rowntreell) is 
specifically devoted to one company which gained world 
notoriety for its handling of the black union question. 
Chapter 9 ("Union Attitudes to Change") presents 
evidence on how the rival union groups assessed each 
others' strengths and weaknesses. 
Chapter 10 ("An Evaluation of the Codes") assesses 
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the part the codes-played in the process of change. 
Chapter 11 ("From Mobilisation to Revolution? ") uses the 
model outlined in Chapter 5 to form a judgement on the 
perennial question about whether the black unions are 
capable of wielding enough power to defeat apartheid. 
What follows is a catalogue of some honest 
endeavours to achieve the objectives of the codes; of 
gross indifference on the part of some; and efforts at 
manipulative camouflage on the part of a few. The whole 
ethos of capitalism - "business before politics" - in 
most respects conflicts with the idea of using companies 
as agents for foreign policy. Their tendency when 
caught up in political crossfire is to retreat behind 
the nearest barricade. only a handful of multinationals 
experienced in politically-sensitive businesses like oil 
appeared to relish their involvement with the codes. 
It is easy to criticise the-codes on many grounds, 
and to dismiss them on grounds of irrelevance to South 
Africa's concerns. Some broadsides fired early in the 
life of the codes were premature, based purely on 
opposition to' the moderate principle, of constructive 
engagement when nothing but total withdrawal would do 
(see: Rogers 1980; Schmidt 1980). In this work, it is 
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argued that the codes have played, only a small part in 
the labour scene as it emerged in the period under 
study. However, there is'some merit in them; and 
probably the best course of action for Western 
governments is to reform them rather than abandon them, 
a gesture it would be all too easy to misconstrue. In 
the short term, we are probably'stuck with them. 
1.4 The-Timescale of the-Inggiries 
This study of South African labour affairs focuses 
on events between 1979 and 1985. The first three years 
were years of unprecedented economic boom, and this 
undoubtedly helped the adoption of new ideas on labour- 
management relations, and employers to absorb large pay 
increases. But already by the end of 1982t the 
recession was beginning to bite, though it was still- a 
period of relative stability. After 1982 things began to 
totter. The government in Pretoria produced a new 
Itricameral constitution' which firmly excluded blacks. 
Schools were on strike; townships blazed; nasty 
practices of blacks on those suspected of 
'collaboration' were widely reported. The economy 
seemed in a tailspin-and the rand, that'erstwhile symbol 
of financial rectitude, cascaded downwards. Firms 
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announced redundancies; union leaders were on trial or 
in jail. A few well-known overseas companies threatened 
closure and withdrawal, though "business reasons" 
predominated_, as the public excuse for departure. The 
period ends with evidence that the unions were making 
massive efforts to regain the political initiative 
within the black community. This comes largely in the 
form of the creation of a wholly new, much more overtly 
political union confederation. 
PART II: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.5. Fieldwork in South Africa 
The 'process of selecting suitable 'locations 'for 
fieldwork and carrying out the inquiries was not 
straight-forward. Sensitivities - abound' 'in most 
industrial relations situations that can confound the 
unwary researcher. In South Africa these sensitivities 
are greatly magnified because the spotlight of world 
attention is focused on the subject. Before anyone 
answers a question, the researcher can observe them 
silently asking themselves: why does he want to know 
that? what will he do with the information I give him? 
The important underlying race question merely adds 
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further to this sensitivity. 
It is not uncommon for visitors to be confronted by 
the argument that the problems of South Africa are so 
unique they defy coventional analysis. This notion is 
completely rejected. That South Africa's problems may 
defy conventional prescription is readily granted, but 
that is a wholly different matter. Surely, the simple 
lesson to be gained from the work of generations of 
social scientists who have examined South African 
problems is that it is possible to proceed with models 
and hypotheses that permit inquiry of a kind that could 
be found in any industrialised society. Nothing in the 
writings of that champion of "anything goes" scientific 
methodology, Feyerabend (1978), allows for any exception 
to the universal principles of inquiry. It is probably a 
mistake to allow South Africans to see themselves as sui 
generis. 
The pilot study carried out in 1980 at the plant of 
Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd. confirmed the 
obvious point, that people are less suspicious of a 
researcher if that researcher can establish some 
"credibility". Credibility, in-this context means that 
the introductions must be right: the researcher 
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approaches the intended subject through an intermediary 
trusted by the subject, hoping that some of the aura of 
acceptability rubs off on to him. It -was therefore 
relevant to this research to accept, the offer as a 
working base of an academic whose unit -the Industrial 
Relations Unit at the University of Port Elizabeth - had 
established widely recognised credibility through its 
work with practitioners on both sides of the management 
- labour divide. This opened up access to a large range 
of individuals and institutions; and it was from them on 
the whole that the companies for detailed study were 
chosen. 
The second aspect of credibility arises once access 
has been gained: how can the researcher optimise his 
opportunity to prick the public relations, veneer of a 
business, that natural-desire to present itself in the 
best possible light, or the understandable reluctance of 
black trade unionists to reveal to a white researcher 
the information which he seeks?, After discussing this 
dilemma with other academic researchers, the writer 
determined that the way forward was to present himself 
to the parties not primarily as a researcher -gathering 
data for publication, but as a specialist teacher with 
something to offer. The research intention was never 
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hidden from anyone: but the offer of service was a most 
helpful device to establish a working relationships with 
individuals and groups. By mounting a series of 
seminars for company managers and trade unionists, it 
proved possible to abstract information in the course of 
discussions without appearing to be the classical 
researcher in a supplicant role simply consuming the 
respondent's valuable time. 
Access was gained to eight multinational 
subsidiaries for case study purposes - three with 
British parentage, two American, one German, one Dutch 
and one Belgian. These firms were: Cadbury Schweppes, 
Wilson Rowntree, Barclays National Bank, Ford, Johnson & 
Johnson, Volkswagen, Aberdare Cables and Industex. 
Detailed interviews were also carried out with managers 
from four more subsidiaries - two British, one American 
and one German (Standard Chartered, ICI, Carborundum. 
Universal and Siemens). Table 1.1 lists the details of 
numbers of interviews. Three subsidiaries of the South 
Africa multinationaLholding company, Barlow Rand, were 
also investigated. Barlow had adopted its own code 
partly based on the European and Sullivan approaches. An 
indigenous firm acted as a control: it was possible to 
assess how locally-owned firms had moved and compare 
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this with the general movement of the multinational 
subsidiaries. Thus in total the managers of fifteen 
firms contributed data for analysis in this thesis. 
1.6 The 'Workshops, 
Each management seminar took the form of a 
workshop, which consisted of a day's activity designed 
to examine a particular company's industrial relations 
and consider ways of improving them. The role as tutor 
was to introduce the subject material, usually in the 
form of a short lecture about the current external 
forces shaping the system inside the firm. Participants 
- drawn from line managers and supervisors - would then 
work in syndicates, collectively answering questions 
about decision-making and management responsibilities 
within the firm; evaluating their own firm against 
others they believed to be 'good' or -*bad,; and 
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their own 
system. Together the syndicates could then frame 
recommendations for improvement which would be put by 
them to personnel management at the conclusion of the 
workshop. 
It was not possible to carry out workshops like 
\ to page 16 
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_Table 
1.1 
MANAGERS AND TRADE UNIONISTS INTERVIEWED 
IN THE COMPANY INQUIRIES 
A) Case Studies at Multinationals 
No. of Manaqers No. 
-of 
TU Officers 
Countrv of Course Course 
Comioanv origin Intervwd. Members Intervwd. Members 
(Footnote 1) 
VW Germany 4 25 3 2 
Ford USA 24 2 8 
Cadbury UK 32 2 4 
Schweppes 
Wilson UK 2- 5 - 
Rowntree 
Barclays UK 5 8 - 
National 
Johnson USA 3- 5 - 
& Johnson 
Aberdare Nethrlds. 32 3 - 
Cables 
Industex(2) Belgium 5 32 4 - 
B) Case Studies at Barlow Rand Subsidiaries 
Middleberg 33 - - 
Steel & Alloy 
Plascon-Evans 2 18 2 - 
Palmiet 2 20 1 - 
C)--Interviews at other Multinational Subsidiaries 
Standard UK 3 30 8 - 
Chartered 
Carborundum. USA 22 - - 
Universal 
Siemens Germany 2- 2 - 
ICI UK 2 4 - 
TOTALS INTERVIEWED: Managers: 47; T. Unionists: 36 (note 1) 
ON COURSES: Managers: 138; T. Unionists: 14 (note 3) 
Footnotes: See overleaf 
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Footnotes to Table 1.1: 
(1) Some union officers interviewed provided information on more 
than one company; therfore the total of interviewees has 
been reduced to avoid double-counting. Nine further 
trade unionists were interviewed for general information 
(see table 1.2). 
(2) Two plants under the same ownership: Industex (pty) Ltd. 
and Wellington Industries (pty) Ltd. 
(3) A further 33 trade unionists attended various courses and 
provided information relevant to this thesis but had no 
connection with these particular companies. 
this in every one of the eleven main companies studied. 
Six workshops were run altogether, two being for the two 
separate plants of the same firm, thus covering five of 
the eleven main companies. The researcher decided that 
he had sufficient information about six further firms 
from sources other than workshops to include them as 
main companies. But in addition several multi-firm 
workshops and courses were run under the auspices of the 
Industrial Relations Unit which included managers from 
five other firms in the total of fifteen listed in Table 
1.1. 
All this provided a total of forty-seven managers 
interviewed in a conventional sense, and a further 138 
participating in workshops on industrial relations which 
facilitated the systematic collection of data. 
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However, no matter how valuable these related methods 
were for understanding decision-making inside 
organisations, especially between subsidiary and -head 
office and within the subsidiary itself, they do -not 
constitute an opinion survey. The temptation has been 
resisted to try and aggregate the responses of all 185 
individual managers such that 1164 percent think this" or 
1123 percent do not believe that". This -would be a 
distortion of the data. Also, the, chosen method of 
working with collective syndicate opinions at workshops 
deliberately precluded individual views from surfacing 
by the operation of the synergy principle. 
Apart from direct contact with the companies listed 
in Table 1.10, representatives of employers' 
associations, Chambers of Commerce and the public sector 
corporation, South African Transport Services, which 
operates ports and railways, were interviewed . South 
African Chambers of Commerce are organised on the French 
principle rather than the British: that is to say, they 
represent large firms in the manufacturing sector rather 
than small traders. The Midland Chamber, based in Port 
Elizabeth, was particularly helpful with local contacts. 
The researcher was invited by the Director to assist him 
in 'his efforts to resolve a bitter strike over union 
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recognition on the Port Elizabeth docks ,, but our 
combined attempt was unsuccessful: the strikers were 
arrested and bussed back to the Ciskei. A conciliation 
for the Industrial Council 'of the Cape Provincial 
Textile Manufacturing industry was-more successful. One 
member firm, Table Bay'Spinners, had been unionised by a 
FOSATU affiliate, the National, Union of' Tailoring 
Workers. In this industry, the Council recognised only 
the TUCSA affiliate, the Textile Workers Industrial 
Union. The researcher drafted a "representational 
agreement" for the company as a half way measure so it 
could deal directly with the new union (which 
represented over 90 percent of its employees) while 
still remaining members of the Council. The company and 
union accepted the agreement. 
The methods of- working with trade unionists, 
officers and shop stewards, followed similar paths to 
those of management. It was necessary to speak to 
trade unions in each of the 'main companies, and 
desirable in others -, only in one firm, Carborundum 
Universal, of those listed in Table 1.1 did a trade 
union contact not prove possible. ' despite efforts from 
the personnel manager. 'In five of the main companies 
and all of the other multinationals, independent contact 
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was made with the unions involved., In the remaining 
four (VW, Cadbury, Industex and one of the Barlow 
subsidiaries, Plascon) the contact was made via the 
firm. The case for contacting the unions independently 
to preserve impartiality was overwhelming, but in the 
firms mentioned the opportunity for independent contact 
was simply not present. Shop stewards at VW and Cadbury 
were clearly quite used to meeting foreign visitors, and 
the researcher was satisfied that introduction through 
the firm was no bar to research. In the other cases it 
was felt that the unions had reservations which could 
only partially be circumnavigated. 
The British Council scholarship awarded proved an 
indispensible way of bridging the credibility gap with 
trade unionists. The workshops and discussion groups 
for trade unions gave the researcher the status of 
'expert' in the subject of industrial relations: the 
researcher could input some skills development in areas 
like techniques of bargaining, and help generally on 
elementary research like interpreting consumer living 
and poverty datum indices for which little of their 
previous education had equipped them. Within two months 
unions were approaching the researcher for help (instead 
of the other way round), and each occasion provided a 
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research opportunity. Other introductions to local 
groups came through general secretaries of trade unions 
or third parties from the church or academia. The list 
of trade union contacts appears in Table 1.2. 
Some of these workshops created their own special 
difficulties. At a weekend school for activists of the 
CUSA group in the Eastern Cape Province, all the plenary 
discussion was in Xhosa, the language being interspersed 
with such terms as "collective bargaining", 
"consultation" and "shop steward", terms for which there 
is obviously no Xhosa equivalent. But it was the 
meeting in East London with the five senior SAAWU 
officials - including Thosamile Gqweta, just released 
from one period in police detention and about to undergo 
another - that remains particularly etched in the 
memory. It had been arranged by two intermediaries at a 
location kept secret until half-an-hour before the 
appointment. After answering only a couple of questions 
about the two companies with members in the survey 
(Johnson & Johnson and Wilson Rowntree), Thosamile 
Gqweta, the SAAWU President, launced into an eloquent 
tirade against the twin evils of apartheid and 
capitalism and the researcher's small part as a "white 
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Table 1.2 
UNIONS AND OFFICERS INTERVIEWED IN THE COURSE OF RESEARCH 
(1980 to 1983) 
No. of 
Affilia- Inter- 
Union Title tion Status viewees 
African Food & Canning Workers Union Unaff. U 2 
Amalgamated Engineering Union Unaff. R 1 
Chemical & Allied Workers Union TUCSA R 2 
Engineering & Allied Workers Union FOSATU R 2 
General Workers' Union Unaff. U 4 
Metal & Allied Workers Union FOSATU R 5 
Motor Assembly & Component Unaff. U 8 
Workers Union 
National Automobile & Allied FOSATU R 5 
Workers Union 
National Union Mineworkers CUSA U 1 
National Union Textile Workers FOSATU R 2 
S. A. Allied Workers Union Unaff. U 5 
S. A. Chemical Workers Union CUSA R 1 
S. A. Engine Drivers Firemen CONFED R 2 
& Operators Association 
S. A. Railways & Harbours CONFED R 2 
Employees Union 
S. A. Society Bank officials TUCSA R 4 
Steel Engineering & Allied CUSA R 2 
Workers Union 
Sweet Food & Allied Workers Union FOSATU R 5 
Textile Workers Industrial Union TUCSA R 2 
Transport & Allied Workers Union CUSA R 2 
Council of Unions of South Africa 1 
Federation of Unions of South Africa 1 
Trades Union Council of South Africa 2 
TOTAL No. of UNIONS 18 
TOTAL No. of UNION CENTRES 3 
TOTAL No. of OFFICERS 57 
(For Affiliations - see list of Abbreviations) 
Status: R= Registered U= Unregistered 
under the 1979 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (1979: 94) 
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lackey" in this system. All this 1. 
minutes, at which point Gqweta swept 
One of his officials stayed behind 
finish the interview. All in all, 
union activists from every major 
interviewed (where possible! ). 
asted about twenty 
out of the room. 
and we tried to 
fifty-seven trade 
union group were 
In addition to these representatives of management 
and labour, interviews were carried out with academic 
observers, journalists, officials from both the 
Department of Manpower and the National Manpower 
commission, plus three members of parliament (two 
Nationalists and one PFP). Journalists specialising in 
labour affairs were particularly helpful, and in two 
instances information was given that they had collected 
in their professional capacities about the seamier side 
of industrial relations which their editors had 
'spiked'. Interviews were conducted with some of the 
academics, managers and trade unionists who were in the 
process of establishing a Conciliation and Mediation 
Service independent of government, with a grant received 
from the Ford Foundation. other academic meetings often 
led to further useful contacts and certainly enabled the 
researcher to check out some of his judgements. He was 
also able to question Professor Wiehahn three years into 
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the reforms his Commission had instigated. 
1.7 Fieldwork Outside South Africa 
A key object of study in the eight multinationals 
in the main survey was the relationship between head 
office and subsidiary. It was therefore important as 
far as practicable to carry out interviews with head 
office management personnel. This was achieved directly 
with four headquarters - VW; Cadbury Schweppes; 
Rowntree; and Barclays. With Industex, the Belgian 
family owner was interviewed - it is not corporately 
controlled. With Johnson & Johnson interviews were held 
with one individual HQ manager who was visiting South 
Africa. No contact with Ford's head office was 
possible; but this was compensated for in part by 
raising the case with both the State Department and the 
Sullivan organisation. The only company where no 
corroborative information was gathered was Phillips NV 
concerning Aberdare Cables, and the reason for this is 
very relevant: Phillips regards Aberdare Cables as a 
'portfolio' investment, one which they have acquired by 
takeover, rather than a direct investment. They report 
under the EEC Code only for their direct investments: 
this European subsidiary therefore goes unreported. 
With government and inter-government organisations, 
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interviews were conducted with government officials in 
both the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the State 
Department, at the European commission and the 
International Labour Office. Participation in a seminar 
at the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
in Brussels allowed the gathering of information. The 
researcher saw the TUC in London and its counterpart in 
Washington, the AFL/CIO. In Philadelphia several hours 
were spent at the headquarters of the Sullivan 
Organisation, where interviews with senior Sullivan 
staff and a consultant from Arthur D. Little & 
Associates, who analyse the returns and prepare the 
annual reports on Sullivan signatories, were possible. 
The Washington offices of the Investor Responsibility 
Research Centre, a pressure group increasingly involved 
in South African issues, were visited. IRRC is a model 
of what may be termed "stakeholder power", that diverse 
body of interests from which the business corporation 
draws its legitimacy. 
Participation in and paper presentation at other 
seminars after the fieldwork - notably at the FCO, the 
Royal Institute for Foreign Affairs (Chatham House) and 
the Centre for Southern African Studies at York - all 
provided further opportunities for information 
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gathering. Much of the information obtained at 
seminars and by interviews was governed by "Chatham 
House Rules". These conventions stipulate that 
information and opinion may be used in reporting or 
research but may not be directly attributable to -a 
particular source. When presenting this information in 
the thesis it is indicated by the notation (CHR). - 
1.8 Written Sources 
Inevitably most of the written material used came 
from secondary sources, books, newspapers and other 
publications, and these are listed in the usual way in 
the bibliography. References contain the author's name 
and date (or newspaper) in the body of the text, with 
page number where appropriate. Primary sources consist 
of company and trade union documents, agreements and 
reports, some published and some unpublished. 
Unions were on the whole more co-operative about 
written material, but often so disorganised that it 
proved impossible to retrieve information even though 
the spirit was willing. Perhaps ironically, the one 
South African trade union centre that seemed 
meticulously organised over providing information, 
TUCSA, was the one that has since folded. In 
Yon . 4. tx t 
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determining-- data on trade union membership, the 
researcher telephoned individua1union headquarters in 
an attempt to update the work Shirley Miller (1982) had 
done at the University of Cape Town. Later estimates 
are based on reconciling the calculations made in 1982 
with the work of Peter Cunningham (1984) at UPE. - There 
is inevitably a ring of propaganda about some of the 
union claims, and the problem of disentangling paid up 
and non-paid up members. This applies particularly to 
most of the smaller black unions outside the old FOSATU 
and CUSA camps. 
1.9 fAction Research, 
The work reported in this -thesis is clearly 
qualitative rather than quantitaive. It is based partly 
on data gathered by conventional interviews with key 
actors inside South Africa, and partly as the product of 
"action research" as described-above. , It would have 
been impossible to proceed otherwise. The difficulties 
of impartiality in action research have long been 
discussed by social scientists - see for example: Talcot 
Parsons (1954); John Rex (1961); Karl Popper (1963); 
Feyerabend (1975 and 1978). Sir Karl Popper raised what 
he called "the Tristram Shandy paradox",, a dilemma for 
all branches of science. Man, alone and solitary on a 
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desert island, decides to carry out a study of the 
behaviour of the fauna he encounters. But how can he be 
certain that the behaviour he actually witnesses is that 
of the fauna as it always has been? It may be that the 
fauna in its behaviour is reacting to the unusual 
presence of Man. To this paradox the only answers are 
to minimise disturbance as far as possible, and to make 
the assumption that the observed behaviour is, in 'fact 
the true behaviour. And so the assumption of the social 
scientist must be that what is observed or, heard is what 
the subject would do or say even if the researcher were 
not there. In action research, -the researcher 
stimulates the subject to respond to his search for 
knowledge by such devices as the workshop, and by 
cross-checking, so--that an artificial response-has some 
chance of being rumbled. Giving something- back in 
return for information is part, of this methodology, and 
is therefore a wholly justifiable transaction on which 
to base research. 
Following the methods of Popper the author asserts 
a number of hypotheses which he attempts to test in 
various parts of the thesis. Popper is particularly 
dismissive of the inductive method of research: 
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... Induction, i. e. inference based on many 
observations, is a myth. It is neither a 
pyschological fact, nor a fact of ordinary 
life, nor one of scientific procedure. The 
actual procedure is to operate with 
conlectures: to jump to conclusions. 
Repeated observations and experiments 
function in science as tests of our 
conjectures or hypotheses i. e. as attempted 
refutations. 
(Popper 1963,, p. 53) 
It does not take long to realise that this is a 
rather intimidating 'presciption to follow closely. 
There seems no undue difficulty in conjecturing on the 
basis of some familiarity with the subject (even if 
prior experience'and familiarilty can be construed as 
prejudice). The real problems seem to lie in the 
refutation process. How can a researcher know when the 
point is reached where enough attempts at refutations 
have been made so that he can confidently proclaim his 
finding? This speculation was troubling the author 
until,, to borrow an advertiser's cliche, he "discovered" 
Feyerabend. That American Professor of Scientific 
Method is at heart concerned that the spirit of free 
inquiry should not be dampened by an over-fussiness of 
procedure. Dealing specifically with the , popperarian 
school", he writes: 
28 
.... The principles of critical rationalism 
... give an 
inadequate account of the past 
development of science and are liable to 
hinder science in the future. They give an 
inadequate account of science because science 
is much more "sloppy" and "irrational" than 
its methodological image. 
(Feyerabend 1975, p. 179) 
Clearly this is no justification per se for 
I'sloppiness"or "irrationality" in-research; -, but it does 
undoubtedly boost confidence to learn that virtually all 
researchers have difficulties of Ofit' between theory 
and observations. Whether this thesis passes- Popper's 
stern test or Feyerabend's easier one is for the reader 
to judge. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LABOUR, p XANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
"I will not say but that in coming ages a Kafir may make 
as good a Prime Minister as Lord Beaconsfield. But he 
cannot do so now, -nor in this age, -nor for many ages 
to come. It will be sufficient for us if we can make up 
our minds that at least for the next hundred years we 
shall not choose to be ruled by him". 
Anthony Trollope 1878 
South Africa Vol. 1 Chp. 4 
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Introduction 
In our age, the ultimate meaning of political 
change in a country on the African continent is that its 
destiny shall fall into the hands of the majority 
population. Although the century of grace for white 
rule envisaged by Trollope has now expired, there is no 
realistic expectation that a black is likely to become 
Prime Minister in the short term. Yet there have been 
significant changes. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the role of organised labour and management in 
the process of political changes that led to the 
appointment of the Wiehahn commission in 1977, and 
generally to consider relations between those actors and 
the state in an effort to determine where the force of 
influence lay. 
In Section 1, there is a discussion of whether 
capitalism as an economic system is at odds with the 
political system we have come to call apartheid, or 
whether the particular form of capitalism that has 
emerged in South African finds apartheid congenial. 
Section 2 examines labour relations in the first 
fourteen years since the founding of the Dominion, and 
records examples of white worker power that had the 
capacity to defeat employers and to thwart the 
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government. The period ended dramatically with a strike 
of white miners on the Rand which heralded in a major 
shift in power. 
Section 3 continues the historical survey from 1924 
to 1947, concentrating on the emergence of a legally 
regulated system of labour relations with a well-defined 
role for the state, but one which largely excluded 
blacks who were becoming increasingly important to the 
economy. In 1948, the election of the Nationalist party 
committed to a programme of apartheid changed the 
dynamics of labour and management influence, and this is 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 then considers the 
series of crises, begining with the Durban strikes in 
1973,, that undermined many of the government's 
assumptions, and led to the appointment of the Wiehahn 
Commission. 
The Problem Emerges 
Labour relations in any society are shaped by a 
complex interplay of economic, political and legal 
forces. They reflect as well as express the conflicting 
ideologies of which a society is composed. South Africa 
labour relations reflect the conflicts of interest 
between the owners and managers of business on the one 
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hand, and groups of employees on the other. But they 
also reflect the politics, practices and traditions of 
race which have for so long resulted in the suppression 
of the rights and liberties of the subordinate blacks by 
the dominant whites. Douwes Dekker has observed that: 
.... one of the few points of leverage at the disposal of the majority lies in the use of what 
can roughly be termed Ilabour power'. 
(Douwes Dekker 1975, p. 207) 
It is not therefore surprising that the roles of 
management and organised labour in the process of change 
is nowhere debated more keenly than in South Africa. As 
black employees have shown a increasing propensity to 
organise since the mid-1970's, expectations have risen 
among radicals and fears mounted among conservatives 
that the black trade union movement may mobilise through 
collective action on a scale significant enough to 
induce revolutionary change, not merely to abolish 
apartheid but to assist in bringing centuries of white 
political hegemony to an end. 
South African business, when set against the 
intransigence of the government , has often been cast 
in a liberal mould, sitting uncomfortably with apartheid 
policies. Greenberg (1981) has recorded that when the 
Nationalists first unveiled their racist proposals in 
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the late 19401's-, representatives of mining and 
manufacturing sought to draw government's attention to: 
... political impediments in the market (that 
could) discourage capitalist enterprise, and 
that growth - its technology, bounty, and 
markets - would in any case undermine the' 
efficacy of such racial barriers. 
(Greenberg, 1981, p. 667) 
This belief - that political reform will be facilitated 
through economic advancement - is a recurring one. In 
1967 Horwitz declared that: 11 
the South African economy is inescapably 
integrated in the pursuit of productivity. 
Economic rationality urges that polity 
forward beyond its ideology. 
(Horwitz 1967, p. 405)- 
Business leaders have, not surprisingly, been frequent 
advocates of change through growth, and have criticised 
those government policies which have constrained their 
activities. Harry Oppenheimer has long argued the 
responsibility of business to lobby for effective 
reform; indeed, this line of argument is often called 
"the Oppenheimer Thesis". A younger Anglo American 
manager, Michael O'Dowd, has argued that capitalism and 
free enterprise are "equalising factors" which 
"breakdown barriers to the mobility of labour" and lead 
to "compartmentations which create pockets of 
34 
privilege". Government "is constantly being required, to 
shore the colour bar up against the forces of 
capitalism" (O"Dowd 1978). 
Curtis (1984) termed these liberal arguments as the 
"conventional neo-classical analysis" of apartheid: the 
government interferes with the free market for labour; 
Africans receive less and whites more than their 
marginal product suggests; and as a result apartheid is 
irrational because it reduces efficiency and 
profitability. Curtis contrasts the neo-classical view 
with the Marxists' analysis that asserts that apartheid 
is essential to capitalism, because it maintains the 
cheap labour system and thus ensures profitability by 
keeping labour costs artificially low, with the state's 
prime function being the subjugation of workers by 
force. 
John Rex is a notable proponent of the Marxist 
argument. In the early 1970's Rex was writing that: 
.... the full implications of the system for the exploitation of native labour are only 
now being realised. Far from there being any 
historical equivalent of slave emancipation 
in the case of this slave labour system and 
far from the economic system in which it is 
embedded being in decline, the definition of 
the native workers' position has become 
sharper and sharper, and the economy has 
remained in good heart. 
(Rex 1974, p. 48) 
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Apartheid is highly functional for capitalism, Rex 
argues, and the latter has evolved new means of control: 
.... What 
is interesting about some forms of 
slave labour used in South Africa is that 
they enable the employer to control a variety 
of forms of legitimate violence that he may 
use against his workers, but at the same time 
do not require that he should buy the workers 
for life and be responsible for the workers 
for life. The achievement of this state of 
affairs represents. a considerable advance in 
rationality over the slave system. Indeed, 
it might be said to be the most perfect 
system of labour exploitation yet devised. 
(Rex 1974, p. 50) 
Greenberg and Curtis demur from both the 
neo-classical and the Marxist positions. "The 
businessman's role in a racial order is, to say the 
least ambiguous", Greenberg has written: 
... The businessman pictures himself as ; 
reoccupied with business decisions and 
requirements, indifferent to the politics, 
racial conflict and domination that swirl 
around him. If sometimes distracted from this 
managerial focus, he is at least confident 
that "the well-tried laws of economics cannot 
be denied in the long run". 
(Greenberg 1980, p. 129) 
Curtis finds that the relationship between apartheid and 
capitalism is "uneven and contradictory, and not 
reducible to a simple essential result" (Curtis 1984j, 
p. 395). Writing from the perspective of 1978 after the 
Soweto riots, Kane-Berman found that "to some extent 
growth has compelled a liberalising of racist law and 
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practice", but he detects the dominating trend to be: 
.... not the relaxation of the central 
policies of apartheid but their 
strengthening. Rather than- allow 
industrialisation and growth to undermine 
those policies, governments have devised 
measures not only to keep them intact but to 
amplify them .... Apartheid has thus- been 
modernised not in the direction of greater 
liberalisation but in the direction of more 
extensive and more systematic controls. 
(Kane-Berman 1978, p. 85) 
We can infer from this debate that the neo-classical and 
Marxist explanations of the relations between business 
and apartheid are at opposite ends of a continuum. 
- 
Both of these polarised views draw upon,, the often 
heard observation that South Africa is a, classical 
example of "economic dualism". Dualism is the product 
of the different economic and social forces which have 
shaped the country over long periods of time, with the 
result that it has both a sophisticated modern sector, 
in some parts as advanced as any in the world and in 
mining technology ahead, which sits cheek by jowel with 
an impoverished subsistence sector. The neo-classical 
view holds that as the traditional sector is 
increasingly incorporated into the modern, the pressure 
for change intensifies; whereas the Marxists hold that 
apartheid is the means by which the modern white sector 
dominates the traditional black. 
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"Dualism" is of course by no means uniquely South 
African. In their exercise in futurology, Kahn and 
Wiener (1967) examined twenty four countries in Africa, 
Asia, the Middle East, and South and Central America, 
all of which mixed varying but significant proportions 
of traditional and primitive with modern. In 
practically all these countries they predicted a 
widening of dualism, and a consequent worsening of its 
social effects, by the end of the century. Development 
studies in the two decades since then appear to confirm 
empirically this prediction. However, Kahn and Wiener 
noted that only in South Africa of all twenty four 
countries studied was the cleavage between traditional 
and modern sectors reinforced by both ideology and 
racist legislation. Thus it seems improbable that it 
is dualism in South Africa per se which gives rise to 
apartheid, as the privileged defend their gains against 
the underprivileged. If apartheid were removed, it 
seems prima facie to be unlikely that the separate 
sectors of the economy would necessarily become more 
unified by virtue of the society being more open. The 
first step along the road to test these conjectures is 
to examine the interactions of government, management 
and labour in the creation of the present society, and 
to determine how relevant the last two parties have been 
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to the process of political change. 
, 
2.2 White Worker Power: 
-1910 - 
1924 
It is the main thrust of the neo-classical argument 
that coating the dualistic nature of the economy with 
the cloak of apartheid is a nonsense. A sophisticated 
economy requires employees to be reasonably educated and 
capable of skills training, to attend regularly at work 
as well as disciplined while there, and to be free from 
state harassment that directly affects their ability to 
work. circumscription of market forces by, the state - 
including the denial of rights - greatly reduces 
business efficiency. Guelke (1974) has pointed out that 
at least some employers have -complained about 
state-supported discrimination in the labour market 
adversely affecting their businesses long before the 
Nationalists came to power, He quotes the managing 
director of a diamond mine, giving evidence in 1908 to 
the Transvaal Commission on Wages, who said: 
.... The trouble with white miners, whatever they might be paid, is that you can't search 
them, and cannot put them in a compound. You 
can't put them in detention houses at the end 
of a period of a service to see that they 
don't take any diamonds out. To be perfectly 
candid, you could have them on strike - you 
cannot have a big industry like this 
dependent on labour that can go out anyday. 
(Guelke 1974, p. 101) 
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This is hardly 'liberal' in the sense of being 
compassionate. But it is liberal in the sense of a 
perceived restraint on employers: for as Guelke 
concludes, the essential difference between white and 
black labour - now as then - was the whites' immense 
political clout and their "excessive cost" in pure 
labour market terms. 
The newly-formed, government of the Union of South 
Africa in 1910 presided over a burgeoning and often 
turbulent. mining industry, the sheer scale of which: 
.... marked the start of collective labour history in earnest. Labour was scarce, and 
the demand was met in two ways: first, 
Mozambique blacks, Chinese and Indians from 
Natal were recruited .... Secondly, skilled 
white workers were attracted from abroad at 
wage rates sufficient to induce them to come 
to South Africa. The result of this latter 
measure was that the white labour force, many 
of whom were acquainted with unions, had 
little hestitation in using the strike 
weapon. 
(Piron and Le Roux 1986, p. 21) 
By the end of the first World War, white labour was no 
longer so scarce, although skills were still at a 
premium. Many whites entered less skillful employment 
and they set out to establish a 'whiteO standard of 
living, principally by demanding job reservation at 
protected wages. 
In 1913 there was a strike in the gold mines, the 
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outcome of which was seen largely as a victory for the 
trade unions. Membership grew as a result, and unions 
spread to other sectors of the economy. - A strike on the 
railways in 1914 found the government more prepared; 
Martial Law was declared, troops and police deployed, 
and nine union leaders deported - they were subsequently 
returned at the government's expense. A government 
inquiry proposed a new system of negotiating machinery 
and conciliation in disputes, but the Bill was strongly 
opposed by organised white labour and their 
representatives in Parliament. The pressure succeeded 
and the Bill was withdrawn. The unions appeared to 
believe that they could attain their goals without the 
straight-jacket of legislation. In 1915 they won de 
facto recognition from the Chamber of Mines, and 
achieved national negotiations in the printing industry. 
In 1919 a conciliation board was established for the 
Natal coal mines (Piron and Le Roux 1986, p. 22) 
Non-white labour showed little capacity to organise 
in this period. The Native Labour Regulation Act of 
1913 outlawed strikes and regulated the movement of 
migrant labour. Despite this Act there was a strike of 
black miners in 1920 which was put down by police 
action. More significantly, the Industrial and 
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Commercial Workers Union, which was formed in the Cape 
Town docks in 1919, won concessions from the dock 
employers as a result of its first strike. 
In 1922, there occurred the most dramatic and 
violent social conflict in the Dominion"s short history: 
the bitterly contested strike between some 22,000 white 
miners and the Chamber of Mines on the Rand. The white 
miners were protesting about the owners' plans to 
introduce more native labour. "The strike", Williams 
has written: 
.... with all its racist and insurrectionist 
overtones was the final militant expression 
of closed craft protecting itself against 
encroachment by both profit-seeking 
capitalism and cheap labour competitors. 
(Williams 1979, p. 68) 
The white miners won some of their demands, but the 
strike persuaded the Government that a framework for 
labour relations was now unavoidable. The employers, 
led by the Chamber of Mines, lobbied intensively for 
action to redress a situation they plainly saw as 
anarchy (Walker and Weinbren 1961, p. 91 et seq. ). 
In these formative years in the life of the Union 
of South Africa, white worker power was a vital 
ingredient. Built on the reality of skills shortagest 
and strengthened by collective action driven not by 
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officers but by the members, artisans explored the 
extent to which employers would concede their 
economistic demands. As the events of 1922 showed, the 
unions were not always in control once mobilisation was 
underway. But white workers exhibited more ' than 
industrial muscle, they also elected Labour members to 
the Union parliament who articulated their demands 
directly to the government. The employers, by contrast, 
though also with their spokesmen in parliament and with 
contacts in government itself, were less well organised. 
Their competitive business instincts were not 
sufficiently overcome when dealing with labour matters 
that they could present a united front. They certainly 
were not yet able to force a regulative system of 
industrial relations, which was clearly in their 
interests, to emerge (Davies 1978). 
2.3 The Rise Of EmRloyer Power: 1924 - 1947 
But power in the labour, market shifted decisively 
in the aftermath of the great strike of 1922. It seemed 
that white worker power had over-reached itself in the 
process of anarchic conflict. The 1924 Industrial 
Conciliation Act that followed directly upon the strike 
was in many ways a victory for employers (Lever 1977; 
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Davies 1978). 
The Bill's passage in parliament was opposed both 
by the twelve Labour members and the larger body of 
Nationalists. One Labour member claimed in debate that 
the Bill marked an acceptance of the power of the 
Chamber of Mines as "top dogs in South Africa" (quoted 
by Lever 1977, p. 18). During the strike there appears 
to have been considerable collusion between on the one 
hand Prime Minister General Smuts and his United Party 
government, and on the other the Chamber of Mines, to 
defeat the strikers (Walker and We. inbren 1961, p. 97). 
Smuts' 1924 Industrial conciliation 'Act survived 
his party's defeat at the general election in the same 
year by a coalition between Labour and the Nationalists. 
Indeed, it endured with relatively few amendments for 
fifty-six years, until the Wiehahn reforms of 1980. Its 
four main principles were: 
i) the registration of trade unions; 
ii) the regulation of industrial disputes; 
iii) the establishment of industry-wide machinery 
for collective bargaining; and 
iv) the creation of the Department of Labour. 
Davies notes that the proposals for recognition of the 
unions and the negotiation of agreements through 
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conciliation boards that had binding effect came from 
the Chamber of Mines, strongly supported by, the printing 
employers and the railways, rather than from the labour 
side (Davies 1978, pps. 91/2). 
More positively for the unions, the Act permitted 
those that were registered to gain access to machinery 
for settling basic wages rates within each industry, 
thus granting them de facto recognition by employers, 
though at one remove from the level of the individual 
firm. on the negative side, the Act limited the 
definition of a lawful strike by laying down a. tight 
procedure, with severe penalties for , unlawful strike 
activity taken before this new procedure was exhausted. 
The Act's principles were however accepted by white 
union leaders, for as Davies concludes: 
one thing had changed in the wake of the 
strike of 1922 - there was a much greater 
level of political commitment on the part of 
the dominant class to making an industrial 
relations system work effectively. 
, 
(Davies 1978j, p. 100) 
The new industrial relations system quickly took 
shape. From two industrial councils in existence at the 
time of the Act, there were twenty-six by 1929 and 
forty-three by 1931 which by then covered the main 
manufacturing sectors (Davies 1978, p. 103). The 1925 
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Wages Act was as a "back-up" piece of legislation' to 
protect unorganised white labour not covered by the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, and the 1926 Mines and 
Works Amendment Act was the rockbed of white job 
reservation. Together with the Industrial Conciliation 
Act, these were the other two statutory pillars of what 
General Hertzog referred to as "the civilised labour 
policy" (Williams 1979, p. 71). 
The fear of whites that blacks would undercut their 
wages was still prevalent. Amendments in 1930 and 1937 
to the Industrial Conciliation Act empowered councils to 
set rates for African labour in an effort to prevent 
employers using blacks as cheaper substitutes. Job 
reservations were extended. The aim behind these 
measures was well encapsulated by Orde Brown in his 1933 
analysis of the racial wage divide: 
The objection is not to the black man as 
such, but to his standard of living: he 
notoriously is content with far poorer 
conditions than those of the European, and 
can tolerate circumstances much inferior to 
those considered essential for the white man. 
If therefore he were permitted to flood the 
market for skilled labour, a general lowering 
of wages would result, with a corresponding 
depression of the standard of living: the 
'Poor white' class would be reinforced to 
make room for a number of Africans negligible 
when compared with the total population, and 
a general degredation of conditions would 
ensue which would benefit no-one but the 
capitalist employer, and would eventually 
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prove harmful to the black, quite as much as 
to the white, worker. This state of affairs 
is stoutly defended in the interests of both 
races. 
(Orde Brown 1933, p. 118) 
The government also decreed as part of its 
"civilised labour" policy that all areas of public 
employment and contractors working with the public 
sector should follow its example, thus effectively 
eliminating cheaper tenders based on cheaper wages. By 
the end of the 1930's, despite economic recession, the 
government had met its principal objective, the 
reduction of the "poor white" problem, a result which 
owed nothing to direct union action against the 
employer. Rather it brought about a state of affairs 
where white workers: 
.... were encouraged to look toýthe State for their protection and improvement rather than 
to militant or progressive labour leadership 
as would have been the case in most other 
industrialised countries. 
(Williams 1979, p. 71) 
On the economic front, the coalition government 
adopted the deliberate strategy of promoting the 
manufacturing sectors, partly to , offset an 
over-dependency on mining. The strategy included 
protective tariffs and the provision of state capital to 
establish an iron and'steel industry (Du Toit 1981, 
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P. 25). Protective tariffs were supported by the 
Federated Chamber of Industries and Assocom (the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce) and both employers' 
organisations publicly opposed the government's colour 
bar policies as inconsistent with this desire for 
industrial growth (Lipton 1985, p. 140). Not 
surprisingly, the desire to diversify the countriest 
economic base became a bipartisan policy followed by all 
future governments. The new industries which 
prospered almost without exception from the end of the 
depression to the oil crisis of 1973 - thus knew no 
other regulatory system for labour except that provided 
by industrial councils. 
Some expanding industries relied mainly on 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour rather than artisans, 
and many of these new workers were black. None of the 
industrial relations provisions of the "civilised 
labour" policy attached to them, save the wage-fixing 
designed to preserve whites from undercutting. 
Industrial unions were formed to organise in these 
sectors: from the late 1920's, there was an increasing 
growth in the number of multiracial unions in the 
furniture, garment, leather, laundry, chemical, foodo 
sweet and other secondary industries (Williams 1979, 
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p. 73). There was too the previously-mentioned 
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, a union with 
aspirations not dissimilar to Robert Owen's Grand 
National Consolidated Trades Union of 1834. The ICU was 
regarded by Edward Roux as "the pioneer mass 
organisation for blacks" (Roux 1964). 
From its begining in Cape Town in 1919, the ICU had 
spread to Natal by 1924 and then onto the Orange Free 
State and the Transvaal by 1925. Its conference in 
January 1923 was addressed by no less a person than the 
British trade unionist, Tom Mann, former self-styled 
revolutionary and veteran of the great London dock 
strike of 1889 who was "a powerful and passionate 
speaker" 
-(Cole 
and Postgate 1963, p. 574). By 1925 the 
ICU was claiming a membership of 50,000, by 1926 70,000 
and by 1927 100,000 (Kadalie 1970, p. 55). Though there 
was never more than a fraction of that number fully 
paid-up, there is little doubt it enjoyed a vast popular 
following (Coetzee 1976, p. 19). 
The union was led by Clements Kadalie, ' a man 
described by Roux as: 
.... full of restless-energy, a born orator, a 
capable organiser... intelligent, versatile, 
passionate, he possessed those qualities 
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which drew others to him and made him a 
natural leader of his fellows. 
(Roux 1964, p. 196) 
Kadalie reportedly told a meeting at Bloomfontein: 
.... I would not trust an, Englishman, even if he and I were found in Hell together. I 
should watch him for fear he left me there 
while he found a way out for himself. 
(Kadalie 1970, p. 71) 
He went on to urge his audience "to make such a hell of 
a noise that the white man cannot sleep". Three years 
later he was bitterly attacking the native pass laws, 
and for this he was arrested'and charged under the 1927 
Native Administration Act- with, inciting hostility 
between natives and Europeans. He was acquitted; but 
within months the ICU had split into three sections and 
disintegrated thereafter. Kadalie later laid much blame 
for this split on the presence of-a British adviser sent 
out to the ICU by a group of Fabians, W. G. Ballinger 
(who in Kadalie's judgement "had not enough experience 
to understand the African mind"). But he did concede 
that there were scandals involving the mismanagement of 
union funds and consequent allegations of corruption. 
Roux noted that: 
... the forces of internal disruption were a 
more fundamental cause of its collapse. It 
illustrated, as all other mass movements have 
illustrated, the tremendous disparity between 
the urgent desire for change on the part of the 
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downtrodden blacks and the inadequacy of their 
political leadership. 
(Roux 1964, p. 196) 
Feit cited the "negligence" of the ±CU leadership and 
their "elite or bourgeois" background; and, perhaps more 
fundamentally, a simple inability to organise (quoted by 
Du Toit 1981, p. 112). 
The ICU also faced unremitting hostility and 
persecution from the state and was treated with at best 
indifference by the established trade union movement. 
After an early period of flirtation, Kadalie had in 1926 
set his organisation firmly against the Communist party, 
which from 1927 onwards worked increasingly to establish 
rival unions for black workers (Williams 1979, p. 76). 
This divergent clash between Communists and 
anti-Communists was to echo down the years of black 
trade union politics. 
Roux later claimed that the ICU had "missed 
opportunities" to "undermine white society",, but Stanley 
Trapido, in an introduction to Kadaliels autobiography# 
said, that this was "far too harsh a judgement" (Roux 
1964,, p. 25). Kadalie brought moral fervour to the cause 
of African trade unionism, and some measure of 
utopianism. He created a populist base for the movement, 
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not just for workers but for all blacks. It is worth 
recalling that in the case of that earlier utopian, 
Robert Owen, the Webbs dismissed his vision of the 
Grand National Consolidated Trades Union as -being 
"ephemeral" to the "real life of the trade union 
movement" S. & B. Webb 1920, p. 167). Kadalie's 
movement may have been short-lived, but it was not 
ephemeral. It left a legacy of African protest focussed 
on, but not exclusive to, those in employment that would 
not be forgotten. It also "inspired a generation of 
black leaders" (Luckhardt and Wall 1980, p. 46). 
Much more durable than the ICU was the formation of 
the South African Trades and Labour Council (SATLC) in 
1930, the country's most influential co-ordination body 
to date. SATLC represented both registered and 
non-registered unions, thus encompassing multiracial 
unions from the various process industries including 
those with a marked Communist penetration, and gained 
steady influence with government until it reached its 
zenith in 1947. In 1943, the Council and the Minister 
of Labour reached agreement in principle on recognising 
unions for Africans, but the unions themselves could not 
agree on what form this should take (Williams 1979, 
p. 77). SALTC's life was never trouble-free: the 
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established artisans' unions and the newer unions made 
uneasy bedfellows. As Williams expressed it: 
The multiracial industrial unions seemed just 
one step too activist, one step too 
committed, one step too militant for the 
artisan unions,, whose method of promoting the 
interests and security of their workers 
differed by degrees from that of industrial 
unionism. on the other hand, left-wing trade 
unionists, made sensitive by their racially 
mixed constituencies, resisted strongly the 
artisan leaders' concern , only or overwhemingly with the interest of their 
particular trade members. , (Williams 1979, p. 75) 
The co-ordinating body also became increasingly sucked 
into the rising struggle between Afrikaans- and English- 
speaking unionists for control of the established white 
unions. The Nationalists and other cultural bodies 
placed priority "on weaning the Afrikaner workers away 
from their working class organisations" from the late 
1930's onwards, virtually as soon as Afrikaners 'became 
industrial wage earners in any numbers (Luckhardt and 
Wall 1980, p-57). Yet despite these vicissitudes, by 
1947 SATLC had one hundred and eleven affiliated 'unions 
with a combined membership of 184,000, 'which was about 
sixty-five percent of all trade unionists (op. cit. 
p. 83). 
other steps were taken to orgariise black workers. 
There had been, Douwes Dekker notes,, a total of over 
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26,000 blacks involved in strike action in the decade 
1930 to 1939, many of them unorganised. In 1942, the 
council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) was formed 
with the express purpose of changing the law so as to 
gain statutory recognition. Two years later, it was 
claiming a membership of 158,600 in 119 separate unions, 
though few members were actually paid up (Douwes Dekker 
1976, p. 2). Despite-the-fact that CNETU's campaign for 
a weekly minimum-wage of 40/- in 1942 had led directly 
to the government's adoption of War Measure 145 which 
outlawed strikes, there is-evidence, that the-number of 
strikes continued and the Ministry did not always 
prosecute even when it had a prima facie case. Indeed, 
as already mentioned, the Minister took the initiative 
in 1943 in calling a conference of all unions to 
determine a way of incorporating blacks into the 
collective bargaining process. A Bill providing for a 
restricted form of registration for black unions was 
published in 1947, but it lapsed when the government 
fell from office (Douwes Dekker 1976, p. 3). 
I 
African mineworkers showed little propensity to 
unionise until World War II. - Earlier attempts in the 
early 1930's had come to nothing. Black miners were of 
course more difficult to organise than factory workers - 
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most were migrants, they worked under a contract labour 
system, and they lived in tightly policed and segregated 
compounds, all factors which militated against 
collective action for the amelioration of their 
condition. The economic boom after the depression had 
slightly narrowed the racial wage gap for black factory 
workers (Lipton 1985, p. 21). But Lodge has pointed out 
that in 1942, miners' wages were actually lower than 
those that applied in 1890 (1983, p. 19). However there 
occurred in 1946 a strike of black mineworkers which 
mobilised 70,000 in support, far more than were in 
membership of the union. O'Meara has -postulated that 
this "remarkable strike" was "a milestone" in history: 
Most obviously it profoundly affected the 
direction and thrust of black opposition; 
patient constitutional protest by an elite 
rapidly gave way to mass political action and 
passive resistance. In the white political 
arena it focussed attention on important 
shifts in class structure produced by the 
rapid economic growth ... of which the strike 
was a natural and logical result. These 
provoked a political re-alignment resulting 
in the slim victory of the Nationalist party 
in 1948. 
(O'Meara'1983, p. 187). 
In conditions of economic growth once the 
depression was over, employers could absorb the wage 
increases for white and black labour without undue 
difficulty. More and more foreign businesses were 
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attracted to invest inýthe country. Politically, the 
South African government enjoyed rising prestige abroad, 
due in no small measure to its contribution to the 
Allied war effort and Smuts' personal status in Britain 
and the Commonwealth. Employers, rather than white 
labour, had the more influential voices inside the 
councils of state, helped partially by better 
organisation through Chambers of Industry and Commerce 
with a legitimate representative role. But in addition 
to the main employer groups, the Ministry of Labour also 
gained the respect of main established unions, and as we 
have seen showed some sympathy towards the black unions. 
Labour conflicts still occurred: the 1946 strike of 
blacks was crushed by the police (Douwes Dekker 1976, 
p. 3). On the whole, the outspoken bitterness which had 
characterised labour - management relations in the 
period before 1924 was largely absent for white workers, 
though it was a slowly growing reality for blacks. 
There was in summary some evidence of tentative steps 
towards a new accommodation between government, 
employers and unions. 
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2.4 Industrial Relations and Apartheid: 1947 -1973 
O'Meara has reminded us that there wasý developing 
in the 1940's a major new force in society ýbased on 
entirely different notions of accommodation. This was 
Afrikaner nationalism, which was not merely a political 
phenomenon but was based on the self-conscious use of 
Afrikaner capital to advance ethnic mobilisation. No 
matter how much neo-classical capitalism believed 
itself free from race prejudice and felt itself working 
towards that end, the new "Volkscapitalismell was clearly 
not colour blind (O'Meara 1983). 
On the labour side, the ethnic mobilisation of 
Afrikaners led to a split in the white unions. In 1947, 
at the highpoint of its membership, six Pretoria-based 
unions broke away from the South African Trades and 
Labour Council when a motion to bar African unions from 
affiliation was soundly defeated by conference. The 
break-aways formed the Co-ordinating Council of South 
African Trade Unions, the exclusively white group later 
known as the South African Confederation of Labour. 
Forthright champions of Afrikaner nationalism, their 
campaign contribution "must be seen as crucial to the 
slim victory won by the Nationalists at the 1948 
parliamentary election" (Williams 1979, p. 78). 
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Two major industrial relations statutes set the 
framework for apartheid in the labour market once the 
Nationalists had consolidated power. The first was -the 
Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953, an 
Act which envisaged no place for black unions, but which 
instead sought to establish: 
.... a complex 
hierarchy of plant-level, 
regional and national committees, founded on 
a paternalistic philosophy in which a 
benevolent state and employers catered for 
black worker aspirations. 
(Piron and Le Roux 1986, p. 24) 
In more direct words, - Douwes Dekker said the-Act "aimed 
to bleed the black trade unions to death; it was a 
complete rejection of the findings of the 1949 
Industrial Legislation Commission" (1976, p. 4). Helen 
Suzman, critised the Act at the time of its passage as: 
.... an unrealistic measure. To refuse 
recognition to the Native trade unions, to 
hope they will die when the natives are 
becoming more and more integrated into 
industrial life, is futile. We will find 
these trade unions will fall into the hands 
of the less responsible elements among native 
leaders... (when they could) have been guided 
and controlled and made useful instruments of 
peace and order. 
(cited in Strangwayes-Booth 1976, p. 78) 
The second statute was the Industrial Conciliation 
58 
Amendment Act of 1956. The broad principles of 
conciliation laid down in 1924 were kept intact (though 
the interpretation by successive government ministers 
was in marked contrast to the mediating techniques 
adopted by those of pre-Nationalist days). What the 
1956 Act did was to prohibit any new mixed race union 
from registering, and deliberately to exclude blacks 
from the statutory definition of 'employees'. 
Henceforth, only whites, coloureds and Asians could be 
represented by unions. 
But the Nationalist government's attitude to unions 
was not merely expressed in labour legislation. A 
battery of other apartheid enactments directly affected 
trade unionists as citizens, and the notorious 1950 
Suppression of Communism Act - which defined communism 
as including any scheme which aimed at the "promotion of 
political, industrial or social change" by "disturbance 
or disorder" - was used frequently against leading union 
activists. By January 1956, seventy-five officials of 
all races were banned, and fifty-six of them ordered to 
resign from their unions (Douwes Dekker 1976, p. 4). The 
impact of all this on most of the trade union movement 
was literally shattering. The rump of the Trades and 
Labour Council left behind after the Nationalist unions 
59 
had walked out fragmented further in disagreement over 
how to respond to the incoming government's stated 
intention of enforcing segregation on the unions and 
generally breaking their power. Under the weight of 
pressure (according to Williams 1979) or because of a 
complete lack of principle (according to Luckhardt and 
Wall 1980), in 1954 the remaining SALTC unions abandoned 
their open clause allowing African unions to affiliate. 
A few multiracial registered unions then returned to the 
fold, and the South African Trades Union Council (later 
known as TUCSA) was formed from these remnants. 
The realignment of the labour movement caused by 
the dissolution of the Trades and Labour Council after 
1948 did not end there. Some excluded African unions 
combined ýwith the Transvaal-based council of 
Non-European Trade Unions and a handful of unaffiliated 
smaller unions to form the South African Congress of 
Trade Unions (SACTU), a decision which was to have 
far-reaching effects in international trade union 
politics. SACTU, though three-quarters of its members 
were black, had a non-racial constitution and 
significant white leaders, many experienced in 
organising and some with connections in the Communist 
party. In 1961 SACTU was estimated to organise over 
60 
53,000 members in forty six affiliates (Horrell 1969, 
p. 26). 
SACTU was a strong supporter of the Congress 
Alliance. From its first conference, the new union 
centre: 
.... clearly laid the link between trade union 
and political activities and resolved to 
pursue the workers' struggle with all the 
means at its disposal .... It helped organise 
political strikes in support of demands for 
abolition of the pass laws and the Group 
Areas Act. 
(Du Toit 1981, p-227) 
It survived openly inside the country for nine years, 
despite individual banning orders and a sustained level 
of general repression, successive, leaders being deeply 
affected by the 1956 Treason Trials and the Emergency 
after Sharpeville in 1960. In 1962, severe banning 
orders were served on all its leading officials. By 
1964, it had all but ceased to function, with over fifty 
of its officials banned and others in voluntary exile. 
SACTU, 's impact as a trade union was much less 
significant than its symbolic role as a vehicle for 
protest in the African Nationalist movement. For 
instance, it never gained recognition from employers, 
even where it built up a solid membership,, because 
employers were acutely aware of the government's 
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hostility and could shelter behind its aggressive-stance 
(Du Toit 1981, p. 228 - 231). Also, 'it never succeeded 
in recruiting the larger black unions in clothing or 
distribution into membership: the latter are on record 
as refusing to join because SACTU was "too 'political" 
(Douwes Dekker 1976, p. 5). Although SACTU 'itself has 
never formally been proscribed, it has set up offices in 
exile along with its political-ally, the banned African 
National-Congress, and its political rival among blacks, 
the Pan African Congress, both of which are proscribed. 
In exile it has developed a more sharply defined 
revolutionary strategy (Du Toit 1981, p. 432 et seq). 
SACTU"s strategy and its close affinity with the 
Communist element in the Congress Alliance make its 
politics appear on the surface to be radically different 
from the earlier populist crusade of Clements Ka dalie 
and the ICU. But when the two organisations are 
compared as functioning bodies, then it is their 
similarities which are most apparent. Edward Feit 
argued that SACTU was a failure not only because of 
intense government harassment, but because of its own 
shortcomings (Feit 1975). He laid several specific 
charges at SACTU: it was unfocussed because it pursued 
too many goals at one time; it had a poor organisational 
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track record, often not following up recruiting effortsý 
beyond the stage of rhetoric; and it let initial 
contacts with employers' organisations such as Chambers 
of Industry and Commerce lapse, so depriving it of 
potential sympathy, for instance on the poverty wage 
issue. of course, in defence it can be asserted that 
SACTU never had any funds. But Feit goes on to state 
that SACTU's membership claims have also to be treated 
with caution: "most of the union records were in poor 
order", and "membership was inflated for technical 
reasons, for local secretaries to have voting strength 
at SACTU's annual conferences". No accurate estimates of 
membership can therefore be made (Feit 1975, p. 210). No 
one, however, has laid the charge that SACTU was 
"elitist and bourgeois", an accusation that was levied 
against the ICU. But Feit's allegations are important, 
because in the 1970's and 1980's SACTU was to lay claim 
to being the only legitimate heir to the black union 
tradition. This was a claim not lightly accepted by 
many of those involved in trade union activities in this 
period who perceived, directly through experience or at 
second hand, different realities and myths. 
The political split of the late 1950's between the 
ANC and the PAC naturally found an echo in the trade 
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unions. In 1959 five small unions broke away from 
SACTU, saying they disagreed politically with the mother 
union and supported the PAC (Du Toit'1981,, p. 229). 'They 
formed a small co-ordinating body, the Federation of 
Free African Trade Unions (FOFATUSA), which in turn 
affiliated to the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), based in Brussels. Now, with 
SACTU an affiliate of the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU), based in Prague, both rival'co-ordinating 
bodies of the black trade unions were firmly embroiled 
in the cold war of international trade union politics. 
Meanwhile, at TUCSA - after seven years of 
representing whitesf coloureds and Asians in membership 
of registered unions - the union decided in 1962 to 
change its attitude towards blacks. So began the 
controversial policy of "parallel unionism" - unions for 
blacks in the same industry as a TUCSA affiliate which 
often shared premises and staff with a registered union, 
the parent firmly controlling its black offspring. 
TUCSA lost some of its conservative affiliates as a 
consequence of this policy; but this in turn attracted a 
number of FOFATUSA unions into TUCSA membership, and by 
1965 FOFATUSA was disbanded. 
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TUCSA had now become the largest and most 
representative co-ordinating body on the South African 
labour scene. Its potential was obvious, even though 
the conditions of the mid-1960's were not noticeably 
propitious for any trade union. The agenda of TUCSA 
conferences for that period are scattered with motions 
about social, economic and political matters of concern 
to its members, but none seemed to carry any weight with 
government. In 1968, Tom Murray of the Boilermakers 
Society was driven to ask: 
.... Have we ever had any consideration from the government? What happens to the dozens 
of letters that go back and forth, and about 
which you read in your Annual Reports? How 
many of the wonderful resolutions that you 
adopt year after year ever gets the ear of 
the government? 
(TUCSA 1968, p. 554) 
Yet within a year, TUCSA was making news not for 
pressurising government on social issues but for itself 
yielding again to political pressure from government. 
In an act of astounding capriciousness , but one 
prompted by the weiýht of more resignations from 
affiliates, it again excluded black unions from 
membership. As a result the previous FOFATUSA unions 
were simply "left to their fate" (Du Toit 1981, p. 230). 
What happened was that an African Affairs committee had 
been established by TUCSA in 1964 on money granted by 
65 
the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) to 
develop African organisations. It appeared to be 
succeeding, but by 1967 the Minister of Labour 
threatened to deregister TUCSA, accusing it of being out 
of touch with white worker opinion by paying such 
attention to black development. Some of the more 
conservative craft unions then withdrew from TUCSA in 
alarm, leaving it with an agonising internal debate as 
to how it should respond. 
(Interviews: Tyake and Douwes Dekker, Johannesburg, 
August 1977; Lipton 1985, p. 201) 
But no matter what its cause was, the decision to 
disaffiliate the African section became the most 
catastrophic volte face in the history of South African 
trade unionism. When sustained black trade unionism 
arrived as a result of new events in the 1970's, TUCSA 
simply had no credibility on which it could build: try 
as it might, it could never live down the 1969 
capitulation. Years later its general secretary, Arthur 
Grobbelaar, by now a Wiehahn commissioner, regretted the 
outcome of the 1969 decision, but believed his union had 
no alternative. "In those days,,, the government treated 
us no better than it treated SACTU. If we hadn't 
conceded, they'd have finished us off" (Interview: 
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Johannesburg, August 1977). It was a stark choice, as 
he saw it, between "certain death" or problematical 
survival. 
Thus successive Nationalist governments had by 
early 1973 fragmented the union movement into many 
divers strands. This was Horrel's "divided movement" 
(1969). There was the all-white Confederation of 
Labour, firm in its political support for apartheid; 
there was TUCSA, stoicly multiracial, in organising 
whites, coloureds and Asians, but seen as volatile and 
capricious on the central issue by both conservative and 
black unions; there were embryonic worker support 
groups (the best known of which was the urban Training 
Project set up in Johannesburg in 1971 for the purpose 
of nurturing small black unions and keeping union 
education alive); there was SACTU in understandable. but 
self-imposed exile, campaigning, internationally for the 
right to be the sole representatives of trade unionism 
in the Republic; and there were registered unions which 
had nothing to do with co-ordinating bodies. The 
government talked only to the all-white Confederation of 
Labour, and arrested, banned or exiled other officials 
with seeming impunity. 
Such a divided labour force might be thought to 
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have pleased some employers: after all, there was no 
threat of their managerial control of work-based issues, 
and strikes were put down enthusiastically by the police 
whenever they were called in. But employers, at least 
English-speaking 'liberal' employers, 'were held almost 
in as low esteem as the unions. Helen Suzman observed: 
... I can think of no other country in the ýestern 
world where the greatest employers of 
labour, and indeed by far the biggest 
taxpayers and contributors to the State's 
coffers, would be treated by their government 
in the contemptuous and arrogant manner of 
the Nationalist government. 
(cited by Strangwayes-Booth 1976, p. 150) 
Already, a few of the larger employers were being 
increasingly indentified with the Progressive party, the 
inheritor of the liberal tradition. 
But Afrikaner capitalism had been growing apace as 
an outcome of the Nationalists' 'Afrikaner first' 
policy. The policy had been enormously successful: 
major businesses in Afrikaner hands were to be found in 
banking and insurance, printing and publishing, food and 
drink,, and general manufacturing. Some business 
conglomerates, notably Sanlam, had expanded by 
"investing heavily and cheaply" during the flight of 
foreign capital in the post-Sharpville panic of the 
earlier 1960, 's (O'Meara 1983, p. 250). Afrikaner 
68 
businesses also set up structures to''rival those of 
English-speaking and foreign firms, such as the national 
Afrikaanse Handelinstitut (parallel to' the Federated 
Chamber of Industries), and local associations -of 
commerce. Within ten years of 'taking office the 
Nationalists were able to feel more relaxed about 
foreign capital and multinationals within the boundaries 
of the country, a presence which they had -at first 
intuitively felt to be highly undesirable (Lipton 1985, 
p. 285). Already by early 1973 there was'the beginning 
of a debate, initially among Afrikaner intellectuals but 
soon "reinforced by the Afrikaner capitalist class" 
(O'Meara 1983, p. 251), as to'the nature and direction of 
policy which implied a criticism of the certainties of 
separate development (the Iverligte- verkramptel debate: 
see Hill 1981). 
But for labour and management who were not of the 
Afrikaner faith, this debate was not yet a portent for 
change. The government was firmly in the driving seat, 
and the influence of the industrial parties was slight. 
It was their ethnicity, rather than their status as 
industrial relations actors,, that gave Afrikaner capital 
and- the all-white Confederation a voice in the affairs 
of state. 
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2.5 Industrial Relations froM Durban to Wiehahn: 
1973 - 1979 
The strikes in the Durban - Pinetown industrial 
complex began, in the way of these things, humbly enough 
in a brick works on 9 January 1973. However, their 
repercussions on the pattern of industrial relations, 
for twenty five years practically the exclusive 
decision-making domain of the government, were decidedly 
massive. The details of the strikes are well-documented 
(see Du Toit 1981, chapter 7). They lasted two months, 
and involved nearly 62,000 workers in 160 separate 
stoppages (SAIRR 1973, p. 1). Overall in 1973,73,000 
black workers were involved in 252 illegal strikes, 
which contrasts with an average of under 10,000 in 
seventy strikes each year in the period 1971 to 1975, 
except 1973 (Cooper 1980). At the time the strikes 
started trade unionism was negligible in the Durban 
area, though afterwards a support body, the Trade Union 
Advisory and Co-ordinating council was set up out of 
which grew a major new federation later known as FOSATU. 
In analysing reasons for the Durban strikes, Du 
Toit is at pains to discount the "spontaneous 
combustion" theory that the conflict was spread by 
imitation once publicity for the first strike had 
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supplied the oxygen. Rather he bases his explanation on 
the objective conditions of African workers, some 
seventy nine percent of whom were earning less than the 
estimated bare subsistance level for an average-sized 
family (p. 251/2). The whole economy was experiencing 
Istagflation', with a chronic balance of payments 
deficit not helped by the chaos in world financial 
markets that was building up from 1971. The "inflation 
created by maintaining a high rate of expansion put the 
poorest layers of workers in an intolerable situation 
and paved the way to renewed industrial conflict" 
(p. 249). The demoralisation of blacks in the earlier 
decade, which manifested itself in a fear of joining 
trade unions, had to a large extent worn off, as older 
workers with memories of Sharpeville had been joined by 
younger ones yet to be taught a lesson'. There was a 
mood of "new confidence and determination". The 
"fundamental influence in this process", Du Toit 
claimed, was what was happe ning outside South Africa: 
.... The former protectorates of Bechuanaland, 
Basutuland and Swaziland had become 
independent during the 1960's. Guerilla war 
was developing in Angola and Mozambique. The 
Vietnam war escalated in this period. News 
reports from Vietnam multiplied and left 
scarcely a country in the world unaffected. 
The world wide ferment among students and 
intellectuals in the late 1960's found an 
echo in South Africa as well. The Black 
Consciousness movement sent ripples of 
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radical protest throughout the African 
population. 
(Du Toit 1981, p. 246/7) 
It only required a "decisive development" in the world 
capitalist economy to bring to the surface the 
underlying conflict between capital and labour. 
The difficulty of such a global explanation as an 
answer to the phenomenon manifested by the strike is 
that it still fails to answer the question: why Durban? 
A global view may help to understand some of the forces 
that create appropriate conditions for mobilisation, but 
not necessarily the catalyst that transforms the 
potential into action. 
Surely a crucial point about the Durban strikes is 
that everyone in the industrial relations scene - 
government, employers, traditional unions, those black 
unions that were then existing in the country, and the 
exiled SACTU - seems to have been caught quite unawares. 
Although many had long predicted a general explosion of 
discontent on the part of Africans at their conditions, 
none closely involved with labour matters had sensed the 
imminence of the Durban protests. For the first time it 
seemed in a major strike under apartheid, there were no 
obvious scapegoats,, no "agitators" to be summarily dealt 
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with, no whites'in positions of direct influence who had 
been urging the workers to mobilise, though the Minister 
of Labour did tell parliament: 
.... the strikes had little to do with more 
money for Africans. They were caused by 
agitators who wanted to cause the downfall of 
the government. 
(Quoted by Du Toit 1981, p. 255) 
In fact it took the government over a year before it 
could discover anyone on whom to serve banning orders as 
a result of their part in the strikes, and they were 
three white trade union officials. 
The extreme left also clearly wanted to believe 
that the strikes could'not'simply have 'happened. The 
official SACTU historians have written: 
I 
While the strikes were undoubtedly 
spontaneous, they were not unorganised. Such 
a large scale interruption of production 
could occur only if workers had their own 
underground organisation that made decisions 
and refused to expose individual workers to a 
hostile regime. 
(Luckhardt and Wall 1980, p. 453) 
Both of these hypotheses miss an important element of 
mobilisation process: namely that the unexpected may 
happen even without (from the right's viewpoint) 
"agitators" stirring up the usually docile, or (from the 
left-*s) "comrades" plotting the form of the revolution. 
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Whether spontaneous mobilisation can consummate the 
desires of the mobilised may indeed hinge upon the 
nature and durability of organisation;, but organisation 
and planning or agents provocateur are not necessary 
preconditions for the action to begin. Later in 1973, 
strikes by Africans on theý mines disintegrated into 
riots, and it was therefore easier for the -authorities 
to treat these as a --law and order problemj, the 
economistic goals were lost sight of. 
The Durban strikes hit large firms, and small ones, 
locally owned and subsidiaries of multinational groups. 
That they were concentrated in the textile- and metal 
working sectors is a reflection merely of the fact that 
these sectors predominate in the Durban area. Some 
employers, fearful that the. strikes would spread to 
them, conceded massive wage increases, upto forty 
percent, a rate unprecedented at that time. It appeared 
that in the vast majority of cases those who went on 
strike benefitted with a wage increase (Du Toit 1981, 
p. 265),. For employers generally and their representative 
bodies, the strikes focussed their attention on the 
inadequacies of the committee system for blacks laid 
down in the Bantu Labour Regulations. In five years, 
the number of works and liaison committees rose 
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dramatically, from about one hundred to over 3,000 
(SAIIR 1981, p. 271). Employers also acknowledged their 
neglect of simple communications functions within 
management, so that they were often quite unaware of the 
nature of grievances (Du Toit 1981, p. 256). Even a 
leading Afrikaans banker called attention to the low 
growth rates and high inflation rate that underlay the 
low wage question (op. cit., p. 254). 
With the economy spinning into recession, the 
Chamber of Mines in 1975 made new efforts to persuade 
white miners to ease job reservation and allow blacks to 
work unsupervised. There were threats of strikes, but 
the employers got some of their demands accepted with a 
large pay increase (Callinicos and Rogers 1977, p. 117). 
In manufacturing, employers were talking to registered 
unions, principally TUCSA affiliates, on a previously 
unknown scale. The subsidiary of the British firm of 
Smith & Nephew actually granted recognition to an 
unregistered black union which had organised all its 
production workers (Interview: Pretoria, August 1977). 
By 1977, two new groups of African unions had 
appeared. In the Transvaal, the Council of Unions of 
South Africa (CUSA) had evolved out of the unions 
nurtured patiently by the Urban Training Project. This 
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group articulated economistic goals, though it had 
inspirational links to the black consciousness movement 
(Interviews with officials: Johannesburg, August 1977). 
In Natal and the Cape, the Federation of South African 
Trade Unions (FOSATU) emerged out of the support group 
in Durban. Both gained affiliations from former TUCSA 
members, and engaged in effective recruiting paid for by 
monies received from international labour bodies (see 
Chapter 9). 
Between 1973 and 1977, pressure on government to do 
something increased dramatically Afrikaner business 
leaders were heard, alongside their English-speaking 
colleagues, advocating "action" and "change". Even 
Arthur Grobbelaar at TUCSA received a phone call from 
the government asking for advice, and requests for 
assistance from employers (Interview: August 1977). 
Apart from certain removals of 'petty apartheid', little 
else happened, until in June 1976 the political process 
was consumed by the Soweto uprisings. Although these 
events inspired Kane Berman to entitle his study of 
their causes "The Method in the Madness", the government 
appeared panic-stricken, dithering and (to O'Meara) 
"rudderless" on an unprecedented scale. Considering all 
the vicissitudes that by then seemed to engulf the 
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government, O'Meara has written of the: 
.... disastrous political aftermath 'of the defeat in Angola, the Soweto uprisings, the 
murder of Steve Biko and the panic banning of 
eighteen African organisations, now 
confronted with an increasingly organised and 
militant working class and mass resistance to 
apartheid -a resistance now taking an 
increasingly anti-capitalist form - under 
severe international pressure to introduce at 
least cosmetic changes, and faced with a 
massive outflow of foreign capital, huge 
unemployment and the worst recession in South 
African history, both the Nationalist 
Government and Party were decisively split 
over precisely the political questions posed 
by these multiple crises. 
(0, 'Meara 1983,, p. 252) 
In fact South Africa caught the full blast of the world 
recession ushered in by the oil crisis. Her oil import 
bill rose six fold in two years from 1973, from R190m to 
R1,100m. Economic difficulties were exaccerbated by 
industrial and political unrest among blacks. But what 
neutralised the adverse effects of recession was the 
rise in the gold price once the fixed-price system was 
abolished in 1969. Exports doubled in value between 
then and 1975 (Innes 1984, p. 190). 
The government responded to the pressure to do 
something by establishing two Commissions, headed by 
Professors Riekert and Wiehahn. Professor Riekert, 
working on his own, was charged with examining the 
workings of the pass law system, and influx control of 
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Africans coming into the white urban areas. The Wiehahn 
Commission had the remit of examining all labour 
legislation. Its fourteen commissioners came from 
diverse backgrounds: four were representative of 
employers (three industrial and one financial); two from 
the all-white unions; two from TUCSA unions; one from an 
unaffiliated union; four academics; and one from the 
Department of Labour. Yet of the fourteen only two were 
non-white. With the appointment of these commissions, 
there was some distant prospect of change, though 
radical critics saw them simply as manoeuvering 
strategies, a chance for the government to gain a 
breathing space in the face of mounting pressures. 
The period since Durban yielded evidence that the 
face of Afrikanerdom was not monolithic. Afrikaner 
capitalists expressed concern at the anti-capitalist 
nature of the drift of black opposition politics, and 
added considerable pressure on the government. By its 
nature the government was more predisposed to listen to 
this source for advice. However, the rise in the price 
of gold which helped to stave off the worst of recession 
underlined the government's dependence on co-operation 
with major exporters. on the union side, TUCSA was 
recruiting strongly, though the new groupings of African 
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unions appeared unwilling to bed down too closely with 
it. It had also gained influence through the membership 
of various officers on the Wiehahn Commission. 
Between 1973 and 1977, certain sections of 
organised labour and management had exerted more 
influence on the process of change than in the previous 
epoch of Nationalist government, but little had actually 
happened as a result. International pressure had become 
intense, as will be seen in Chapter 3, but the evidence 
is that it too was feeling impotent: there was talk of 
change, but it was so far just talk. The internal 
parties and the world outside could only wait for the 
commissions to report, and for the government to act 
upon their findings if it so chose. On past government 
form, the outlook was gloomy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CODES AND SANCTIONS 
IlSouth Africa is destined to become the one great 
unsolved, perhaps unsolvabler problem of our colonial 
system. " 
W. E. Gladstone 1881 
Hansard 3rd Series (Col. 1840) 
25 July 1881 
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Introduction 
Gladstone was referring in his speech only to the 
form of self-government upon which the Mother of 
Parliaments and her South African colonies could agree. 
But his words have a prescient ring about them in view 
of the fact that, over the past three or four decades, 
the modern Republic has increasingly been seen as a 
growing problem for the world's international community. 
This chapter traces the origins of the two principal 
external codes of conduct, and discusses the codes as a 
manifestation of the policy of constructive engagement. 
The use of codes is one aspect of a model of sanctions 
that might be (theoretically and increasingly in 
practice) applied against South Africa by the 
international community in an attempt "to do something 
about" the problem. 
In section 1, the gradual build-up of 
international pressure, particularly from international 
agencies, is considered. The irony in the censure of 
the United Nations (UN) and the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) is noted, ironic because South Africa 
was a founder member of both. But idea that there is a 
co-ordinated international conspiracy against the 
Republic, the so-called "total onslaught", is rejected. 
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Section 2 explores six possible initiatives in erecting 
sanctions, one of which is the labour code approach. It 
is argued that between 1962 and 1977 the most apt 
description of the way sanctions have been applied to 
South Africa is contained in Stultz's notion of the 
"thumbscrew" approach. 
The origin of labour codes as a regulatory tool of 
British Colonial administration from 1940, and the 
discernible trend from 1970 to use codes to counter the 
huge power of multinationals, are discussed in section 
3. Section 4 analyses the concept of "constructive 
engagement" in seeking to explain why codes specifically 
directed towards South Africa arose at a particular 
juncture in the mid-1970s. 
The origins and workings of the British Wages Code 
of 1973 is discussed in Section 5; and the origin and 
workings of its direct descendent, the European Code, in 
Section 6. This latter section records that not all 
'social partners' in the European Community appeared to 
welcome the Foreign Ministers' initiative. 
Finally, the contrasting origins of the United 
States code, known as the Sullivan Principles, are the 
subject of section 7, which ends with the claim that 
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what the West really sees at stake in "the South African 
problem" is the future existence of market capitalism. 
3.1 International Pressure 
Although the codes of practice for foreign 
companies engaged in South Africa date only from 1977, 
they emerged after nearly two decades of debate about 
the sanctions that could be employed against the 
Republic by the international community. The principal 
forum for these debates was naturally_enough the United 
Nations and its agencies, where South Africa experienced 
slow but seemingly inexorable diplomatic isolation. 
Such isolation of South Africa is of fairly recent 
vintage. The Dominion of South Africa had been an 
active participant in the League of Nations from its 
inception, and a founder member in 1921 of its first 
major agency, the International Labour Organisation, the 
only one to survive the demise of the League. In 1942, 
South Africa was one of twenty-six originating allied 
nations which signed the United Nations Declaration that 
led to the setting up of the UN, with fifty member 
states at the end of World War Two. 
The Charter of 1945 setting up the United Nations 
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contained a principle of "non-interference" in the 
domestic affairs of member states, which states: 
Nothing contained in 
shall authorise the 
intervene in any 
essentially within the 
of any state, or sha, 
submit such matters 
Charter. 
the present Charter 
United Nations to 
matters which are 
domestic jurisdiction 
11 require members to 
under the present 
(UN Charter 1945, Article 2 para. 7) 
Any alleged breach of this article by a member can be 
raised at the General Assembly. Any alleged breach by 
the General Assembly itself can be remedied by 
enforcement on the part of the Security Council. 
The non-interference principle was first put to 
test in the case of South Africa. In 1947 the 
representative of newly-affiliated India attacked the 
Dominion's attitude towards its Asian citizens; and in 
1952, in the fourth year of office of the National 
party, South Africa's emerging racial policies were 
discussed in critical terms by the General Assembly. on 
both occasions South Africa and her allies invoked 
Article 2(7) to prevent the matter being put to 
resolution by the Assembly. For the time being the 
principle remained intact (Austin 1966, chp. 5). 
However, the Article contains an additional clause 
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which states: 
This principle (of non-interference) shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter 7. 
This Chapter permits action by the General Assembly and 
Security Council against member states in matters 
regarded as "threats to peace, breaches of the peace and 
acts of aggression". In 1963 the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution (182/63) which inter alia declared 
South Africa's apartheid policies to be: "a crime 
against humanity... 11 and ... a threat to peace in the 
region" (Berridge 1977, p. 223). 
This, therefore, legitimised United Nations 
intervention in South African affairs by nullifying the 
erstwhile protection of 2(7); South Africa's allies were 
by this time much fewer in number and were not able to 
prevent the successful adoption of the resolution. In 
June 1964, the Security Council adopted a resolution to 
investigate the feasibility of applying sanctions, a 
move endorsed by Britain (Berridge 1977, p. 225). 
South Africa first came into conflict with the ILO 
in 1949 when she refused to endorse the Convention No. 
87 on Freedom of Association. In 1958, the ILO raised 
critisms of the country's discriminatory labour policy; 
and in 1961, it passed a resolution specifically 
85 
criticising the country's race policies in the general 
field of employment, and advising South Africa to 
withdraw until such time as apartheid was abandoned. In 
1963, thirty-six states withdrew from the ILO in protest 
at South Africa's continued membership (Bonner and 
Webster 1979, p. 7). 
Withdrawal finally came about in June 1964 to 
prevent certain expulsion. Within a month the ILO 
adopted the Declaration Concerning the Policy of 
Apartheid. This condemned the: 
degrading, criminal and inhumane racial 
policies (of South Africa) which are a 
violation of fundamental human rights and are 
thus incompatible with the aims and purposes 
of the International Labour Organisationo 
(ILR 1964) 
The Declaration went on to make three specific 
criticisms of South African labour practice: 
i) that it was in breach of ILO Convention 87 on 
freedom of association and Convention 98 on the 
right to organise in respect of black employees; 
ii) that the migratory labour system constituted 
'forced labourl; and 
iii) that there was no equity of opportunity for 
admission to employment and training between 
the races. 
The Declaration further instructed the ILO Director 
General to report each year to the annual conference 
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detailing violations of ILO Conventions and reporting on 
progress (ILR 1964). - 
Thus by 1964 the UN and the ILO, its principal 
agency, had adopted positions hostile to South Africa, 
and moved some way to isolate the Republic from the 
mainstream of inter-governmental activity. This had 
become possible partly through the widening membership 
of nation states, many of them former colonial 
territories in what by now was commonly referred to as 
the third world,, new members who unanimously 
strengthened the anti-apartheid voting lobby. But the 
anti-apartheid lobby was undoubtedly assisted by the 
actions of the South African government itself, most 
notably in the seemingly indifferent response it 
exhibited to world criticism that condemned the 
shootings of unarmed blacks at Sharpville and Langa in 
March 1960, just a month after Macmillan's famous "winds 
of change" speech in Cape Town. South Africa appeared 
to be cocooned in the bizarre certainties of Verwoerdian 
morality, unwilling to see why others found its system 
of white racism so repugnant, and unable to detect any 
change of wind. 
, The effect of these international developments was 
to transform South Africa's status from being an 
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important if rather eccentric senior partner in the 
British Commonwealth to the pariah state with few 
friends among the international community, a community 
which otherwise had little politically in common apart 
from its collective dislike of apartheid. one remaining 
friend was Britain: despite casting occasionally hostile 
votes, "it swiftly became apparent" to Berridge: 
... that no profound alterations in Anglo-South 
African relations were foreshadowed... indeed, 
the 'wind of change' had given birth to no more 
than a breeze of adjustment in British policy 
towards South Africa. 
(Berridge 1977, p. 226) 
Nevertheless, many more years were to elapse before 
the possibility of political action by international 
agencies was translated into functional pressure on 
business through codes of conduct. True, the Security 
Council had adopted a non-mandatory arms embargo in 1963 
(it eventually became mandatory in 1977) but this 
appears to have little impact other than the stimulation 
of an indigenous arms industry (Barber 1980). In fact 
for much of the 1960's and 1970's the world's political 
attention was focused on parts of the South African 
subcontinent other than South Africa itself: firstly, 
Rhodesia after the declaration of UDI in 1965 to the 
Lancaster House conference agreement in 1979; secondly, 
South West Africa/Namibia and the attempt from 1966 to 
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terminate South Africa's mandate to administer the old 
German territory; and thirdly, Angola and Mozambique 
after the 1974 withdrawal of the Portugese. Though 
inexorably implicated in all three crises, South Africa 
could largely shield her own internal problems from 
undue outside interference behind the dominance in world 
terms of these front-line conflicts (Hill 1981). 
3.2 The Sanctions Model 
What the international agencies and certain member 
states were groping towards from 1960 onwards was a way 
of pressurising South Africa to abandon its apartheid 
policies. Several different kinds of sanctions were 
discussed, which may be grouped into six: 
i) diplomatic and political ostracisation; 
ii) denial of military equipment; 
iii) denial of fuel and power; 
iv) withholding of foreign investment capital; 
V) imposition of codes of conduct; and 
vi) exclusion from world sport. 
It is not surprising, given the disparate interests of 
member nations of the UN, that progress was far from 
even across these six possible areas of sanctions. 
Indeed, there is no real evidence of any systematic 
attempt to co-ordinate action, despite the South African 
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government's frequent assertions about a "conspiracy of 
International Communism" (the so-called "total 
onslaught"). This claim characterised official 
pronouncements from the early 1970's onwards, as 
evidenced by official comments, - notably in successive 
editions of South African Digest (Hill 1981). ý 
There was the progress already discussed on 
ostracisation by removing representation within 
international bodies, and several nations severed 
diplomatic links after South Africa's withdrawal from 
the Commonwealth. These were actions solely within the 
decision making power of governments. But there was 
considerable activity directed towards excluding South 
Africa from participation in world sport, due to the 
enthusiasm of bodies like SANROC (and also possibly 
because of the fact that governments can act against 
sports contacts at little or no economic cost to 
themselves). The open trade in arms certainly became 
more difficult, as did trade in oil, but neither trade 
ceased. Hopes of restricting the supply of oil were 
largely thwarted by the surpluses available on world 
markets in all but a handful of years in the 1970s. 
Action on the disinvestment of capital and the 
imposition of codes of conduct had to await more 
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propitious times, until the interests of foreign 
governments, and the western multinationals who would 
actually carry out these sanctions, could be seen to 
dovetail together. 
Indeed the problem for advocates of total sanctions 
was to persuade key governments and companies that the 
time was ever propitious. Governments and companies paid 
lipservice to the need for reform, but they were 
cautious,, perhaps because they recognised that the 
formidable battery of sanctions they were being urged to 
adopt by the many vocal proponents of change stemmed, 
not so much from an evolutionary model of how South 
Africa might change, but from a radical or. revolutionary 
model. In an evolutionary model, of change, it might be 
envisaged that the rulers of South Africa would amend 
their policies in such a way as to permit a negotiated 
settlement with other legitimate parties (including but 
not exclusively the ANC), in order to restructure their 
political processes to achieve desired ends. The 
evolutionists hoped and believed that the pressure of 
sanctions would persuade the power elite that the price 
of continued white domination was simply too high. On 
the other hand, a revolutionary model explicitly rejects 
the idea that the system is capable of gradual reform. 
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Fundamental reform can only come about by a complete 
assault on all existing political institutions, possibly 
involving violence inside the country as pro-reformers 
meet the backlash of the state's apparatus. 
Partial sanctions could play a part in the 
evolutionists' strategy. But total sanctions would be 
needed to support the revolutionary aim. Stultz, using 
a geological metaphor, likened the evolutionary approach 
to the process of erosion, and the revolutionary 
approach to that of an earthquake (Stultz 1982, p. 125). 
Not surprisingly, governments that retained political 
links, and businesses with economic links, showed a 
marked aversion to the idea of the earthquake, and 
therefore expressed a preference for erosion. 
From a substantial survey of the practice and 
literature on sanctions, Stultz listed five key problems 
in implementing sanctions: 
i) sanctions are very hard to apply effectively; 
ii) the leverage they give on an economically 
advanced country with a diverse economy 
is not great; 
iii) the burden of sanctions often falls on 
individuals within the target who have little 
power to change the policies the sender 
finds objectionable, whereas those who have that 
power may feel little effect of the sanctions or 
even (in a political sense) profit from them; 
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iv) far from lessening political support for the 
target's offensive policy within the target's 
own boundaries, international sanctions can 
actually increase that support, especially in 
the short run; and 
V) if the sanctions are applied incrementally, that 
is in a piecemeal fashion, the likelihood is 
that the target population will merely adapt to 
each as it is applied. 
(Stultz 1982, p. 125) 
The experience of sanctions against the 
unilaterial declaration of independence by Rhodesia in 
1965 is especially relevant to the South African 
problem. Here was a land-locked country with a white 
population of only 250,000 that resisted sanctions far 
longer than anyone predicted; and furthermore did so at 
a time of increasing discussion about sanctions against 
South Africa. This is probably the single most 
important reason why the six initiatives theoretically 
available against South Africa have never been taken 
together, nor seemed likely to, either in the period 
specifically under discussion (1962 to 1977) or since. 
Insofar as international action has been taken on these 
initiatives, it has been piecemeal and fragmentary. it 
is therefore more akin to another model proposed by 
Stultz - the 'thumbscrew' approach: 
The central idea here is that the whites of 
South Africa derive a great deal of 
instrumental benefit from the policy of 
apartheid. Eliminate this benefit and replace 
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it with negative costs, and the whites can be 
expected to abandon apartheid. The 
strategy.... is essentially one of 'turning 
the screw' - deliberately and steadily 
increasing the cost to Pretoria of pursuing 
apartheid until a point is reached where it 
becomes obvious to South Africa's leaders 
that they have more to gain by rejecting 
apartheid than by continuing with it. This, 
it seems to me, is the classic conception of 
how international sanctions ought to work. ' 
(Stultz 1982, p. 124) 
The dilemma for pro-sanctions advocates is thus 
revealed: how to proceed, when the evolutionary model 
is clearly inadequate and there is not the consensus and 
certainly not the enthusiasm to embrace the 
revolutionary model? "Turning the screw" sounds fine in 
theory it is possibly all that is left as an 
international strategy - but the difficulty from the 
radicals' point of view is that it relies on other 
people (such as multinational companies, who may or may 
not be willing accomplices) to carry out the policy. The 
co-operation of multinationals, willing or unwilling, is 
essential to the success of the sanctions initiative 
which is the subject matter of this thesis, namely the 
codes of conduct. 
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3.3 Codes of Labour Practice 
Codes which stipulate minimum performance on the 
conduct of companies towards their employees are one 
ingredient in the cocktail of sanctions through which 
the international community has sought to put pressure 
on South Africa. The use of codes in regulating the 
treatment of Africans in employment is by no means new. 
Amsden (1971) notes that as early as 1940 the Colonial 
Office in London was issuing directives on labour policy 
under the terms of the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act. It was official purpose of this Act was "to 
promote the prosperity and happiness of the peoples of 
the Colonial Empire". Amsden, writes: 
Apparently, the government believed that 
legalising trade unions would further 
promote "the prosperity and happiness" of 
colonial peoples. For on the insistence of 
a group of Labour Members of Parliament, the 
Act made aid to a colony contingent on the 
passage of protective trade union 
legislation. This provision for the first 
time armed the Colonial Office with coercive 
powers over trade union policy. 
. 
(Amsden 1971, p. 3) 
The idea was that unions could help solve local 
labour grievances. Immediately after the war, the 
Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies was urging for East Africa "the well-tried 
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principles of collective bargaining and negotiation" 
(ibid, p. 4. ). 
By 1946 the Labour Department in Nairobi had 
enacted a protective code for African workers. 
Hand-in-hand with the Code was a Minimum Wages 
Ordinance, based on the twin measures of Poverty Datum 
Level and Effective Minimum Level (ibid, p. 13). Whether 
the existence of codes and statutory regulation actually 
stimulated genuine collective bargaining between 
employers and independent trade unions is open to 
considerable doubt (Turner 1965). What is not in doubt 
is that the promotion of codes governing the 
administration of labour became a standard practice in 
many parts of British colonial territories after 1945. 
It was not until the early 1970's that the 
emergence of powerful multinational corporations on a 
world scale promoted inter-governmental agencies to 
devise regulatory mechanisms via codes of conduct. 
There is now a plethora of codes and the Institute for 
Research and Information on Multinationals in Geneva has 
produced a classification scheme of four types of code: 
international, regional, issue-based and interest group. 
Table 3.1 lists fifteen codes of conduct by type. it 
should be noted that the classifications may overlap: 
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Table 3: 1 
TYPES OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONALS 
(1) 
Type ExamRle status 
INTERNATIONAL * OECD Guidelines (1, 
" ILA) Declaration of 
(1977) 
" UNCTAD Restrictive 
Practices (1980) 
" UN General Code 
" UNCTAD Transfer of 
976) 0 
Principles 
0 
Business 
0 
UN 
Technology UN 
REGIONAL Andean Pact (1970) 0 
Pacific Basin Charter on Inter- 
national Investments (1972) 0 
EEC Lange-Gibbons (1977) 0 
ISSUE * EEC South African 
Subsidiaries (1977) 0 
" US Sullivan Principles (1977) 0 
" ICC Illicit Payments (1977) 0 
" UN Economic and Social Council 
Consumer Protection UN 
INTEREST * ICC International Investment 
GROUP (1972) 0 
" ICFTU Multinational Charter 
(1975) 0 
" IFPMA Pharmaceuticals (1978) 0 
Note: 
Status: 0- Operational; UN = Under Negotiation 
Source: 
Based on data in IRIM (1984) and updated by the author. 
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some codes devised by interest groups may be 
issue-based. The two principal external codes for South 
Africa, the European and Sullivan codes, are 
"issue-based". All the codes in Table 3.1 are 
"external" in that they have general applicability in a 
region, across an issue or in a particular interest. 
There are also many examples of internal codes applying 
to one multinational company throughout its 
subsidiaries. 
3.4 constructive Engagement 
By the middle-19701s, given the crises described in 
Chapter 1, the need of Western goverments to be seen to 
be doing something positive about South Africa had grown 
significantly. That, together with the assumption that 
the power of international business was pretty 
formidable, created a role for business in the execution 
of foreign policy, a role that became known as 
"constructive engagement" (Lipton 1976; Barber 1980; 
Hill l9al). The "propitious moment" for action on 
codes of conduct that had seemed so elusive to the 
advocates of the sanctions approach seemed to arrive 
quite suddenly in the mid-1970s. 
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Was the assumption that multinational power could 
be harnessed for political ends at all justified? There 
are several writers who argue that multinationals 
concentrate economic power so effectively that it is 
they, the multinationals, who can and do exert the 
greatest political leverage on governments in matters of 
trade and investment: for instances Shearer (1967); 
Myers (1979); Liebhaberg (1980); and - specifically in 
the case of South Africa - Du Toit (1981). 
However, other writers have'pointed out that these 
same enterprises frequently need their own government's 
support to legitimate their activities, and so they are 
open to some reciprocal influence over specific policies 
under certain conditions. This is the view of Brooke 
and Lee Remmers (1970), Kassalow (1978), Kujawa (1980), 
and Lipton (1986). The case for utilising the sheer 
Power of multinationals as conduits for foreign policy 
was forcefully, if somewhat apocalytically, expressed by 
the Rev. Leon Sullivan: 
Companies have vast lobbying strength. Vast. 
They can change presidents of America. 
Companies can elect United States Senators. 
Companies in foreign countries can determine 
what happens in foreign countries. 
(Washington Post, 2 March 1985) 
Constructive engagement is therefore the attempt to 
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harness the presence inside South Africa- of 
multinationals for a political purpose, namely that of 
helping to bring about desirable change in government 
policy. As manifested in codes of conduct, it was the 
preferred alternative to the more radical policy of 
total withdrawal or boycott by economic disengagement. 
For as early as 1971 the South African Institute of Race 
Relations in Johannesburg was noting: 
The question of the extent to which foreign 
investment bolsters the status quo in South 
Africa has received closer scrutiny from 
opponents of apartheid during the year. 
Debate has tended to be located principally 
in the United States, although mounting 
pressure is discernable in the UK. In the US 
these pressures should be seen as only one 
call for social criteria to be applied to 
business .... Concern for the role of American business in South Africa is ... o 
broadly-based and embraces senators, 
congressmen, clerics and academics committed 
to the idea of eradicating discrimination. 
(SAIRR 1971, po 24) 
Malkiel and Quant, in their examination of the "moral 
issuesif in investment policy, note that Princeton 
University first publicly advocated disinvesting stock 
of American companies with South African connections in 
1967 (19710 po42)o 
The argument that foreign investment per se 
bolsters the status quo irrespective of what that 
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investment tries to do was later elaborated into an 
argument against the constructive engagement thesis. The 
at I tempt to put employment relations in a given company 
on the footing of equal opportunity, it was said, was a 
mere palliative in the light of injustices perpetrated 
outside employment. But what were the forces that 
triggered the adoption of codes? 
3.5 The British Wages Code 
From the early 1970s, there was an intensification 
of research inside South Africa into relative poverty 
levels, the distribution of income, and patterns of 
household income and expenditure for the different race 
groups. Wages as the principal form of income were 
under the spotlight and those paid by foreign-owned 
subsidiaries even more so. Here it seemed was an aspect 
of business where performance could be measured 
reasonably objectively. 
In March 1973, the notion of the "racial wage gap" 
inserted itself into the British political consciousness 
when Adam Raphael of The Guardian newspaper published 
evidence that many British-owned companies were paying 
black workers less than the poverty datum lines 
established by academic researchers. By then, the 
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unprecedented and seemingly spontaneous wave of strikes 
by blacks in Durban in protest at low wages broke out, 
and were soon to be followed by others. The possible 
complicity of British owned firms in paying poverty 
wages ensured that the matter raised by Raphael's 
article remained highly controversial in Britain. 
In October 1973, following protests about thewage 
policies of British firms at the Trade Union Congress a 
month earlier, a delegation from the TUC General Council 
visited South Africa and published a report which 
recommended that: 
Opposition to British investment in South 
Africa should be continued unless British 
firms operating in South Africa show in a 
practical way that they are encouraging and 
recognising genuinely independent trade 
unions for black workers. 
(TUC 1974, p. 39) 
The TUC clearly believed at that time that evidence of 
progress would avoid the need to oppose investment. The 
report also proposed that the TUC and ICFTU` should give 
financial help to develop the organisation of black 
workers particularly through the training of black trade 
union officers. 
The House of Commons established a select committee 
to investigate the wages and conditions of African 
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workers employed by British firms. Its main finding was 
accepted by the British Labour government (which had 
come to power as a minority government at the February 
1974 , General Election). The government issued 
11amplified guidelines" in the form of a Code of Practice 
for British firms with operating subsidiaries in the 
Republic, inviting these companies to file regular 
reports on progress made in raising African wages and in 
employment practices. This 1974 White Paper then became 
the first issue-based code specifically focusing on 
South Africa (UK 1974). 
In order to provide more comprehensive information 
and advise on employment matters, a labour attache was 
despatched to the British Embassy in Pretoria. The 
post-holder was a civil servant with nearly twenty 
years' experience in the Department of Employment, 
rather than a career diplomat, as were most of the other 
ten British labour attaches. He was however directly 
responsible to the Ambassador but also had what in 
management parlance is termed a 'dotted line 
relationship' to the overseas Labour Adviser at the 
Foreign and Commonwealth office. Through the OLA, the 
attache could communicate with both the TUC and the 
Confederation of British Industry. The Overseas Labour 
Advisor had worked in colonial labour administration 
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both at home and in African colonies; he believed 
strongly in codes as a method of influence; and he had 
a substantial role in drafting the 1974 Code of 
Practice. (Interviews with officials: FCO, London and 
British Embassy, Pretoria 1977 and 1982. ) 
Critical to the success of any code is the 
enforcement mechanism. The first assessment of the Code 
of Practice was presented to Parliament by the Secretary 
of State for Trade on 13 December 1977. As Hurst - the 
OLA - later noted, perhaps somewhat drily: "Assessment 
proved difficult in the absence of a uniform reporting 
format" (Hurst 1981, p. 34). The six salient features of 
the assessment were: 
i) only six firms declined to co-operate but out of 
the 189 reports published, only 43 (covering 
52,080 African employees) provided fully the 
information requested by the White Paper; 
ii) another'53 reports (covering 48,324 African 
employees) provided information on wage rates 
but little or none on the other points 
included in the code of practice; 
iii) seven companies employed a total of 728 
employees at wage levels below the Poverty 
Datum level (PDL); 
iv) nevertheless, during the period 1973-76 there 
was a substantial increase in wages paid to 
Africans in the lower (and higher) wage groups; 
V) -fringe benefits (or benefits 
in kind) were 
numerous and of a wide variety: but it could 
not be shown whether any had been 
introduced in response to the Code of Practice; 
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and 
vi) some reports mentioned the provision of training 
facilities for blacks and opportunities for 
black advancement and movement up to 
semi-skilled grades, but not beyond. 
(Hansard 13 December 1977, Cols. 115-118) 
Hurst further observed that: 
The assessment did not disclose any, 
predisposition on the part of employers to 
bargain with unregistered black unions in 
fixing wages and conditions. During the 
period covered by the assessment (1975-77) 
only one major British firm was known to have 
had a relationship with an unregistered 
union. 
(Hurst 1981, p. 35) 
This firm was the pharmaceutical company, Smith and 
Nephew. 
The unions seized on the lack of recognition beyond 
this one company as proof positive that the wages code 
had no effective enforcement mechanism . (TUC Congress 
debate, September 1978). But there never was a second 
assessment of the code of practice on wages, for by 1977 
it had been superseded by the European. Code. 
3.6 The European Code 
The formal initiative to draw up a European Code of 
Conduct, more broadly based than the British code, came 
from the British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, 
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supported by his German opposite number, Herr, Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher, at a meeting of Community Foreign 
Ministers on 12 July 1977. The Code was produced within 
two months, and ratified on 20 September in Brussels. 
That was an astonishingly short period, given the normal 
due process of consultation between member governments 
of the European Community and their chief employer and 
trade union organisations. "Rapid progress was possible 
when drafting the code", Hurst later wrote "because of 
the experience gained with the UK Code". (Hurst 1981, 
p. 36) In fact, Hurst himself and the British labour 
attache had largely drafted it before Dr. Owen's July 
Foreign Ministers, meeting in recognition of the 
weaknesses in the British Code of Practice and the 
pressure of fast-moving political events. 
Chief among these events was- the- first UN 
Anti-Apartheid Conference scheduled for August 1977 in 
Lagos. In the middle to late 1970's, Nigeria's buoyant 
economy basedt on oil, and, her increasingly strident 
criticisms of apartheid, had sharpened European (and 
particularly British)- fears that a political and 
economic choice might have to be made between black 
Africa and South Africa. The staging of the UN 
Conference in the Nigerian capital was thus an important 
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catalyst in the adoption by European Community nations 
of the Code of Conduct. The Community felt it had to 
demonstrate that it was not unmindful of international 
criticism against apartheid, that it recognised the 
guilt by association as a result of its extensive 
economic linkst and that it would use its influence over 
its own mother companies to promote reform - hence 
'constructive engagement'. 
Because of the haste in those summer months of 1977 
(to head off the anticipated criticisms of the Community 
at the Lagos meeting), the "usual processes of 
consultation" between member governments and their 
employer and trade union interest groups did not take 
place until after the code was adopted. Their absence 
led to some criticisms, particularly from employers' 
groups. The British CBI "regretted the lack of 
consultation". Many German employers were downright 
sceptical of the value of the code and felt it 
compromised "the political neutrality of business" (Hill 
1981, p. 29). They seized on the lack of consultation as 
a cover to hide their true opposition to the principles 
of the code. Hermle has described the initial attitude 
of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie as "frankly 
negative" (Hermle 1981, p. 53). In France, the code was 
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treated with indifference: 
In the absence of any strong public opinion on 
South Africa, the (French) government showed 
little enthusiasm for urging the Code on the 
business community. 
(Barber 1980, p. 82) 
For the o- ther European Community members, the question 
of South Africa was almost wholly without economic 
significance since they had negligible business 
interests. Nevertheless, three members - the 
Netherlands, Denmark and the Republic of Ireland 
called for tougher provisions if the code should prove 
unsatisfactory. 
Not surprisingly, the unions were 'more welcoming 
than the employers, but scarcely enthusiastic. Although 
the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), which 
comprised federations of union centres of EEC member 
states, called the code "a positive move,, (Press 
statement, 30 September 1977), the more broadly-based 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
regretted both the "lack of a mechanism to verify 
information from companies and the_ absence of any 
sanctions against non-compliance" (Press statement,, 28 
September 1977). Some years later (in 1980) the 
President of the ETUC referred to the code as 11 a unique 
example of government initiative" because:. 
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... unlike other codes of conduct or guidelines 
... it came about without any pressure from the international trade union movement. 
(Wim Kok, President, ETUC; ICFTU 
Seminar, Brussels, February 1980) 
Kok did go on to argue that, on the evidence of what had 
been achieved at that point in time,,, the "gift horse" 
had failed to live up to expectations. 
Much of the unions' frustration lay in coming to 
terms with the code's non-enforceability. Its technical 
status is that of a Iforeign_policy instrumentl,,, arising 
out of an initiative inspired by governments, which is 
provided for within the framework of European Political 
Co-operation (Barber 1980)'. ' Holland pointed out in 1985 
a positive aspect of the code, that: 
... it is in fact the Community's only 
established collective foreign policy towards 
South Africa and goes beyond the ordinary 
anti-apartheid rhetoric and joint 
condemnation. 
(Holland 1985, p. 12). 
But on the negative side he noted that because it is 
classed as an act of political co-operation,, the code is 
regarded as a voluntary endeavour. It does not 
therefore fall within the legally-enforceable provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome. This added weight to the force 
of union criticisms which had been heard over the years 
(ICFTU Seminar, Brussels, Feb 1980). 
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As a voluntary non-enforceable code progress was 
bound to be seen largely at the pace of the slowest 
company in each of the reporting countries; and the 
less-than-enthusiastic responses of some of the European 
"social partners" was to prove a pretty good indication 
both of the tasks ahead in implementing it and of the 
difficulty governments would have in deriving political 
benefits from it. 
Writing two years' after the code was promulgated, 
Hill noted a continuing disparity in performance: 
There is too, some difference between the 
reactions to the code of German and British 
business men. In Britain it has, I think, on 
the whole been recognised, though often 
rather reluctantly, as a worth while measure. 
In Germany, on the contrary, there seems to 
be considerably more scepticism both about 
its relevance and its effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the German Government appears to 
have less power to encourage companies to 
comply with the requirement to report under 
the code (since the code is voluntary no 
government can enforce compliance) and it has 
had to give way to companies' reluctance to 
report directly, rather than through their 
representative organisations. There seems, 
too, to be less readiness in German than in 
British business circles to see the 
promulgation of the code as a creative 
political initiative, perhaps because the 
possible dangers of South Africa as a field 
for long-term investment are less widely 
, recognised in Germany than in Britain and so 
there is less recognition of the need for 
change,, and of, its urgency. 
(Hill 1981, p. 29) 
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The "relative degrees of urgency" to which Hill 
refers is almost certainly due to two factors. The 
first is the far greater historical,, ' political' and 
cultural connection between Britain and South Africa, 
than has ever existed between Germany or France and 
South Africa. The second is the differing size of 
economic involvement: while the collective EEC'share of 
foreign investment in South Africa in 1977 was 64 
percent (Hurst 1981, p. 35), Britain alone accounted for 
54 percent (Financial Times, South African Survey, July 
1978). 
3.7 The Sullivan Principles 
As the second largest country of origin for 
investment in South Africa, the United States of America 
is in principle susceptible to similar world political 
pressures as the European nations. But America does not 
have the long history of involvement with Africa that 
conditions the British approach. Politically the United 
States accorded South Africa nowhere near the priority 
between 1960 and 1977 that was given'to the Middle East, 
Vietnam, China and Central and South America. 
Nevertheless the State Department did commission a 
report on US multinationals' employment practices in the 
111 
Republic as early as 1973 (United States 1973). The 
stated purpose of this inquiry was: 
.... to assist in indicating some of the areas 
of activity in which firms .... (could) improve their labour practices. 
(United States 1973, p. 3). 
The paper, in a "self-congratulatory and dramatic 
manner", according to Otten (1985, p. 34), described the 
innovative roles of American firms and cited 
improvements in wages, working conditions, fringe 
benefits and opportunities for advancement for blacks. 
It concluded that much remained to be done. After the 
paper was published, the State Department opened up a 
"dialogue" with leading US investors which was 
intensified during the Carter Administration and the 
gradual emergence of anti-apartheid as a radical issue. 
(Interview: State Department, March 1983) 
The State Department, s "dialogue" was discreet. 
Much more audible pressure came from the Rev. Leon H. 
Sullivan, a pastor of the black Zion Baptist Church in 
Philadelphia, whose forthright views on the capacities 
of business to affect politics have already been quoted. 
Sullivan is a disciple of the civil rights leader, 
Martin Luther King, who believed in dramatic but 
non-violent means of campaigning for a better deal in 
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American society for blacks. King and other civil 
rights leaders argued not just for an end to flagrant 
-discrimination over voting rights, education and housing 
-but also positive 
discrimination to wipe out the 
destructive effects of centuries of slavery and inferior 
social status. Sullivan concentrated on the opening up 
of opportunities for blacks in industry, stressing the 
desirability of "affirmative action programmes" 
(Whisson 1981, p. 19). 
In 1971 Sullivan became a member of the Board of 
General Motors which then had a substantial 
manufacturing base at Port Elizabeth. He was a firm 
advocate of disinvestment at that time, and has written: 
My first public reaction -regarding the 
Republic of South Africa occurred in 1971 at 
the annual GM stockholders' meeting.... I 
stated my views and voted that General Motors 
should withdraw from South Africa until 
apartheid was ended. To my knowledge, I was 
the only Board member in America, or in the 
world, to take such a position on a 
stockholders' meeting floor. I held that 
position until the summer of 1975 when I 
briefly stopped over near Johannesburg. 
(Sullivan 1980, p. 7) 
On that first visit to the Republic (he was en route to 
Lesotho), Sullivan met non-white leaders from the 
churches, trade unions and communities who repeatedly 
asked him to make an attempt to persuade American 
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companies to become a force for change, as he put it: 
"by taking a stand against racial segregation, beginning 
with their own operations" (op. cit., p. 7). 
In March 1977, fully four months before the meeting 
of Foreign Ministers initiated the European Code, the 
Sullivan Principles were launched with the support of 
twelve signatory companies. From the start, the 
principles were actively supported by the Administration 
and members of Congress, who were able to pressure. other 
companies to subscribe. (Interviews: State Department; 
and Sullivan Organisation, Philadelphia, March 1983). 
Indeed, the Administration made corresponding 
political demands on South Africa. In a speech the 
Secretary of State warned the country that relations 
with America would deteriorate "if it failed to make 
rapid progress to end racial discrimination and to bring 
about the full political participation of all citizens" 
(Du Toit 1981, p. 369) Within two years, virtually all 
US investors operationally active in the Republic had 
subscribed to the principles, perhaps influenced by 
Sullivan-*s unequivocal stance: 
I will be supporting selective divestment 
against American companies that do not 
co-operate with the Principlest and who fail 
to favorably comply with their 
implementation. I will also, be calling for 
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and be urging strong United States government 
action against them, including tax penalties, 
sanctions, and the loss of government 
contracts. And, if change still does not 
come fast enough, I will consider stronger 
measures, including total divestment, and 
ultimately, a total embargo on all American 
exports and imports to and from South Africa. 
(Sullivan 1980, p. 17) 
3.8 The EEC and Sullivan Codes Compared 
The different routes by which the two codes 
originated goes some way to explain the differing 
achievements ascribed to them. On the one hand, the 
European code was an elaborate version of the British 
Wages code, itself a direct descendant of the Colonial 
Office approach, with emphasis placed on the role of 
collective bargaining and achieving minimum target wage 
rates. It is relevant to note that both main authors of 
the EEC code - the overseas Labour Adviser and the 
British labour attache - had worked during their careers 
in the Commonwealth labour environment. on the other 
hand, the Sullivan principles stemmed from a history of 
combatting deeply divisive race discrimination in the 
United States, the partial healing of which relied upon 
the moral persuasion of employers to provide corrective 
opportunities for the disadvantaged. The principles are 
therefore oriented towards employers' human resource 
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policies, and did not in their original formulation 
accord much role in the process of change for trade 
unions (though this was later added under criticism: see 
Chapter 9). 
. 
As to the question of who is covered, the European 
code applies to all "legal subsidiaries" of 
multinationals based in EEC countries, which is taken to 
mean those with a fifty percent equity held by the 
parent company. The Sullivan principles apply only to 
those who subscribe to them, though in practice about 
sixty percent of US firms known to be operating in the 
Republic do subscribe. Neither code is in the legal 
sense mandatory. The penalty for non-compliance or non- 
submission of reports is normative: the risk of adverse 
publicity. In the United States, the Sullivan 
principles have become a benchmark for probing questions 
at stockholders' meetings. Theo Purcell calculated in 
1979 that South Africa had "become the dominant issue at 
such meetings, with one-quarter of all stockholder 
motions urging opposition to trade or supply with the 
Republic". Many more US executives were visiting their 
subsidiaries to acquaint themselves with developments. 
Purcell concluded that "there can be no doubt that 
observable changes have occurred ... the result of 
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shareholder activism as well as corporate concern" 
(Purcell 1979, p. 30). 
Subsidiaries are required to report annually. The 
British Department of Trade has published a summary of 
the returns, and the German Ministry of Commerce an 
occasional one. The Sullivan returns are analysed 
according to criteria which change annually and is 
determined by a committee of signatories, with the 
reports themselves prepared by an independent firm of 
consultants, Arthur D. Little and Associates. The fact 
that the Sullivan criteria are frequently reviewed means 
that the principles have the advantage of flexibility 
over the European code, which needs inter-governmental 
agreement for revision. 
The two codes stimulated others to appear. In 
South Africa, the Urban Foundation helped draw up a code 
in association with the Employers' Consultative 
Committee on Labour Affairs (SACCOLA), which was 
published in December 1977. This followed an employers, 
conference, which had been called to decide what role 
employers in the private sector should play in 
addressing black grievances revealed so dramatically at 
Soweto. The Barlow Rand Group Code of Employment 
Practice was issued in 1978. In 1978 also, the Canadian 
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government adopted a variation of the European code, a 
move shortly followed by the withdrawal of 
government-sponsored support facilities for Canadian 
firms, including the closure of commercial sections and 
the removal of export credit guarantees (ICFTU 1982). 
The chief external codes, Sullivan and the EEC, are 
inherently political in nature and intent. They were 
designed primarily with the interests of foreign 
governments in mind. They depended for their success on 
business '-realising and accepting the constructive 
engagement case - that codes were a more desirable 
policy than disinvestment. The slow reluctance of some 
companies and indeed some governments to endorse the 
codes with 'any convincing degree of enthusiasm, is 
evidence that this point has not been widely understood 
or'accepted. Those foreign investors who'did accept the 
constructive engagement thesis probably recognised, 
along-with 'liberals' within the South African business 
elite, that what was ultimately at stake in the Republic 
was the survival of the-free 'enterprise system. As 
Professor-Felberg, head of the Cape Town Graduate School 
of Business, expressed it: 
The policy of separate development has for 
decades been sowing the seeds for the 
destruction of the free enterprise system.... 
Today, as in the past, South Africa needs 
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business leaders with vision. Men who can 
see beyond the narrow confines of their own 
business. Fortunately, our corporate 
statesmen are now taking a strong and 
positive position on our racial 
problems.... Thinking businessmen (however) 
should not merely be reacting to South 
Africa's current problems and taking suitable 
action, but should rather be looking at the 
problems of the future and taking positive 
steps to help create an environment in which 
all South Africans can live in peace and 
harmony. 
(Quoted in Du Toit 1981, p. 369) 
Thus Holland was surely right to claim that the 
codes were an advance on the previous two decades of 
"rhetoric and condemnation" (Holland 1985). The 
political agitation of international agencies at the 
injustices of apartheid then had little discernible 
effect inside the South Africa political and business 
elites. But would the codes be taken any more seriously 
than the rhetoric? A measure of their achievements 
inside the subsidiaries of multinationals is worth 
attempting, not the least because it may help determine 
the prospects on the other possible initiatives in the 
sanctions model which if implemented would need the 
active co-operation of international business if they 
were to achieve success. 
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The research attempted a measure of what had been 
achieved inside companies and where it was believed the 
pressure points had come from. The next Chapter 
examines the nature of employers and capital inside the 
Republic. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPLOYERS AND CAPITAL 
"Though the gold trade of the Transvaal has not yet 
been remunerative, it may nevertheless help to bring a 
population to this country which will build it up, and 
make it prosperous.. *.. There is a charm and a power 
about gold which is so seductive and inebriating that 
judgement and calculation are ignored by its 
votaries ... I am not now intending to warn the covetous 
against the gold fields of South Africa but am simply 
expressing an opinion that though they should not be 
the source of fortune to the speculators, they will 
certainly serve to bring white inhabitants into the 
country. #' 
Anthony Trollope 1872 
South Africa Vol. 2. Chp. 5 
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Introduction 
It was indeed gold which transformed the fortunes 
of South Africa, gold which became the source of 
personal and corporate fortune - enriching the 
speculator, against Trollope's wish - and the stimulus, 
as he rightly anticipated, for much other economic 
activity. This chapter examines the nature of employers 
and management in an economy which because of the wealth 
waiting to be mined has been attractive for overseas 
capital for the century since gold was first discovered. 
Section 1 describes and analyses the multinational 
enterprise in its 'global setting, comparing , the 
characteristics of these firms with purely domestic 
enterprises. In Section -2, differences 'between 
multinationals are discussed, in relation to the type of 
control emanating from the centre, " ý 
The question of how much autonomy multinational 
subsidiaries enjoy in relation to personnel and labour 
affairs is the subject of Section 3. Section 4 examines 
the kinds of foreign investment attracted to South 
Africa, and the changing pattern from direct to indirect 
investment. The role of multinationals in the modern 
South 'African economy and the place of mining finance 
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houses occupies Section 5. Section 6 discusses 
managerial ideology and the prospects of subsidiaries 
responding to the corporate social goals. 
4.1 The Global Business 
one of the most significant economic developments 
in the twentieth century has been the emergence of the 
multinational as a global enterprise. A multinational is 
a business which operates in two or more independent 
countries; though on a scale of importance we should-not 
rate very highly a business which only operated in 
adjacent countries,, such as Britain and Ireland or 
Canada and the United States. Vernon defines a 
multinational enterprise as:,, 
.... a cluster of corporations of different 
nationalities that are joined together by a 
parent company through bonds of common 
ownership that respond to a common strategy, 
and that draw on a common pool of human and 
financial resources. 
, (Vernon 1971i p. 6) 
This is a deliberately wide definition which does not 
attempt to limit the concept of the multinational, by 
reference to any numerical scale. -It includes firms 
that trade, provide services, - or own portfolios of 
investment as well as those that manufacture. ý 
It is now accepted that multinationals collectively 
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are, in the words of Sauvant: 
.... the major factor in international 
economics .... the volume of international 
production surpasses inAmportance the volume 
of exports as a means of delivering goods to 
foreign markets. 
(Sauvant 1976,, p. 10). 
World wide, there are estimated to be "well over 10,000 
multinationals", but most are relatively small: in the 
mid-1970's, just 171 controlled fifty-eight percent of 
the total stock of foreign investment (Sauvant, p. 45). 
Most of these companies owned subsidiaries in at least 
twenty different countries. Further, over ninety percent 
of the aggregated activities of multinationals were 
controlled by head offices located in only seven 
countries - the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and Canada (Sauvant 
1976, p. 9). 
This high degree of concentration has led to 
controversy over the impact these companies have on the 
ability of national governments to be truly sovereign in 
determining economic policies. "The surge of interest 
in transnational corporations", wrote N. T. Wang, a 
member of the United Nations Secretariat, in 1976: 
.... reflects a widespread disquiet about the 
state of the world and a searching 
reappraisal of existing values and 
institutions. With the critical 
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re-examination of the foundations of modern 
industrial as well as the less 
developed societies, and the searching 
questioning of the abilities of , these societies to fulfill basic human needs, the 
growth and spread of transnational 
corporations are no longer equated with 
progress and development. Every crisis, 
whether it is external or internal 
dis-equilibrium, shortage of food or energy,, 
has been linked with the operations, if not 
the misconduct of some transnational 
corporations. 
(Wang 1976, p. 215) 
Multinationals still attract strong ideological 
passions, though it may be that the concern over their 
activities has been somewhat muted as nations now woo 
investment from them in order to counter the rundown of 
employment opportunities in indigenous industries, 
Investment by multinationals headquarters overseas 
is either 'direct' or 'indirect'. Direct investment, 
usually thought of as plant and facilities under the 
ownership of the central company, occurs when a branch 
factory or office is set up. Indirect investment refers 
to the acquisition of a financial stake in an existing 
business, either for the purpose of extending control 
over that enterprise or for securing a return on the 
risk. 
Fishwick has noted six main economic reasons which 
companies have used to establish a foreign presence: 
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i) "defensive" investment; 
ii) greater exploitation of fixed assets; 
iii) economies of scale; 
iv) transportation costs higher than local 
production and distribution costs; 
V) competitive advantages over exporters; and 
vi) financial advantages from a spread of risks. 
(Fishwick 1982, p. 52) 
Defensive investment strategies result from the 
intense competition between rivals in any - one market. 
Crudely, it often seems that if one rival' moves, its 
competitors often follow. Ottersen cites the Harvard 
Project on multinationals which found that foreign 
investments "clustered. around critical peaks of 
activity" (Ottersen 1984, p. 36). Foreign investment 
with the objective of exploiting assets more effectively 
leads some firms to vertical integration backwards into 
the raw materials process (for example, a tyre company 
wishing to own its rubber plantations to better 
experiment with new strains). Others may incline to 
horizontal integration into the markets of a similar 
company (for exampl e, to use a particular technique, 
invention or distribution system to produce or 
distribute a similar product by buying into an existing 
business). 
Multinationals accrue considerable economies of 
scale by centralising certain services which can be 
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commonly drawn on (such as research 
while maintaining diverse productio 
minimise interruptions in supply 
disputes). Additionally, companies 
savings can be made by local supply to 
overseas markets. This is especially 
such as chemicals which are expensive 
transport. 
and development) 
n facilities (to 
through labour 
may decide that 
reasonably secure 
true for products 
or difficult to 
The competitive advantage achieved by local 
production compared with exporting includes the ability 
to circumnavigate any trade protection barriers or 
'local content' laws. Japanese manufacturers have 
penetrated European markets largely by such means. 
Local production may also be an important part of the 
strategy to overcome any jingoistic reaction against 
foreign products. It also helps the multinational 
secure any particular cost-saving advantages such as 
cheap labour or more abundant raw materials. Perhaps 
the most immediate financial advantage to be gained from 
setting up local production facilities in present times 
is, as Ottersen notes, the plethora of: 
.... grants and financial advantages all 
national governments offer companies as part 
of their wider social policies to minimise 
the effects of structural unemployment. 
(Fishwick 1982, p. 15) 
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A further advantage allegedly enjoyed by 
multinationals is the relative freedom to adjust 
internal transfer prices. It is difficult to envisage, a 
mechanism which could effectively outlaw the 
manipulation of reporting profit in each country 
so as to exploit different tax rates, or take advantages 
of tax credits, or minimise the amount of customs duties 
payable, or any combination of these devices, in order 
to maximise the repatriation of profit or capital. 
Fishwick has also noted the key characteristics 
that distinguish multinational enterprises from purely 
domestic firms. These may be summarised as: 
i) higher capital-intensity and greater labour 
productivity; 
ii) a tendency to pay higher wages and salaries 
than indigenous firms; 
iii) in general, a larger unit of plant (measured 
both by capital employed and number of 
employees); and 
iv) fewer vertically-integrated plants (a much 
greater proportion undertaking only a part 
of the manufacturing process in one 
particular location). 
(Fishwick 1982, p. 23) 
These four characteristics are of course linked. 
Fishwick argues that multinationals are likely to be 
engaged in more technologically advanced activities 
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which require greater concentrations of capital, so 
their "value-added per employee" is bound to be higher 
on average than in purely domestic enterprises in order 
to secure an adequate return on capital. 
It follows that since labour costs are a relatively 
low proportion of total costs and productivity higher in 
multinationals, they are in the main able to pay higher 
remuneration than many purely domestic companies. They 
are also likely to offer more secure employment, and, in 
developing economies, to offer employment packages based 
on first world industrial countries, standards. 
Kassalow (1978) has further noted that multinationals 
are likely to be more easily unionised than domestic 
enterprises, since personnel practices are based on a 
world experience, not merely a local one. 
The third and fourth characteristics also arise 
inexorably from the economic raison d'Stre of the 
multinational. Plant size is a function of the scale of 
investment; and a fragmented production process comes 
about by the spreading of risk and division of labour 
that is part of the multinational's objective. 
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4.2 Manacrement Control 
Thus far, multinationals have been treated as a 
fairly homogeneous genre. But of course there are wide 
variations between different types, and nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the structure of management 
control over decision-making- This not only varies 
between multinationals of different national parentage 
and in different businesses, it also varies within the 
same multinational for different functional areas. 
Kassalow (1978) notes that British multinationals 
are more decentralised in decision-making than American. 
He ascribes this to the generally longer time scale 
under which British companies have operated 
subsidiaries, particularly in countries of the British 
Empire, in days before modern information technology 
facilitated the growth of knowledge at 'the centre. 
Roberts and May (1974), confirming Kassalowl's line of 
argument, have called the British propensity for 
decentralisation a "cultural factor". Kassalow 
speculates that, apart from a relatively late entry into 
international business, American multinationals, ' 
reasons for operating more centralised decision-making 
may include the fact that the American home market 
constitutes a far greater share of the average U. S. 
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multinationals' total'business than Europea In business 
does of the European multinationals' total activity. 
Thus the overseas subsidiary is more likely to be 
treated as an extension of the home-based undertaking. 
Mira Wilkins points out that the principal purpose of 
American multinationals was to sell - they had much less 
reason to seek supplies overseas and so were able to 
establish what were in effect "foreign sales 
subsidiaries" (Wilkins 1974, p. 215). 
A second factor differentiating America and British 
multinational control is the practice of management 
appointments. In countries such as South Africa the 
British company may traditionally have preferred to 
appoint expatriate managers, but to most intents and 
purposes the managers' careers lie in South Africa 
rather than 'with the parent in other locations. This 
includes key appointments at managing director level. 
With American companies, however, the practice of 
secondment to key managerial positions is commonplace. 
The career path of these individuals is likely to 
encompass several locations and the head office of the 
same company. This practice clearly intensifies the 
power of the centre over the subsidiary, thus allowing 
closer control (Wilkins 1974, p. 217). As an ILO Study 
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pointed out, there may-be few American nationals in 
relation to all the managers employed in a typical 
subsidiary, but the enterprise is usually under more 
tight guidance than those of European nations, (ILO 1976, 
p. 53). 
In 1975 Kujawa studied 134 Unit ed States 
multinational operations abroad. He applied the product 
life-cycle theory to overseas operations: that US 
multinationals generate new products at home, export 
them, then manufacture them elsewhere. He found that 
the US parent retained a tight control over its 
subsidiaries over both the product and the process 
technology. He observed that a technology developed in 
the US to offset high labour costs may not always be 
appropriate overseas, where the local need may be for a 
technology to offset the high cost of materials in an 
otherwise low-wage environment (Kujawa 1980). 
It follows from this that we may expect some 
variation in patterns of control according to the nature 
of the business - its source of finance, technology and 
markets. The sheer scale, of products, such as power 
transmission systems and aerospace equipment forces a 
certain rationality on manufacturing systems, but the 
local differences in markets and costs would suggest a 
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fair degree of autonomy in subsidiary management. 
Decentralisation is also likely to be more appropriate 
where products vary, as in food manufacturing, or where 
local content agreements with host governments create 
the need for local research and development, as in the 
vehicle industry. On the other hand, common markets and 
technologies, such as in computer hardware and software 
and some consumer durables, facilitate tight centralised 
control (Shearer 1967; Ackerman 1973; Ottersen 1984). 
Ackerman argued that the strong trend in 
multinationals towards divisionalised structures' and 
diversification: 
.... has been accompanied by important 
modifications in the internal dynamics of, the 
corporation, and in the assignment of 
responsibilities for responding to 
environmental change. 
(Ackerman 1973, p. 90) 
He makes the important point that the I'modus operandill 
of a typical divisionalised multinationals makes a 
"poor fit" with the idea of corporate social 
responsibility. Local management run their own show in 
exchange for meeting agreed and quantifiable targets., 
The notion of externally imposed social considerations 
from the centre sits uneasily with established patterns 
of autonomy. Social costs and benefits are not amenable 
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to financial measurement or planning, and may occur in 
time frames longer than the local manager's tenure of 
office. This may well constitute an important factor in 
the South African case. 
4.3 The Personnel Function 
Of all the key functions of management, none 
appears to enjoy as much autonomy from the centre as 
personnel: human resourcing, training and development 
and the conduct of industrial relations (Tugenhadt 1971; 
Copp 1977). The reasons are obvious. National customs, 
social policies and legislation need to be followed by 
the multinational if it is to nurture a "good citizen" 
profile and establish harmonious working relations with 
the host government. Only management on the spot, the 
argument goes, can know the local labour market well 
enough to develop an appropriate personnel policy. This 
has led to the observation that multinationals are 
cameleon-like - taking on the colour of the environment 
in which they happen to find themselves. 
Blainpain claims that in the long-run 
multinationals of any parentage tend to conform to local 
custom and practice on industrial relations matters 
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(Blanpain 1977, p. 125). Writing solely about American 
companies, however, Shearer claimed: 
.... (they) usually premise their industrial 
relations policies on the basis of values, 
assumptions and habits they developed in the 
United States. They then may or m, ay not 
modify them in response to the different 
circumstances abroad. 
(Shearer 1967,, p. 117) 
Shearer also found United States multi-nationals more 
reluctant to grant union recognition and fringe benefits 
to local staff, and more prone to lay-off workers than 
domestic enterprises. This confirms Kujawa's claim that 
US multinationals made threats to relocate production 
elsewhere as a result of a labour unrest. Kujawa found 
that between 1968 and 1974 his sample of multinationals 
sold or liquidated 717 manufacturing outlets out of a' 
grand total of 6,500, implying tight central head office 
control (Kujawa 1980, p. 35). 
Nevertheless, as Liebhaberg claims, the precise 
extent of decentralisation in personnel affairs is not 
easy to calculate. He writes: 
One of the areas of greatest controversy in 
multinational management revolves around the 
exact point at which decisions are made 
concerning industrial relations .... Trade 
unions look upon local subsidiary management 
as an essentially powerless puppet which 
dances to the tune of the international and 
non-national headquarters' management .... In 
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answer, the multinationals say that, in 
their organisational charts, they classify 
industrial relations as a decentralised 
function. 
(Liebhaberg 1980, p. 77) 
Organised labour, including the international trade 
union federations, does indeed remain sceptical of the 
decentralisation thesis. The unionsO frustration often 
stems from what they see as delay and indeed sometimes 
insensitivity in dealing with local grievances when 
matters are referred to head office. They readily 
acknowledge that these characteristics may be no more 
than a tactical ploy, along the lines of "dont blame 
us, we'd give you the money - but it's those people at 
headquarters". They argue strongly that their experience 
does not point to genuine decentralisation in the 
overwhelming majority of cases. (Interviews: TUC, 
London; ICFTU, Brussels. ) 
Yet Hamill (1984) cautions against too extreme a 
few on this issue. He studied foreign-owned companies 
operating in Britain in the chemical, mechanical and 
electrical engineering sectors, and found that the key 
factors which define the basic operating characteristics 
of parent-subsidiary relations within multinationals 
included the nationality of parent ownership, and the 
subsidiary's financial performance. He noted: 
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.... American -owned MNCs were found to be 
more centralised in labour relations 
decision-making than European-owned MNCs. 
This was a consequence of of the more 
integrated nature of American-owned 
MNCs .... and the more ethno-centric managerial 
styles of American NMCs. 
(Hamill 1984, p. 33/4) 
Ottersen's, study of international banks, petrochemical 
companies and manufacturers found ten out of a total of 
seventeen firms stating that their industrial relations 
policy-making was "mostly", "very" or "totally" 
decentralised, plus a further three who were 
"reasonably" or "basically" at the decentralised end of 
the spectrum (Ottersen 1984, p. 98). 
The evidence therefore suggests that the function 
of personnel is decentralised relative to most other 
functions within a multinational, providing a subsidiary 
company is performing satisfactorily. 
4.4 Foreign Investment in South Africa 
South Africa has been attractive to foreign capital 
ever since Kimberley diamonds and Witwatersrand gold 
were discovered. Indeed, the relationship was 
symbiotic: without foreign capital these resources could 
not have been exploited. Geology dictated-that the thin 
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and uneven spread of the ore-bearing reef required deep 
mining methods of great expense and technical complexity 
(Lipton 1985, p. 111). The London finance market played 
the crucial part in raising equity and risk capital for 
mining, and since investors then had a clear preference 
for direct investment, many of the mines and mining 
houses were British-owned (Hall 1969). Within a few 
months of the verification of goldfields on the Rand, 
Cecil Rhodes and his associates had registered in London 
the first mining finance house, Goldfields of South 
Africa Ltd., with an initial capital of E125,000 (Innes 
1984, p. 46). Frankel published in 1938 an assessment of 
investment in the first fifty years of mining: 
It is probable that over the whole period to 
1932, roughly speaking, 75 percent of the 
dividends distributed by the gold mining 
companies were paid to investors residing 
overseas. 
(Frankel 1969 ed, p. 89) 
He estimated that in this period C190 millions were paid 
at as dividends, a mean yield of 4.1 percent over the 
years 1887 to 1932 (p. 91). 
South Africa had to be attractive to bring in the 
required level of investment. To do so meant providing 
not only a satisfactory rate of return (thus emphasising 
the need to keep costs down) but also a spread of risk 
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(which was best achieved by diversification). Thus 
there was an incentive for the thriving mining companies 
to spawn manufacturing and tertiary industries in which 
they themselves had participatory ownership. Foreign 
capital again provided equity and loans for these new 
ventures. In only a very few periods of 
industrialisation has the rate of South Africa's 
internal capital formation been sufficient to generate 
domestic economic growth (Nattrass 1982, p. 52). 
By 1960, South Africa had an advanced economy for a 
country not of the first world, but it still exhibited 
distinctly colonial features. For instance, over 
three-quarters of foreign liability was owned within the 
Sterling area of which South Africa, still in the 
British Commonwealth at that time, was then a part. The 
bulk of this investment was direct, manifested in the 
dominance of British firms over the manufacturing 
sectors. After severing Commonwealth and Sterling area 
links the Republic began to look elsewhere for funds, 
especially short and long term loan capital. Of capital 
purely of British origin, the proportion of direct 
investment was roughly constant over the period 1956 to 
1983. But as Britain's share of South Africa's total 
foreign liabilities has fallen, so the proportion of 
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direct investment in the total indebtedness has fallen 
also. Table 4.1 illustrates this latter point. 
Continental Europe has provided loan capital on a 
rapidly rising scale in recent decades. In 1964 this 
source accounted for twenty percent of total foreign 
indirect investment: by the end of 1972 it had risen to 
forty-two percent (SA Reserve Bank). The reason for 
this increase lies in the growing importance of Western 
Europe as a net capital exporter, utilising the 
euro-currency and euro-bond markets (Hermle 1981). In 
1973, Britain herself joined the European Economic 
Community and from then on the official figures of both 
the South African Reserve Bank and the Bank of England 
ceased to provide reliable data on the exact nature of 
British as distinct from European capital. 
What is however clear is that Europe and North 
America between them contributed more than eighty 
percent of South Africa's capital requirements after 
1973. Following the Soweto riots in 1976 and 
uncertainties arising from the military conflict in 
Angola and Namibia, long-term loans dropped sharply. 
Short-term funds continued to be available from the Far 
East and the International Monetary Fund as well as 
traditional sources (Kaplan 1983a). The economic boom, 
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Table 4: 1 
SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN LIABILITIES 
Direct Investment in 
Government stock and 
banking 
Private Sector 
Subtotal % share 
Indirect Investment'in 
Government stock and 
banking 
Private Sector 
Public Corporations 
Subtotal % share 
Total Value (Rbn. ) 
% of Total 
1956 1966 1974 1979 1983 
3.4 4.3 1.7 1.6 2.0 
54.6 53.2 50.8 43.0 39.8 
58.0 57.5 52.5 44.6 41.8 
8.2 8.6 11.2 14.5 20.5 
33.8 33.9 24.3 24.2 13.7, 
-- -- 12.0 16.7 24.0 
42.0 42.5 47.5 55.4 58.2 
2.79 4.68 12.78 22.88 45.55 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
Quarterly Bulletins - various editions: 
1968: 11 1975: 11 1980: 11 1984: 1 
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fuelled by a record gold price which for a period in 
1980 exceeded $900 an ounce, again sucked in capital 
from many world, centres. In 1983 when'the boom turned 
into slump, - about fifty percent of foreign liabilities 
were owned in Europe, about thirty percent in North 
America (primarily the United States) and the remaining 
twenty percent throughout the rest of the' non-Communist 
world (SA Reserve Bank). 
Two significant features of the past twenty years' 
changes in South Africa's foreign capital stand out. 
First, while the ratio of direct investment to 
fixed-term loans has been steadily falling, the 
dependency on foreign capital has actually increased. 
Myers et al (1980) estimated that of the average six 
percent compound growth rate achieved in the period 
1960-75, fully one-third was directly funded from 
overseas. Curtis (1984) has argued that since the 
second IMF loan was granted in 1982, South Africa's 
dependence on foreign loans has visibly increased, and 
is likely to continue to grow. 
Second, demand for overseas capital has come not 
just from the private banking and manufacturing sectors 
within the Republic but also increasingly from the 
I 
public sector. So-called "parastatal corporations" - 
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for example, Iscor, Escor and Armscor - have engaged in 
international borrowing and joint ventures with overseas 
investors, loans which have been guaranteed by the South 
African government. Government, too, has -sought 
overseas funding for some of the projects undertaken by 
its own departments such as Transport Services, and 
Posts and Telecom. At the end of March 1982, total 
overseas indebtedness by the public sector ran to R9.56 
billions, of which fourteen percent (Rl. 33bn) was in the 
government's own name and the remainder with public 
corporations (SA Government Gazette, 9 July 1982). 
The massive increase in South African spending on 
defence, both in absolute terms and relative to other 
priorities, which Myers has estimated to be at 
twenty-five per cent a year from 1974 to 1977, had the 
effect of increasing the government's control over the 
economy via its procurement policies. But the policy 
has also forced the government to borrow overseas simply 
because its own tax base cannot alone sustain such an 
increase (Myers et al 1980). 
The recession which set in before the end of 1982 
deepened throughout the period to 1985, 'despite a four 
percent growth in the gross national product achieved in 
143 
1984. This was a period marked by a continuing low 
price for gold, -seldom higher than $325 an ounce and 
often under $300, which in turn lost the Government much 
income, had an adverse impact on the balance of payments 
and depressed profits, especially but not only in the 
mining sector. Inflation - on official figures never 
less than 10.2 per cent a year from 1975 to 1983 - stood 
very high in relation to first world countries, thus 
inter alia increasing the cost of borrowing, yet at the 
same time increasing the demand for it. Recession and 
high inflation together have placed great strain on the 
economic system to repay loan capital increasingly 
guaranteed by government (Blumenfeld 1987b). 
4.5 Multinationals in South Africa 
Nothing typifies the dual model of the economy more 
than the presence of multinational companies in its, 
modern sector. ' Myers has estimated that, by the end of 
the 1970's, eighty-three percent of petrochemicals 
manufacture (and ninety-one percent of retail outlets) 
were controlled by Shell, BP, ', Mobil, Caltex and Total. 
The vehicle market was dominated by VW, Ford, General 
Motors, Datsun and Toyota, with only one South African 
firm (Sigma, accounting for fourteen percent of the 
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market) controlling the manufacture of Chrysler, Peugot, 
Citroen, Mazda and Leyland models. In computing, IBM 
and ICL between them held two-thirds of the market 
(Myers et al 1980, p. 6) 
In 1982 it was estimated that there were 3,000 
active investor companies from abroad in the Republic, 
concentrated particularly in engineering, household 
products, banking and finance, and oil. About one-half 
of these companies were American and between 350 and 4ob 
each from Britain and West Germany (Financial Times, 25 
May, 1982; Goldberg 1982; Leape et al 1985). In 1981, 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
claimed 3,035 subsidiaries of foreign parentage from no 
less than twenty-two mother countries (ICFTU 1981, p. 5). 
These countries are listed in Table 4.2 overleaf. 
The majority of these three thousandý investor 
companies exhibited a minority but nonetheless 
significant foreign financial holding, rather than a 
majority controlling interest. Using 1977 data, Savage 
carried out an empirical investigation into registered 
ownership of the top 100 South African companies to 
determine whether there was any evidence of a divorce 
between actual ownership and control, as there had 
appeared to be at a similar stage of economic 
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Table 4: 2 
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF FOREIGN FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Countrv No. of Firms 
% of Total 
(N = 3,035), 
United States 894 29.4 
United Kingdom 874 28.8 
West Germany 296 9.75 
France 202 6.7 
Netherlands 171 5.6 
Australia 151 5.0 
Switzerland 97 3.2 
Sweden 88 2.9 
Canada 86 2.8 
Belgium 63 2.1, 
Hong Kong 30 1.0 
Italy 28 0.9 
Ten others 55 1.8 
TOTAL 3.035 
I 
Source: ICFTU 1981 
"Investment in Apartheid, " p. 5 
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development in the United States and Britain. He found 
that seventeen of the top 100 industrials were under 
majority foreign ownership, and a further twenty-nine 
under minority foreign ownership, making a foreign 
presence in forty-six out of the top 100 (Savage 1979, 
p. 55). However, he believes this understated the extent 
of foreign participation in leading companies: 
Registered foreign investments (as revealed 
by share records) do not indicate the full 
extent of such investments... for many ... are 
registered in the name of local nominee 
companies. Thus, for instance it is known 
that several South African banks have 
nominee companies, which are the registered 
owners of industrial shares but that several 
of these nominee companies hold their 
investments on behalf of foreign owners. 
(Savage 1979,, p. 57) 
There is, furthermore, the problem of measuring indirect 
foreign participation: that is, the value of foreign 
investments in South African companies which themselves 
have shareholdings in the top one hundred industrial 
companies. 
Further evidence of the abundance of 
multinationals in the South African economy relative to 
its size and stage of developments, comes from what Levy 
refers to as its "bias" towards capital-intensive 
sectors. , Comparing manufactured exports from Korea, 
Brazil and South Africa, Levy noted: 
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In 1977, labour-intensive textiles and wood 
products accounted for 48 percent of Korea's 
exports and 15 percent of Brazil's; by 
contrast these sectors accounted for only 3 
percent of South African manufactured 
exports. In fact, in 1974 the value of 
textile imports into South Africa was almost 
as high as the value-added in domestic 
textile production. And while 
capital-intensive exports of base metals and 
chemicals comprised 12 percent of Korea's and 
9 percent of Brazil's manufactured exports, 
a massive 50 percent of South Africa's 
exports emanated from these sectors. 
(Levy 1981,. p-8) 
Foreign investment is the route by which an 
intermediate developing country like South Africa 
acquires foreign technology. This can be, in Nattrass's 
phase, something of a "mixed blessing". On the one 
hand, it facilitates an increase in productivity, but on 
the other it has been developed: 
.... to suit the relative endowments of the factors of production in the country from 
which it originates. As the research and 
development processes that lie behind, 
technological advances are in themselves 
usually capital intensive, such research 
tends to take place in countries that have an 
abundance of capital and are short of labour. 
This means that the origin of the technology 
is highly likely to impart a capital-using 
bias to it. 
(Nattrass 1982, p. 86) 
Suckling (1977) calculated that access to foreign 
technology accounted for forty per cent of the growth in 
gross national product in the period 1956-72. It widens 
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the gap between the modern and the subsistence -elements 
in the dual economy; and consequently leads to the 
situation where South Africa has one of the "most 
unequal distributions of income in the entire 'world" 
(Levy 1981, p. 1) 
one obvious explanation of the orientation towards 
capital-intensive, and thus a significant presence of 
multinationals, is the resource of raw materials. Quite 
apart from gold, South Africa is known to possess 
important world reserves of strategic minerals: the 
largest share of platinum (82.3 per cent), of chromite 
(74.1 per cent) and of manganese (45.0 per cent), the 
second largest of vanadium, the third of asbestos, the 
fourth of titanium and the fifth of lead (OECD 1979, 
pps 48-9). It follows from possession of these raw 
materials that a modern infrastructure of secondary 
industry is needed to add value and generally support 
their exploitation. With only one or two exceptional 
years (notably after the soweto uprising) the rate of 
return on capital employed in the period 1960 'to 1982 
has clearly satisfied investors from overseas, in- that 
rates of return have been as good as'could have been 
achieved in virtually any alternative location (The 
Financial Times, South African Survey 1984). 
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However it may also be that the political structure 
of white racial hegemony has by a series of incremental 
decisions - over many years driven the economy, 
consciously or 'unconsciously towards greater capital 
intensity. The expectations of first world rewards by 
white workers has been a-recurring theme of 'political 
and economic discussion since before the Union was 
formed in 1910 (Guelke 1974, p, 0101). - The post-1948 
efforts to build an, Afrikaner business base through the 
utilisation of state power and the collective financial 
resources of Afrikaans-speakers, the development of 
parastatals and growth of military spending to meet the 
perceived external and internal threat to security -have 
all contributed to and benefitted from capital-intensity 
(O'Meara 1983). In short, although business interests 
have had notable disagreements over short term 
objectives with the political elite, over the longer 
term the interests of government and capital seem 
irrefutably to have coincided. 
At the heart of white-hegemony, -, and central to the 
nature of the South African-'economy for self-evident 
historical reasons, are the powerful mining, finance 
houses. - Their existence complicates this attempt to 
quantify the extent of foreign-capital and multinational 
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activity. Indeed, the mining finance houses serve to 
remind us that the true measure of control cannot 
necessarily be reduced to simple majority, calculations 
of share ownership. The greatest and most powerful of 
them - Anglo American, Consolidated, Charter, General 
Mining, Anglovaal, Federale Mynbou - have emerged to 
control divers industrial and commercial businesses in 
many sectors. This feature, together with the growth of 
parastatals already noted above, leads Savage to 
conclude that "pyramidical control" is the dominant form 
of corporate control in South Africa. "Pyramiding" 
refers to a situation where the dominant, but not 
necessarily the majority, ownership of a company is 
another corporation which in turn is dominated by a 
third corporation, and so on (Savage 1979, p. 42). 
one abundant resource that capital has taken 
advantage of is labour. Innes records-that once the 
capital costs of sinking shafts had been met by''the 
mining companies, labour accounted for'sixty percent of 
their operating costs (Innes 1984, p. 50). Because the 
price of gold was-fixed (a system that remained in force 
until 1969),, 'control of, costs and hence-wage rates was 
the most, sensitive factor contributing to profits. 
Labour supply ýwas therefore crucial; and the mining 
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houses devised the migrant system, drawing iný lab'our 
from virtually all other countries within a 'thousand 
miles, and from within South Africa itself -a system 
which Lipton claims to be the origin of modern apartheid 
(Lipton 1985, p. 14 et seq). The Chamber of Mines was set 
up primarily to avoid inter-firm competition for labour 
(Innes 1984, p. 57); and its recruitment methods, 
discriminatory payments systems and separate facilities 
were' widely adopted in agriculture and some 
manufacturing sectors (Du Toit 1981; Lipton 1985). The 
migrant system itself spread north to cover most 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa (Orde Brown 1933). 
The most distinctive feature of South African 
industrialisation - monopoly capitalism - arose from the 
unique nature of the mining industry (Innes 1984, p. 45). 
The huge investment required for sinking deep- 
level mines, the guaranteed price in the international 
market and'the seemingly endless demand for the product 
meant that the industry soon became concentrated in a 
few giant firms formed out of merger and acquisition. 
The mining finance houses organised themselves on the 
group principle, with the parent providing capital and 
controlling its operating subsidiaries. When in the 
1920, *s these groups engaged in horizontal 
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diversification into manufacturing activity, they 
concentrated financial. power further into "galaxies" 
(see: Innes op. cit). In modern South Africa a 
significant proportion, over forty percent, of the top 
100 industrial companies are subject to a system of 
control where banks, mining finance houses, industrial 
conglomerates, private fortunes and overseas financial 
and non-financial institutions mesh together and 
interact in a pattern of interlocking complexity 
(Savage 1979). The modern economy has also witnessed 
the transition of some erstwhile indigenous companies, 
led by Anglo American Corporation and the Barlow Rand 
group, into fully-fledged multinationals in their own 
right. 
4.6 Management 
Multinationals significantly dominate the, South 
African private sector, by tradition drawing capital 
from . international money markets and corporate 
headquarters. But what of the managers themselves? The 
dual nature of the South African, economy,, with its 
highly developed commercial, industrial and banking 
sectors and its mining industry a world leader, is no 
third world posting for managers on short-term 
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contracts.,, Its managers are by and large indigenous, 
white and overwhelmingly English-speaking. (Of the 
surveyed firms, only one - the American-owned Johnson & 
Johnson - employed a black manager at executive level). 
The recent rise of an Afrikaner managerial class is 
significant but does not yet challenge the numerical 
supremacy of English-speaking managers (O'Meara 1983; 
Lipton 1985). 
As a class South African managers may cut a-liberal 
image when measured against the Nationalistý government. 
But they are managers in a capitalist order: as such, a 
situation in which business power *and authority is 
unchallenged must represent some kind of ideal. , For 
decades, South African managers have had the barely 
questioned right to manage at the place of work. This 
reality has undoubtedly been reinforced by ideology, 
for as- Harris has written: '"The main function of 
managerial ideology was (and is), - to justify the 
continued possession of power'and authority by the 
business elite. " (Harris 1982ý p. 97). He goes, on: ' 
In managerial ideology, businesses are held- 
to be accountable to a variety of pressures 
and 'constituencies' - the state, the public 
interest, the local community, the business 
community, employees et al variously ranked. 
But it is up to the management of any 
particular firm to decide what its 
obligations are, how to meet them, and when 
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they have been met... Management claims that 
it is in the best position to reconcile and 
satisfy the numerous and conflicting demands 
made of it, and that its performance in doing 
so is adequate. 
(Harris 1982,, ýp. 97) 
In South Africa as elsewhere the demands of these 
"constituents" made on managers are often contradictory. 
With international competition intensifying, they are 
exhorted to be more market-oriented and to improve 
efficiency by increasing productivity, especially the 
better utilisation of labour. "Cheap labour" is not 
necessarily efficient labour in productivity terms. if 
pay rates were to be raised beyond inflation for a range 
of social, humanitarian and ultimately political reasons 
to better the lot of African workers, then much tighter 
controls on numbers employed and working practices could 
be expected. The major consequence of large pay rises 
at Volkswagen in 1982 was the reduction in total number 
of employees by the elimination of casual employment for 
the unskilled. It is not therefore surprising that 
trade unions are thus seen as posing challenges, both 
to the unilateral exercise of-control by managers, and 
to the traditional internal economics of the firm. 
Very few South African managers by the mid-1970's 
had any experience of managing industrial relations as a 
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conflict-resolving activity in the way developedýin'some 
Western industrial societies'like Britain. Indeed the 
personnel function in companies was largely staffed 'by 
graduate psychologists. This was-because the only'real 
negotiations with unions were conducted by industrial 
councils remote from places of employment; the personnel 
function at the place of employment re'qUired specialists 
in the pyschology of worker behaviour'to explain 'and 
correct where possible problems such as laboUr turnover 
(Van der Merwe 1983). It was therefore unsurprising that 
the growth of black unions and the demands they made on 
individual companies were seen' as a threat 'to 
traditional authority. Much of the training provided 
for managers after the arrival of black unions therefore 
stressed that industrial relations strategy could be 
effectively meshed in with other aspects of business 
objectives and planning (Van Coller 1979; Van der Merwe 
1981 and 1983). 
A considerable proportion of the research data, as 
explained in the introduction, was gathered in the 
context of industrial relations training. This involved 
some skills development (for instance, negotiating) and 
the analysis of actual cases (such as disciplinary 
matters) that had occurred. But the simple if often 
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unstated objective of its design was to build up 
confidence and reduce panic at the disappearance of the 
old order. In the course of this training, the 
managers' dilemma under the post-Wiehahn dispensation 
was starkly exposed. As members of the "liberal 
bourgeoisie" - or at least in some cases working for 
business leaders publicly pressing for reform in the 
apartheid system - they clearly felt under pressure to 
accept the legitimacy of African demands in the field of 
wages and collective rights. But as agents of those 
capitalist businesses often acutely aware of being in 
competitive markets, many of those same managers 
expressed a preference for watering down union demands, 
and exploring the possibility of developing alternative 
strategies to collective bargaining. Harris (1982) has 
established that many US business leaders tried 
successfully to do this in the formative decade of 
American industrial relations after 1935, with the 
result that many unions never countered the employers' 
offensive strategy. 
For a multinational or significant indigenous 
company in South Africa, the option of being publicly 
committed to union-busting strategies in 1982 was 
largely foreclosed, because of the negative impact this 
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would have had. The vast majority of managers 
interviewed by the author were aware of this constraint. 
But most noticeably, when asked to identify a blockage 
to reform inside their own companies the overwhelming 
tendency of managers was to point to the supervisory 
level. Here, it was constantly argued, at the principal 
point of contact for black employees and their shop 
stewards with the management hierarchy, the traditional 
view of the lowly place of blacks in a white-ruled 
society would be hardest to change. 
Resistance at supervisory level to the aspirations 
of black employees to be unionised was present, but it 
was however not the only factor. Indeed, it is possible 
to speculate that in some firms the propensity to shift 
blame onto the lowest management level was a cover for 
identifying where the real blockage lay. In order to 
determine the true response within a particular firm to 
black unionisation, it is necessary to go beyond the 
stipulated policy of the company, beyond the allegations 
of resistance at supervisory level, to examine the 
attitudes and behaviour of managers at every level to 
the mobilisation of labour. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MOBILISATION OF LABOUR 
I'The work is done by black men. They plough, they 
reap; they herd and shear the sheep; -' they drive the 
oxen; they load the wagons; they carry the bricks; 
they draw the water; they hew the wood; ' they brush the 
clothes; they clean the boots; they run the posts; they 
make the roads; they wait at table; they cook; they 
wash the wool; they press the grapes; they kill the 
beef and mutton; they dig the garden; they plaster the 
walls; they feed the horses; and they find the 
diamonds. A South African wool grower and a South 
African shopkeeper will boast that South Africa is a 
productive country. If it be so she is productive 
altogether by means of black labour. 11 
Anthony Trollope 1878 
SoUth Africa Vol* 2 Chp, 17 
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Introduction 
I Trollope was observing the universality of 'black 
labour nine years before the discovery of the 
Witwatersrand goldfields. How much truer were his words 
to become! The purpose of this chapter is to consider 
the processes by which working people identify their 
common interests, become organised and mobilised for 
collective action. Section 1 discusses the classical 
formulations of the process. It reviews the writings of 
evolutionists like Emile Durkheim and Max Weber and the 
revolutionary predictions of Karl Marx who saw organised 
labour power as being in the vanguard of change. 
Section 2 describes and presents a model of worker 
mobilisation drawn largely from the writings of the 
American social scientist, - Charles Tilly. This model 
suggests that in many Western societies trade unions 
have been 'incorporated' into political decision-making. 
In Section_3 the theories of union growth are discussed 
and the chief variables, both economic and non-economic, 
that influence growth are identified. It suggests that 
variables such as the quality of leadership must be 
included if a theory is to explain adequately the 
different rates of growth. 
Section' 4 outlines a theory of mobilisation that 
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incorporates these variables. It asserts a number of 
hypotheses which can be tested in the South African 
case. 
5.1' Orqanised-Power 
The potential political power of working people 
organised into trade unions has, long been recognised. 
The outlawing of 'combinations' of working people, the 
harsh treatment meted out to leaders 
'by 
judicial 
representatives "of 
the governing elite, and use,, of 
vigilantes to repress trade unions, witness to 
European and North American resistance to a new. forml. o, f 
lese-majesty. The simple belief - that workers' 
strength lies in combination was both advocated 
expectantly by Union pioneers'and acknowledged fearfully 
through the actions of governments and employers. 
The growth in scale of1factory and mine in the 
industrialising period created. the need for a compliant 
working class. The e, mployers', wish for, compliance in 
economic relations-was__countered by, trade unions with 
their 
'ability 
to interrupt production through strike 
action. Because,., their actions frequently involved 
clashes with. the, law, the unions were increasingly 
perceived as challenging the political system itself 
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(see: S. & B. Webb 1920; Cole and Postgate-1963 ed., 
pps. 143-178 and 228-257). 
Nineteenth and early twentieth century social 
theorists were divided on the extent to which unions 
were an evolutionary or revolutionary force for change. 
Compte, Spencer, Durkheim, and Weber were all included to 
the evolutionists' position. They believed that social 
change arose incrementally by forces located within 
society itself, a view influenced to some extent by 
Darwinian notions of biological evolution. Labour 
organised into trade unions was but one such force, one 
element of-an evolutionary concoction of which the base 
ingredient was the development of industrial capitalism. 
Marx assigned a specific role to the organised 
working class in the process of change. Like the 
evolutionists already noted, Marx wrote from an 
historicist viewpoint: he argued that through the very 
process of industrialisation, all societies from 
whatever origin were moving towards a similar - if not 
completely identical type. However, for Marx 
industrial capitalism, no matter how advanced, was not 
the ultimate destination of societies: socialism 
beckoned beyond that. 
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The- transition beyond -capitalism depended-upon 
organised labour. In some instances 'Marx envisaged 
socialism as arriving naturally by, a deepening 
polarisation between the bourgeois and the proletariat 
until the latter reached a limit of endurance from which 
point they would be mature enough to move to 
self-emancipation. But in many instances the bourgeois 
classes would resist, and it would be necessary for the 
proletariat to engage in armed insurrection. ' The actual 
change from capitalism to socialism could be advanced or 
retarded according to two factors: the revolutionary 
capacities of the movement, and the revolutionary 
calibre of the proletariat's leaders, the two 
necessities for an act of mobilisation. 
The task of the Communist party was to be a 
facilitating agency. Where trade'unions existed they 
were to-be steered into appropriateýrevolutionary mode. 
Where they did not exist,, they were--to be created. It 
was especially important that the party should provide 
the right kind of personal, leadership. Marx was greatly 
influenced in his views on the necessity of strong 
institutions and capable leadership by the ultimately 
unsuccessful- revolutionary period 1848 - 51 in France. 
Writing shortly after this event in 1852 Marx noted: 
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With this defeat the proletariat steps to the 
background of the revolutionary stage. It 
always seems to crowd forward, so soon as the 
movement seems to acquire new impetus, but 
with ever weaker effort and ever smaller 
results. So soon as any of the above-lying 
layers of society gets into revolutionary 
fermentation, it enters into alliance 
therewith and thus shares all the defeats 
which the several parties successfully 
suffer .... The more important leaders of the 
proletariat, in its councils, and in the 
press, fall one after another victims of the 
courts, and ever more questionable figures 
step to the front.... It gives up the task of 
revolutionising the old world with its own 
large collective weaponso and on the contrary 
seeks to bring about its emancipation, behind 
the back of society, in private ways, within 
the narrow bounds of its own class 
contradictions, and consequently inevitably 
fails. 
(Marx 1907 ed, p. 10) 
Marx thus acknowledged that the objective position of 
workers in the process of production was not in itself a 
sufficient condition to guarantee successful 
mobilisation for political action. It required 
additionally a committed leadership capable of 
transcending divisions to consummate the revolution. 
The central attention paid by communists to unions is 
the clear result of Marx' stress on their putative role. 
Galenson has written that: 
The communists have long recognised, in 
theory and practice, that trade unions occupy 
a highly strategic position in modern 
industrial society, and have everywhere made 
intense efforts for the purposes of 
advancing the political hegemony of 
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communism. 
(Galenson 1952, p. ix) 
. 
5.2 Mobilisation 
Mobilisation has been defined as that process 
whereby "mere interests become a common cause" (Adam and 
Giliomee 1979, p-61). The degree of mobilisation is a 
measure, roughly speaking, of how many members of a 
particular cause embrace the ethos. The effectiveness 
of mobilisation is determined by how far the group's 
objectives are met by collective action, and how far 
unity is preserved (Tilly 1978). 
The concept of mobilisation assumes a, homogeneity 
in a group which can surmount intergroup conflict. In 
the case of South African labour, or at least the 
I 
majority of it, there are two causes around which we may 
expect unity: the cause of being a worker (and thus 
with interests opposed to employers); and the cause of 
being black (and thus against minority white power and 
the complex apparatus of apartheid). Black unions have 
therefore a dual identity. It needs to be established 
whether this duality increases the chance of successful 
mobilisation or weakens it by a dilution of aims. 
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The process of mobilisation can be conceived 
sequentially as a model (Figure 5.1). In stage 1, a 
group identifies its interest in combining, usually 
expressed in terms of opposition to another group such 
as an employer or a- , government. In some cases, it may be 
necessary for advocates of group mobilisation to sharpen 
the group's self-perception by attention to shared 
values and the spreading of an ideology. In others, 
common cause may be entirely self-evident, with little 
reinforcement of belief necessary by the leaders. It is 
concluded 
__later 
that for the particular group under 
discussion, the interest of being black falls into the 
latter category; whereas the interest of being a worker 
is not so clearly apparent to potential members. 
In stage 2, there has to. be some organisational 
structure to channel the common interests towards its 
objectives. Active 'members of the group may need to 
devote substantial amounts of time to building and 
maintaining an institution, such as a trade union, in an 
environment unsympathetic and indeed sometimes 
containing elements decidedly hostile to it. 
In stage 3, that'of mobilisation, the group must be 
able to control the resources at its disposal if it is 
to accomplish its task. If a trade union cannot count 
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riqure S. 1 
THE MOBILISATION MODEL 
stage 1 
Identity 
of Interest 
Conf licting 
Interests 
Stage 2 
Organisation 
S1 ýge 3 
Mo'bilisation 
Repression 
Stage 4 
Collective 
Action 
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on the support of its memberý 
damage on an employer during 
be said to be effectively 
important to be aware of the 
control over its resources 
collective action. 
s, or it cannot-inflict any 
a strike, then it cannot 
mobilised. Hence it is 
way a group first acquires 
and then deploys them in 
Stage 4 is the collective action itself, which 
Tilly defines simply as: "people acting together in 
pursuit of common interests" (Tilley 1978, p. 7). We are 
here concerned with tactics and strategy. Where is the 
action leading to? Does it follow any pattern? If the 
action fails, does demobilisation occur, sending back 
the initiative to stage three, two or even one (as in 
the Marx example of downwardly spiralling 
ineffectiveness after the failure of the Paris 
rebellion)? 
The four stages imply various characteristics in 
the mobilising group -a binding, ideology, loyalty to 
group and institution, a commitment to act. Tilley 
proposes a formula to assess the I'mobilisation level", 
which may be defined, as the propensity of a group to 
engage in collective action. This formulation is 
possible because reasonably well-established economic 
values can be ascribed to the power of a group of 
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workers to disrupt an employer (through strikes, for 
example). The mobilisation level can thus be 
represented as the formula outlined in Figure 5.2 
overleaf. Clearly, the level will vary over time and 
over different conditions. One successful strike may 
trigger off a wave of imitations as members of other 
labour groups increase their probability of delivery 
with the scent of victory (which was a possible 
explanation of the 1973 Durban strikes discussed in 
Chapter 2). As Tilly claims, the formulation poses the 
trade-offs in collective action neatly enough for 
approximate risks to be calculated. 
However interest groups are often "cheated out of 
their collective advantages so easily" as a result of 
being manipulated by appeals to other attachments or 
loyalties (Adam and Giliomee 1979, p. 62). In complex, 
heterogeneous societies, union identity is not the only 
loyalty likely to be tugging at the emotions of workers. 
other loyalties may include self-interest, family 
attachment, or social duty, all three of which can be 
fully exploited by governments, employers, religious or 
community groups, with the net result that the power of 
the mobilisation process is diminished. 
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Figure 5.2 
THE LEVEL OF MOBILISATION 
The Mobilisation Level is equal to the sum of: 
the market value the probability 
of potential of delivery 
damage from the x by members 
resource nominally of groups when 
under group control called on 
to act 
(Tilly 1978,, p. 69) 
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But it is repression which is likely to militate 
against the mobilisation process, intruding at any stage 
once an identity is established. Tilly cites historical 
evidence in favour of his general proposition that the 
effect of sustained repression on a mobilising group 
does not, as might initially be assumed, serve to build 
up tensions to the point of a great explosion; rather it 
tends to dampen down the overall level of collective 
action. He writes: 
At the extreme the Europe of our own time 
provides the example of Spain under Primo de 
Rivera and Franco, Portugal under Salazar, 
Germany under Hitler, the Soviet Union under 
Stalin and his successors, Italy under 
Mussolini, France under Vichy and the Nazis - 
all times of reduced collective action in 
those countries, except for collective action 
directly initiated by the state. In general, 
when a European state temporarily trained its 
full repressive power on its internal enemies 
(as when the Italian state attacked the 
Scicilian Fasci of 1893-4), the enemies 
subsided. 
(Tilly 1978, p. 114) 
The model of mobilisation (Figure 5.1 on p. 157) has 
therefore allowed for repression to intervene at several 
stages in the sequence of mobilisation to blunt its 
effect. 
Oberschall, perhaps more ominously for the South 
African case, accepts Tilly's point about the effect of 
repression, but adds an observation on conflicts which 
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are temporarily- suppressed by a stronger force., He 
writes: ý 
,.... Conflicts which are delayed usually 
reappear in an aggrievated form later, and 
consequently are more difficult to 
regulate.... Delay favours the opponents of the 
status quo by creating the likelihood of a big 
explosion, but delayed victory may have to be 
gained at a considerable cost of lives and 
turmoil. 
(oberschall 1973, p. 71) 
The discussion on the model soýfar has considered 
the outcome of failure in collective action is likely to 
bring about, demobilisation. Oberschall's comment begs 
the question: -what might'happen if- the mobilisation 
succeeds? This is the heart of the matter. Most of the 
collective action engaged in by trade unions is 
concerned with short-term objectives: that is, specific 
economic outcomes of wages or conditions improvements, 
or procedural outcomes and the operation of rules, as 
for instance with protests over dismissals or 
grievances. In the broad context of a society, these are 
only rarely matters of major contention. Settlements of 
these economic or procedural differences do not on the 
whole threaten the larger political status quo. 
Although trade unions in Western democracies have 
pursued many political objectives over the years - from 
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a reform of the franchise, through the enactment of 
specific legislation, to the election of labour and 
socialist governments - they have generally confined 
their political actions to constitutional lobbying, 
implying an acceptance of the legitimacy of the elected 
government's authority. Their actions have therefore 
eschewed a Marxian revolutionary path and firmly 
embraced an evolutionary one. 
But in societies where no consensus exists on the 
legitimacy of the government's authority or-on the role 
the unions can play in society, such as South Africa, 
trade unions are more likely to be seen as wanting a 
revolutionary outcome from the deployment of their 
industrial power. 
The term "revolution" has been defined in many 
ways. There is the broad definition at one end of the 
spectrum, like the Ili ndustrial revolution",, which 
involved massive and radical changes in the way 
societies were organised, but did not necessarily 
betoken any political change. And at the other end is 
Samuel Huntington's more restricted approach, which 
seeks to separate the idea of revolution "from 
insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups and wars of 
independence" (Huntington 1968, p. 264). A middle 
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position convenient for present purposes would be to 
describe a revolution as a fundamentally political event 
whereby one governing elite is replaced by another from 
a different section of society independent of any 
constitutional provision in a relatively short space of 
time. It is obviously important to set some timescale 
for the event, but it is recognised that a revolution 
may occur overnight but it may also take several months 
or possibly a year or two to complete. 
The dilemmas facing unions with '-revolutionary 
objectives in a pre-revolutionary situation are obvious. 
As we have seen, the passage from identity of interest 
to collective action may not be easy, but will need 
careful nurturing by activists. Unions will probably 
need to win economistic or procedural victories against 
employers to demonstrate credibility. There are 
question marks as to the extent 'members who are 
mobilised for short-term gains will also mobilise for 
less certain, less predictable or less immediately 
beneficial outcomes. However desirable revolutionary 
change may be thought to be for its'own sake, the unions 
may put at risk earlier, more tangible gains; and in the 
process they will run a strong risk of courting state 
repression. What conditions are sufficient or necessary 
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for trade, unions to move into a revolutionary 'mould? 
What is the process by which individuals or parties 
anxious to procure revolution can harness the industrial 
power of the unions? 
Little light is shed on these questions from union 
experiences in the Western industrial nations. The vast 
majority have not been noticeably attracted to a 
revolutionary cause, preferring a constitutional route 
and they have largely been accommodated in this by 
establishment forces. Indeed, in the post- Second World 
War period, Galenson was noting "the tremendous 
potentiality for promoting social stability inherent in 
Western trade unionism" (1952, p. ix). In some countries 
such as Sweden, the unions have been incorporated into 
the establishment without unduly replacing it (Forseback 
1980, p. 104 et seq). Is this failure to throw out the 
previous, establishment forces 'evidence ýof lack of 
leadership calibre, or clever manipulation by coalitions 
of other interest groups'which have traduced'ithe unions 
away from revolution by incorporation? if it is 
incorporation, is the, end result the ultimate 
justification of socialýevolution theory? These are 
perennial questions. ýIn Western nations they have been 
asked of unions which organise workers whose principal 
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common cause and thus identity of interest is, that of 
the shared experience of being a worker-In South Africa 
the commonality of being workers is additional to the 
commonality of being blacks in a society where political 
power is denied them by virtue of their race. To 
proceed further in determining the prospects for South 
Africa black unions either as agents for revolution or 
as candidates for incorporation, we need to examine the 
conditions under which unions generally have grown and 
attained a base of power. This will then allow us to 
identify hypotheses that can be tested in the South 
African case. 
5.3 Theories of Union Growth 
Union growth Is-a concept-with two distinct but 
related meanings: it can be measured in both absolute 
and relative terms. Absolute growth is an indicator of 
a union's -ability to be perceived as relevant to the 
needs of workers. union income from members' 
subscriptions rises and it thus becomes better equipped 
to meet its members' needs by employing professional 
staff and deploying resources more effectively. 
Relative growth, on the other hand, is a measure of 
union members as a proportion of those eligible to join. 
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This measure is often called union density, which may"be 
calculated for a whole economy, an industry within it, 
an occupational group or a single company. 
one of the earliest practitioners to speculate on 
the causes of union growth was Samual Gompers. 
Gompers was the first president of the American 
Federation of Labour, who observed in 1904 what he 
termed a "law of growth of organised labor". This was 
that membership grew in times of heightened-' industrial 
activityl- but fell in times of depression. 'The cyclical 
nature of growth was'thus directly a function of "the 
business cycle (Bain and Elsheikh 1976, p. 5). In -the 
1920's and 130's the 'Wisconsin School' (colleagues and 
followers of Professor John Commons at"the University 
of Wisconsin) also noted 'that' union behaviour was 
directed more towards strikes-in times of prosperity, 
but 'towards- political action in times of 'depression 
(Bain and Elsheikh-1976,, p. 8). 
Some years later Davies pointed out that the 
business cycle theorists had failed to distinguish 
sufficiently between general improvements in the climate 
for business, -'and rising prices. They are not 
necessarily simultaneous. -Davies' contention was that 
it was rising"prices--that"led directly to an increase in 
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union membership, as workers felt the pinch of increased 
prices before pushing harder for higher wages through 
union action. Additionally, rising prices usually 
indicate an increasing product demand: employers could 
pass on higher wage costs to customers, but could not so 
easily rely on alternative sources of labour, from among 
the unemployed or immigrants, when production was at a 
premium (Bain and Elsheikh 1976, p. 10). 
Davies's modification of the business cycle theory 
of union growth - that workers wish to restore lost 
purchasing power at a time of rising prices - introduces 
an important new factor into the argument. This is that 
a chief cause, perhaps the principal cause, of workers 
joining unions is a defensive one. Typically workers 
have been initially mobilised defensively for limited 
economic reasons; where workers have been mobilised 
offensively for some grander objective such as altering 
the balance of power between employers and employed, or 
between the state and a segment of its citizens, their 
organisations have tended to be shortlived (S. & B. Webb 
1920). 
Gompers, the Wisconsin School, Davies, and Bain and 
Elsheikh concentrated their search for the explanation 
of union growth on economic variables. But other 
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writers have noted that non-economic' factors'' have 
provided at least a partial explanation for grO'wth''over 
both the short and the long term. These no'n-e6onomiC 
variables have ranged over six main areas-. ' 
i) the climate of public opinion: 
ii) the nature of the urban society where 
the workers reside; 
iii) the effectiveness of unions' 
recruitment campaigns; 
iv) the social and demographic characteristics 
of the potential members; 
V) technology and the nature of work groups at 
the place of employment, and' 
vi) the'attitudes of employers and governments. 
Dunlop began to develop a multi-causal explanatory model 
for union growth which stressed that a group of workers 
are more likely to organise if at least some of them 
occupy a strategic position in the process of production 
which enhances their leverage over the employer. He 
also noted the propensity of groups to unionise where 
the opportunities for upward mobility were limited or 
non-existent so_, they "look 
'forward 
to spending a 
substantial proportion of their lifetime as workmen" in 
the "same or similar work community" (Dunlop 1949, 
163) 
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But the rise--in Britain during the 1960,1s and 
1970, *s-of union membership-among white collar groups who 
were to some extent occupationally mobile -caused Bain 
and colleagues to question Dunlop's assumption that lack 
of advancement opportunities, was a necessary condition 
(Bain, Coates and Ellis 1973). They-pointed out that 
the. social imagery of white collar, technical and 
professional workers, was on the whole different from 
that of manual workers; unions would suceed among these 
former groups which specifically addressed their needs. 
Writers on white collar unionisation in particular 
sectors - such as Prandy (1965) on scientists and 
engineers, Blackburn (1967) on bank employees, and 
Coates- (1972) on teachers - have noted the special 
character of unions catering for members who face some 
opportunities for occupational mobility and exhibit some 
feelings of relative closeness to the employees. 
Runciman has written that manual unions reflect working 
class notions of collectivism, whereas white collar 
unions reflect more the middle class value of 
individuality (Runciman 1966). But Wright Mills has 
observed that it is easy to overstate the differences 
between white and blue collar unions - what unites the 
two types is far more important than what divides them 
(Wright Mills 1951). 
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Variations of union membership between industries, 
or between firms within the same industry, have called 
for different explanatory variables. Kerr and Siegal 
noted the high propensity of workers such as miners and 
dockers - who frequently live in cohesive communities 
close to the place of work - to join unions and also to 
engage in collective action more readily than other less 
cohesive groups (Kerr and Siegal 1954). Others have 
noted that the size of the unit of employment is a 
significant factor, with larger plants or offices 
tending to be both more highly unionised and have a 
greater capacity for mobilisation than smaller units, 
presumably because of increased social distance between 
managers and workers (Blackburn 1967; Goldthorpe 
1968). 
'The attitudes of employers towards unions can have 
an immediate impact on the level and degree of 
unionisation. This is because a prime objective of union 
mobilisation is to secure recognition by the employer as 
the legitimate bargaining agent for the workers. Smith 
has pointed out that much of the white collar 
unionisation in Britain occurred as the result of 
employer policies in both the public and private sectors 
moving in favour of collective bargaining (Smith 1979, 
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p. 11). 
Thel. act of an employer in offering a union 
recognition 
. _for 
bargaining purposes usually pushes up 
membership substantially. This is because of worker 
instrumentality. Workers' motivations for joining 
unions can be seen on a spectrum. At one end are the 
ideological committed who will join the union as a 
matter of principle, no matter what its status is in the 
eyes of the'employer. At the otheris a group (usually 
'smaller 
in number than the idealists) who will only join 
if coerced under a system such as the closed shop. In 
between are-instrumentalists, who will join with varying 
degrees-of en thusiasm or reluctance if they can see some 
benefit. Instrumentalists are more reluctant to unionise 
if they believe the union is or would be impotent in the 
face of'empl6jer hostility. 
In Britain,, the Commission on Industrial Relations, 
an independent state, agency which operated from 1969 to 
1974 and was charged among other things with 
investigating union recognition claims, developed a 
method of measuring'the extent of this instrumentality. 
It made its- recommendations that unions should be 
recognis4d '-on th'e strength of the underlying support 
post-recognition rather than the more modest 
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pre-recognition levelý (Purcell J., 1984). Employer 
hostility to unions has been more pronounced in the 
United States than-in Britain (Harris 1982). ýA 
comparison of the different degrees of unionisation in 
the whole economy over the decades of the twentieth 
century reveals the constantly lower rate, in the United 
States which partly reflects this opposition (Bain and 
Price, -, 1980, -- pps. 37-and 88). --Many workers who are 
whollyýdependent on the power of managers for-their jobs 
will think carefully before becoming advocates for the 
unions. ý 
Employers who are opposed to recognising unions may 
discourage membership in negative or positive ways. In 
a negative guise employers are openly antagonistic 
towards union aims and may take reprisals against 
individual activists., ý In a, positive guise employers 
develop. strategies towards their workforce intended to 
reduce grievances over pay, conditions of work, or 
individual treatment, which experience has shown are 
often catalysts for union growth (Sisson-1987). 
Equally,, the act of conceding recognition may also 
have positive or negative connotations. Recognition may 
be offered grudgingly only after an anti-union strategy 
has failed, and the employer may try to limit the areas 
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of", union -influence by agreeing to only a narrow 
definition of joint regulation, perhaps by permitting 
the union just to make representations over wages. On 
the other hand, the employer may seek to incorporate the 
union into a wide spectrum of bargaining and 
consultative arrangements. Purcell and colleagues argue 
that it is mistaken to assume that accepting union 
influence over a range of matters by a positive act of 
recognition necessarily implies any lessening of 
managerial control. Indeed, what distinguishes the 
positive from the negative act is that in the former, 
the employer seeks deliberately to accommodate the 
unionos part of its corporate business objectives; in 
the latter recognition is perceived as in conflict with 
business_objectives (Purcell and Smith 1979). 
I The other variable which has a bearing on union 
recognition is the attitude of the state itself. Where 
a government is-opposed or at best indifferent to unions 
seeking recognition from private sector employers, there 
is little a union can do beyond the scope of its own 
resources-. Employers often justify a refusal to 
recognise on grounds of the state's attitude, implying 
that they themselves would concede were it not for 
public policy. This line of argument was frequently 
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heard from employers in South Africa prior to the 1979 
Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (Piron 1982). 
However, once a government adopts permissive 
legislation, the impact on aggregate union density is 
often dramatic. After the passage ofýthe Wagner Act in 
1935 whichfollowed a considerable period of turbulence 
in American industrial affairs, union density in 
non-agricultural sectors doubled in two years, from 13.7 
percent in 1936, to 27.5 percent in 1938, (Bain and Price 
1980, p. 88). Similarly in South Africa, the density of 
black trade union membership rose from 5.6 percent 
before the Wiehahn reforms in 1979 to 10.3 percent by 
mid-1982 and. to 12.8 percent at the end of 1985 (present 
author's calculations). 
It therefore makes the task of securing recognition 
in the private sector easier if the unions can persuade 
parliaments to carry legislation favourable to 
collective bargaining, or at the very least (as with the 
Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act) to remove legal 
obstacles which prevented its development. Even to 
fulfil their prime role as agents of representation with 
employers, unions can find themselves as campaigning 
bodies out to change the law. It is common for laws 
which grant unions a right of recognition to contain a 
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'provisioný for registration-of unions as a condition of 
participation in any benefits under the law. The state 
therefore has a means of controlling which bodies are 
recognised as unions, which can be used benignly or 
harshly as the case may be. Ananaba, an ICFTU 
employee responsible for Africa, has noted: 
Unions cannot -exist if the law -is heavily 
weighted against the workers and their 
organisations and in favour of employers, be 
they private or public; they cannot develop 
labour administrators are, biased- against 
unions and their leaders; they cannot exist 
if the unions are dominated by employers, 
politicians, military leaders, religious and 
-ethnic organisations or secret societies; nor 
can they exist if the unions themselves are 
not democratic organisations responsible to 
their members. 
(Ananaba 1979, p. 226) 
He observed two further variables relevant to the 
development of unions on the continent of Africa: the 
type of international relations and outside aid 
influencing a particular country; and the quality of 
union leadership. This last factor has been largely 
overlooked by many analysts who have concentrated on 
economic variables, and will require to be incorporated 
into a testable theory of mobilisation. 
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5.4 A Theory of Mobilisation 
We have noted that trade unions are the visible 
manifestation of worker mobilisation. They arise 
initially as a function of employment; they thus 
determine their primary objectives in relation to the 
employment-based problems which helped to shape the 
workers' common identity. But they learn that political 
lobbying and agitation is necessary if their emerging 
secondary objectives are to be met. Trade unions vary 
widely in structure between countries, between 
industries in the same country and even between firms in 
the same sector, because they are shaped by a different 
mix of economic and socio-legal forces. Yet there seems 
to be some inevitability about the move to political 
campaigning, sooner or later. But-of course there is no 
inevitable guarantee that their -influence will be 
sufficient to induce desired change'in the body politic. 
In developing'a'theory to analyse South African unions 
in the- process of'political'influence and change, we 
need -to, incorporate' the expectations of members,, 
employersý and'other people about the potential role of 
unionsý-as'catalysts for worker mobilisation. 
General explanations of union growth have specified 
several variables, which can assist in an understanding 
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of aggregated mobilisation. ý- Bain and Elsheikh, s model, 
for example, builds in variables such as the rates- of 
change in prices and in wages; "'the rate of 'change in 
unemployment and' its absolute 'level; and government 
economic policy (Bain and Elsheikh 1976, p. 115). These 
variables, can' all be quantified to facilitate 
econometric analysis capable, of producing empirical data 
over long time-scales. It'allows for'changes in union 
density in established industrial societies to be 
attributed to economic factors, and permits comparisons 
to be made between countries at approximately the same 
stages of economic development. 
However, as already noted, those writers 
deliberately omit leadership from the list of variables, 
on'the methodological ground that it is "dependent upon 
and captured by the explanatory variables which have 
already been included" (Bain'and'Elsheikh 1976, p. 116). 
This is acceptable if the intention is only to explain 
aggregated union density 'as-"an' economic phenomenon 
resulting from key primary economic variables. But 
Shister has argued that all the relevant variables that 
explain union growth are by no"means independent of each 
other. What is important is'to explain the specific 
inter-relationship of dependent and independent 
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variables. He, urges the-inclusion of leadership, as, a 
factor to set, alongside economic and socio-legal 
variables. It is-lusual, he notes, for union growth to 
progress in spurts,.. resulting in a very uneven pattern 
sector-by-sector or firm-by-firm.. This ýcharacteristic 
must -in-part at least be determined by the variable of 
leadership, - the "entrepreneurial qualities" of 
individual leaders" (Shister 1967,, p. 584)., - 
A second non-quantifiable variable the 
econometricians omit is the political dimmension. As 
early as 1949 the leading United States labour relations 
academic, John Dunlop, noted the rapid expansion of 
union membership during periods of "fundamental unrest", 
an unrest arising from a "basic dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the economic system and society in 
general" (Dunlop 1949, p. 26). Presumably because much of 
the research on union growth has utilised data from 
developed Western industrial societies, this 
"fundamentallunrest" has generally been taken to refer 
to-war. 
_ 
Bernstein,., who followed Dunlop"s general line 
of argument, observed that: 
... the so cial tensions and dislocations that ; 
ccompany a major war... produce in workers a 
need to express discontent and unionism 
supplies a vehicle for this purpose. 
(Bernstein 1954, p. 313). 
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This' is' the not unfamiliar reasoning '-about "the 
impact of war as an agent for 'social change applied 
specifically to the case of the unions. Firstly, the 
argument runs, governments quickly discover that they 
need the unions' co-operation to help them prosecute the 
war effort; the unions thereby gain a. greatly enhanced 
political influence which is often carried over into the 
period of post-war reconstruction. Secondly, as a 
result of this process,, workers can more easily identify 
the union as a potentially effective body in meeting 
their demands than it was under the previous peacetime 
dispensation, which is but ''another example-' of the 
instrumentality principle in-6peration. " Thirdly, -once 
the' union is up and running in I aný'influential ýposition 
with employers, it is likely to maximise its new-found 
strength-at'a'time Of labour shortages by agitation- for 
wage Increases and-other improvements, using strike 
action where ýecessary`and possible. 
It can therefore be. asserted in general terms that 
the these two non-quantifiable variables leadership, 
and socio-political dislocation may be the very 
triggers 
-that 
set off the entire chain of mobilisation 
in a given situation. 
_Or 
conversely, just as Marx 
argued in regard to the failure of the Paris uprising, 
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inadequate leadership or the absence of a-., dislocating 
phenomenon may blunt the mobilisation process, once it is 
underway. 
- Four critical hypotheses may now be derived -from 
the -foregoing analysis that can be tested in the South 
Afican case. Firstly, black unions have grown to some 
extent in the 1980's as a result of the quality- of 
leadership they have, displayed, a leadership tested in 
the crucible of collective bargaining but- capable of 
seeing the wider political role, trades unions can play. 
Secondly, they have grown as a consequence of 
frustrations felt by blacks on the political front; the 
unions are perceived as potentially capable of 
addressing those frustrations. This responsibility is 
made more awesome by the fact that other institutions 
for, blacks, such as political parties or community 
associations that might be expected to shoulder some of 
theý burden, are-either outlawed, repressed or simply 
shunned -by the state. It may well be that these high 
expectations are likely to be greater than those placed 
on unions in other countries at, roughly the same stages 
ofý development in the industrial relations system. In 
the United States before 1935, for instance, many other 
mechanisms and political and legal institutions were 
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open for participation by workers which could address 
the problems workers and their families had as citizens. 
Thirdly, the level of mobilisation - defined 
previously as the propensity of members to act in 
support of the union when called on to do so - among 
the membership of black African unions is likely to be 
at a higher level than among trade union members in most 
Western industrialised societies. It is not just the 
commonality of being a worker that creates the adhesion, 
but the additional and inescapable position of being 
black under white supremacy, thus effectively doubling 
the bond between member and union. Unions are therefore 
likely to be highly resilient to rebuffs by employers 
and harassment short of total repression by the state. 
Yet despite this, the fourth hypothesis is that the 
expectation that trade unions can spearhead the long 
campaign to end both apartheid and white rule is 
probably unrealistically high. A framework designed to 
explore this is set out in Figure 5.3 overleaf. 
Figure 5.3 summarises the discussion of the 
possibilities of and the limits to the power of worker 
mobilisation which has been the subject matter of this 
chapter. In the centre of the diagram are the sequences 
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Figure 5.3 
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS TO WORKER MOBILISATION 
Low High 
Effectiveness Effectiveness 
Common Interest: 
Union Formed 
Union Beaten Demands Employer Greater Efforts 
may wither Recognition by Leadership: 
II Collective 
Rejected Rejected-e-Action tried/ 
threatened 
Accepted 
Unsuccessful Economic Demands Successful 
Collective application/ 
Action I 
I- 
I-L threat of 
t-Rejected Rejected --ýCollective 
-Action 
Accepted 
Union succumbs Political Demands 
Leaders 
Removed 
Rejected 
Union 
i'wt -hmt-nnrlm 
RejeýiYon/ 
Repression: 
LR 
ejected--> Strengthens 
Gradually Accepted: 
Unions Incorporated 
into Socio-political 
System 
Political 
Links 
Continuing 
Conf lict 
(Open Question) 
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of mobilisation, from identification of interest to 
action for political ends. On the left of the figure 
are possible scenarios for Idemobilisation' where the 
union has a low level of effectiveness to prevent it 
countering a rejection by the employer. On the right 
are scenarios for rejection where the union has a high 
mobilisation level. The open question represented in 
the figure at the bottom right hand corner is the key 
question to which this final hypothesis is directed. It 
is inherently and unavoidably a political question: 
what is likely to happen if and when a highly mobilised 
union movement is rebuffed by the state on matters 
central to its political strategy? Individual employers 
may suceed in incorporating the unions into their labour 
relations systems without, the empirical evidence 
suggests, jeopardising their other corporate goals. But 
if the state refuses to accommodate the unions in any 
acceptable way in the national labour relations system, 
what is the probability that the unions could challenge 
the state to the point of revolution? 
Such an analysis will serve to permit the unions to 
be studied in regard to all the expectations held of 
them - by their foes, by their members, by employers (in 
so far as they are not their foes) and by those who are 
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sympathetic to the overthrow of the present South 
African system and embrace the unions as bedfellows. 
The model itself neither suggests nor implies that South 
Africa is in a revolutionary state, but it does raise 
important tactical and strategic questions about unions 
as agents of change. 
The -*open question, " posed"at the foot of Figure 5.3 
suggests that some form of conflict will continue in 
conditions where an effectively organised group is 
thwarted. The chapter began by noting the wide interest 
in the" potential political''power of' ''effectively 
orga I nised arid' mobilised labour-in ''South ý Africa, 
expressed as-both fear by conservatives 'and- hope by 
radicals. There is probably therefore 'no more 
appropriate case than South Africa in which to explore 
the-extent to which this conflict may"b'e'apo'Calyptic. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE NEW DISPENSATION 
"No one wants to banish the Kafirs. Situated, as the 
country is and will be, it cannot exist without 
Kafirs, because the Kafirs are the only possible 
labourers. To utilise the, Kafir and not to expel him 
must be the object of the white man ..... But, for the 
sake both of the Kafir and of the white -man, some 
further assurance of security is needed". - 
Anthony Trollope 1878 
South Africa Vol. 1 Chp. 10 
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Introduction 
In fact of course many people tried to "banish the 
Kafir" in the century since Trollope penned those words, 
even though they recognised that blacks were the only 
possible source of labour. But the pressure inside 
South Africa and from abroad in the 1970's (discussed 
in chapter 1) pointed strongly towards the need for more 
security - and more rights - for the African population. 
The Wiehahn and Riekert Commisssions were established 
specifically to address these issues. 
This chapter considers the reports and their 
implementation in the period 1979 to 1983. The new 
rights for black trade unions, and the increased 
security for urban Africans at the expense of those 
confined to the so-called homelands, soon became known 
as 'the New Dispensation'. Section 1 sets out the 
principal recommendations of both Commissions, though it 
concentrates on Wiehahn as the more directly relevant to 
labour relations. It reports some of the employers' 
reactions to it. Section 2 discusses the impact of the 
post- Wiehahn legislati6n on the attitudes and practices 
of employers in recognising black unions. It notes that 
the resulting pattern of recognition and local 
negotiation was not what the Report suggested. 
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The black unions' difficulties and disagreements 
over registration are the subject matter of Section 3. 
Section 4 discusses the new legal position on freedom of 
association and the ILO's intialty favourable reaction 
to it. Section 5 analyses the impact of the new 
dispensation on the dramatic growth of union membership. 
Section 6 concludes the chapter by reviewing the policy 
of co-opting blacks in a process. of accommodation, which 
in the period 1979 -1983-appeared to,,, meet with some 
success. i 
6.1. The Wiehahn and Riekert Reports 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that. , the Wiehahn and 
Riekert commissions were set up in 1977 amid 
unparalleled industrial and political pressures on the 
home front, and growing criticism from abroad. The 
Wiehahn report was tabled in parliament on 1 May 1979. 
It stated that its "recommendations must be made in the 
interests of South Africa and its peoplesland not to 
suit foreign countries or organisations", -but 
it did 
acknowlege not just the fact of overseas pressure, but 
also its method: 
.... it would be naive to deny 
the fact or 
ignore the effect of international attempts 
to influence labour and other policies in 
South Africa. The presence of subsidiaries 
of multinational enterprises within a 
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country's borders creates a conduit through 
which strong influences and pressure can be 
exerted on a country's policies and 
practices. South Africa is no exception, and 
the persistant growth of multinational 
influence, particularly in the field of 
labour, is bound to lead to a particular 
proliferation in our labour system - alien 
labour practices of multinational enterprises 
(developing from the different foreign labour 
codes of conduct) being pursued alongside 
local practice. 
(RSA 1979a, para. 1.16.4) 
One of the first acts undertaken by the Chairman 
following publication was to fly to Geneva to explain 
the report to the ILO, one of South Africa-*s most 
persistent critics in labour matters, and the two 
governments in London and Washington on whose territory 
most of the multinationals in South Africa are 
-s 
headquartered. 
The Wiehahn Commission paved the way for the ending 
of the 'dual I system of labour relations. Its 
recommendation covered six main areas: 
all references to race groups should be removed 
from statutes, with the principle of freedom of 
association being accepted without any 
qualification; 
ii) black unions could register, with registration 
providing a control over unions by restricting 
political affiliations; 
iii) once registered, all unions should have full 
participating rights in industrial councils; 
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iv) the few remaining-legally enforceable-job 
reservations should be removed; 
v) all matters of right should be determined in 
law by a new Industrial Court; 'and 
vi) a National Manpower, 'Commission-should be set up 
to monitor developments in labour relations and 
advise the government accordingly.,, 
(RSA 1979a) 
Only on the first point was there major disagreement in 
the Commission, the recommendation being passed by seven 
votes to six (Godsell 1982, p. -215). ' There was-virtual 
unanimity on the'others, with the exception of one 
commissioner, Andries Nieuwoudt, -, the-President'of the 
all-white- Confederation of Labourjý, who dissented 
consistently. 
The South African government acted swiftly to 
implement the recommendations on recognising registered 
unions and on setting up the Industrial Court and the 
National Manpower Commission. A White Paper was issued, 
and a Bill prepared shortly thereafter, which became the 
Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 1979 in May 
(Chead le 19 79, P. 102). Subsequent statutory amendment s 
in 1981 and 1982 extended freedom of association to all 
employees, including migrants from independent African 
states as well as 'homelands'. Statutory law on 
collective employment relations is now consolidated into 
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one'act known as the Labour Relations Act (Piron'and Le 
Roux 1986; p. 75 et seq. ). 
The one-man Riekert commission addressed itself to 
the labour market where Africans are available for 
employment. The notion that blacks were merely 
11temporary'sojourners" in the white areas can be traced 
back'-to' the Stallard Commission"of 1921. It became 
statutorily enshrined in Section 10 of-the'Black (Urban 
Areas) Consolidated Act of 1945, which laid down the 
limited rights of'certain Africans to 'live in black 
townships. Others without the relevant qualifications 
were liable to be 'endorsed out' to the Bantustans 
(Kane Berman 1979, pps. 71-76). The Riekert Commission 
proposals were designed to extend these rights of 
'permanent' Africans living in the urban areas to 
employment and training, not at the expense of whites 
but at -the expense of Africans assigned to the black 
homelands (Nattrass 1979). The report noted that "from 
a purely quantitative point of view" there was likely to 
be a surplus of African'laboui seeking employment; what 
was needed was'a more efficient regulatory system of 
influx control "in the interest of orderly and stable 
community development" so that the "material living 
standards of established black inhabitants" could be 
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protected '(RSA 1979b, pps. 25 and 183). Riekert's 
subject matter was relevant to the State's management of 
the labour market, whereas Wiehahn's was of central 
importance to the way management labour relations were 
conducted. 
The Wiehahn reforms were greeted enthusiastically 
by representatives of big business. ' At the end of the 
week of the report's release, the Johannesburg Sunday 
Times summed up the reaction: 
.... there were no dissenters among the chief 
executives of multinational corporations in 
South Africa when questioned about the 
Report ... bosses of companies doing R2-billion 
worth of business in this country were 
unanimous for the main thrust of the the 
report, which they described as "historic" 
and "the greatest breakthrough in race 
relations in industry in the past thirty 
years". 
(cited in South African Labour Bulletin 
5 (2)-1979, p. 97) 
The reaction of domestic employers was scarcely less 
enthusiastic. The Federated Chamber of Industry, its 
regional counterparts and various Chambers of Commerce 
were welcoming, and -even the Afrikaanse Sekekamer called 
it "a very important and positive step forward" (SALB 5 
(2) 1979, pps. 93-95). 
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6.2 The Impact of Wiehahn 
These reactions were essentially judgements about 
the political implications of the report; and they were 
in large measure echoed, if a little more mutedly, in 
the positive reactions of overseas investors. The 
reality of Wiehahn dawned on employers once the unions 
began to assert pressure within the labour relations 
system, which happened fairly quickly as the rise in the 
incidence of strikes revealed in Table 6.1 overleaf 
demonstrates. In the four pre-Wiehahn years (1976 to 
1979), there were an average of 135 work stoppages each 
year; strikes involving blacks were very short and 
lasted less than one day per strike. In the three 
post-Wiehahn years (1980 to 1982), the average number of 
stoppages each year more than doubled to 314; and the 
duration of strikes involving blacks rose from less than 
one day to nearly three days. It was not simply a case 
of legalising unions which'then went out on strike: 
rather it was a matter of determining in what ways the 
new unions' demands were to be accommodated in the 
system. 
The Wiehahn report was predicated on the assumption 
that unregistered unions "being outside the statutory 
system, could well bring extreme stress to bear on the 
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Table' 6.1 
STRIKES AND WORK STOPPAGES 
1 
1976 - 1982 
No. of Employees_ of Man No days 
No. of Involved I, Lost 
Strikes and ' Work All Black Ali Black 
Stoppa ges Workers 
'Workers 
Workers Workers 
1976 245 
, 
28,013 2,6,291 591_861 22,014 
1977 90 ' 15,304 14,950 1'5,4 71 14,987 
1978 106 14,160 13,578 10,558 10,164 
1979 101 22,803 15,494 671099' 16,515 
1980 207 61f785-56,286 174,614 148,192 
1981 342 92,842 84,706 
'226,1554 
206,230 
1982 394 141,571 122,481 3650,, 337 298,256 
Source: 
National Manpower Commission 11982,. 
_ (RSA 1983, p. 237) 
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existing statutory system -a development which could 
within a very short space of time pose a grave danger 
to industrial peace" (RSA 1979a, para. 3.35.14). 'It 
therefore proposed that newly registered black unions 
should participate in the system as it then was: that 
is, by taking their place alongside established unions 
where appropriate at the industrial council to decide 
minimum terms and conditions for the industry. But 
the reality was that these new unions were organised 
very unevenly: they were strong in some plants but had 
no members in others covered by the same collective 
bargaining machinery. Where they were strong, and 
whether or not they were registered, they pressed the 
employer for recognition so, that they could handle the 
so-called 'bread and butter' issues, grievances that 
were the essence of experience for many of their 
members and could be addressed only at the plant. 
Before 197 9 was over, the Steel and Engineering 
Industry Federation (SEIFSA) issued guidance to member 
firms on black workers in trade unions. There were some 
5,000 employing firms with a labour force of over half a 
million, ý some 80 percent of whom were black, so it was 
potentially a most fertile recruiting ground. On the 
central question of local recognition, the guidelines 
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stated: 
.... No formal recognition be given by individuals and companies to black trades 
unions unless they had registered and been 
admitted as a party to the Industrial 
Council. 
The guidelines also went on to advise employers against 
granting unions the right of access for recruiting or 
organisational activities (cited by Douwes Dekker 1980a, 
17) . 
SEIFSA's president and reputed main advocate of the 
guidelines, E. P. Drummond, had been a Wiehahn 
Commissioner. The guidelines were in part based on a 
comment in Wiehahn that the formation of powerful unions 
outside the industrial council: 
.... would place employers in the untenable 
position of having to negotiate first with 
registered unions on industrial councils, 
second with their committees at enterprise 
level, and third with black trade unions 
outside the statutory system. The distorting 
effect - of such a situation on wage 
structures... is self-evident and can only be 
aggravated by the existing dichotomy of black 
unions being recognised by some employers and 
not others. 
(RSA 1979a, para. 3.35.13) 
- Yet whatever its rationale SEIFSA's communication 
was a serious blow against the ambitions of black 
unions, registered or unregistered, in this vital 
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industrial sector. As Douwes Dekker noted at the 
time, this advice: 
.... cannot facilitate the objective of industrial justice... (it) not only denies 
freedom of association but is vague or silent 
on the responsibility of the individual 
employer who is faced with the new dynamic of 
black trade unionism in his place of work. 
(Douwes Dekker 1980a,, p. 21). 
Even some of the established TUCSA unions, let 
alone those directly affected, complained about the 
tenor of these guidelines. In May 1980 SEIFSA conceded 
a relatively minor modification: where a union seeking 
registration agreed to apply for industrial, council 
membership, it could be granted locall recognition but 
only for the purposes of 'stop order' agreements - that 
is, the deductions of union subscription payments from 
wages. Drummond was quoted in the press as saying: 
We will certainly not permit unaions' to 
bargain with individual employers. All 
bargaining must take place through our 
Industrial Council. 
(Cited by Morris 1981, p. 75) 
But "bargaining with individual employers" was precisely 
what most of the black unions wanted. Within the year, 
Drummond's words were to have a hollow ring about them. 
The concern of critics like Douwes Dekker, and some 
practitioners in the field, was that the SEIFSA rules 
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could stifle -the Wiehahn initiatives and prevent a 
Inormalisation' of labour relations occurring. This was 
not solely a matter of nurturing the unions during the 
early delicate phase of the new dispensation: it was 
also a matter of allowing employers to solve their own 
labour situation as they best saw fit. The ground was 
effectively cut from under Drummond's feet by the 
Federated Chamber of Industries. The FCI guidelines 
were not published until January 1981 - and then only 
after an early draft had been watered down (Morris 1981, 
p. 77-82) - but they addressed the very difficulties of 
employers to which Douwes Dekker had drawn attention. 
The year 1980 had witnessed many firms for the first 
time affected by labour disputes. Recognition was 
frequently the key issue, and some employers were 
inevitably if inadvertently caught up in the unions' 
arguments over registration. The FCI, by encouraging 
employers to set up "effective communications" between 
employers and employees at a time when I'labour relations 
are in a state of transition", opened up the possibility 
of local deals. Some regional chambers, such as the 
Midland in Port Elizabeth, went further and actively 
encouraged recognition of unions where it was in the 
employers' interest to do so (Interview: MCI, August 
1982). 
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6.3 Registration 
In all other epochs of South African labour 
history, embryonic black unions had been crushed -by a 
combination of employer hostility and state repression. 
What the Wiehahn reforms provided was the first lawful 
opportunity for black unions to engage in collective 
relations with employers as independent bodies. Yet 
the licence granted to black unions in 1979 attempted to 
circumscribe any political activity. The Wiehahn report 
had specifically rejected the idea of outlawing 
unregistered black unions. It wanted them inside the 
system with incentives to register in the form of new 
rights. Any registration is a form of control, and 
Wiehahn-*s proposals gave the Registrar wide powers of 
discretion to accept for registration only those unions 
with appropriate constitutional arrangements for money 
and strictly non-political clauses. 
It is not therefore surprising that the black 
unions were divided over, the question of registration. 
SACTU's official historians expressed the view that the 
legal right to register was "a-sham designed to weaken 
and smash the strength, unity and independence" of the 
African unions (Luckhardt and Wall 1980, p. 460). A 
SACTU spokesman, criticising the Wiehahn report, told 
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the-ILO Conference in-June 1979 that: 
.... recognition must come through the 
struggle and the strength of workers 
vis-a-vis the exploiters - it can never be a 
concession granted by the oppressors 
themselves. Legality must not be confused 
with emancipation. 
(op. cit. p. 460) 
But the facts of the matter are that unregistered unions 
over the decades have been demonstrably unsuccessful as 
trade unions if they are judged. by,,, SACTU's own 
yardstick. They have seldom secured strength through 
organisation or through recognition by employers; or 
seldom achieved labour unity; or hardly if ever managed 
financial independence from outside sources. It seemed 
that unions wishing to achieve some of these goals in 
the aftermath of Wiehahn might have to reach different 
conclusions and compromise with the new rules. 
In , January 1980,, , the fourteen unions then 
affiliated to FOSATU,,, (Federation of South African Trade 
Unions) applied together f9r-registration. They issued 
a joint statement which-, made clear that it was a 
reluctant decision. It was a decision intended to 
forestall the actions of their rivals, the parallel 
unions of TUCSA (Trade Union Congress of South Africa), 
who appeared to be "taking the lead" in the upsurge of 
recruiting activity simply because they were registered 
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. (quoted in SALB 5: '6&7 1980, p. 76). FOSATU unions were 
evidently appalled at employers' actions. 
"Employers", another FOSATU'statment said: 
.... are bypassing the'established unions of 
African 
, 
workers and bringing new unions to 
their workers. 'In many cases the new unions 
are being used to undermine or pre-empt 
organisation by FOSATU unions. The most 
important feature of the new unions is that 
they are able to compete at an advantage with' 
the existing unions of African 
workers .... Most of the new unions will be 
prepared to accept certain conditions from 
management which will have the effect of 
weakening the entire labour movement.... 
(SALB op. cit., p. 77/8) 
FOSATU11s decision to register was in flat contradiction 
of its early repudiation of the Wiehahn, reforms, and 
this caused much anguish to many of its leftwing 
supporters. It was a conversion clearly motivated by 
pragmatism in response to what their officials believed 
was-, happening at countless places of employment in that 
first post-Wiehahn year. Applying for registration was 
essentially 'a tactical move: 'it did not signify a 
complete'embrace of'the whole reform package. 
Nevertheless, news of the conversion was sweet to 
those in favour of at least giving the reforms a try. 
When the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) 
announced that it too was seeking registration, the 
balance was decisively tilted in favour of pragmatism. 
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By 1981, the Minister for Manpower was able" to tell 
parliament that forty-five previously unregistered 
unions had applied for registration since July 1979; 'and 
a list of 200 unions in 1981 recorded only twenty-two 
unregistered" (Miller 1982, p. xix). According to 
National Manpower commission figures, there were 56,737 
blacks in 'registered unions at the end of 1980, and 
394,510 at the end of 1982 (RSA_1983). The debate 
between the two sides - those in favour of tactical 
registration and those in favour of a boycott raged 
openly and sometimes acrimoniously in the pages of the 
South 
-African 
Labour Bulletin (see especially: vol. 7 
nos. 1 -3,1981, for editorial comment)., But what 
united the registered and unregistered black'unions in 
coming to terms with the new dispensation was in-'the end 
more important than what divided them, and 'the issue 
gradually faded into the background. 
That the' licence was granted in the"first 'place 
represented what in political circles was seen as a 
victory -of the Iverlightel (enlightened view) over - the 
I'verkrampte, '. It' represented" a victory for the 
Department of Manpower, ' and-for business' organisations 
seeking to- manage I labour 'relation's as a normal-' 
activity, over the security police and others to whom a 
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"grievance procedure' meant tear-gas cannisters lobbed 
and alsatian dogs loosed on black strikers. The matter 
of political activity, most of the unions felt, could be 
left to another time. 'Economistic behaviour' became 
the order of the day. 
6.4 Freedom of Association 
Thus as far as the law itself was concerned - as 
distinct from actual practice - by the end of 1981 'even 
the International Labour Office, the leading, overseas 
critic of apartheid in the labour field, was forced to 
acknowledge: 
Freedom of association has been extended -in 
legislation to all black workers; trade union 
autonomy regarding membership has been 
recognised; racially discriminating features 
have been removed from industrial relations 
legislation; and a unitary system of 
industrial relations has been established. 
(ILR 1982,, p. 32). 
The ILo report also listed the known detentions and 
arrests of union activists and the cases of police and 
security interference in labour affairs. But its 
candour on the legal changes led to criticism at the 
Committee on Apartheid, whose official minutes record 
that the report was considered to be: 
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. '-.. informative but "to lack depth. There 
were features which were almost suggestive of 
a subtle campaign by South Africa to justify 
so-called change; if the Report was to be 
written in that fashion it called into 
question the purpose of the Committee. In 
addition the use by the Special Report of 
official and semi-official South African 
sources was questionable, as they would 
obviously be subjective. It would be 
appropriate for Africans to be associated 
with the Report. 
(ILC 1982,22: 2 para. 7) 
In the years 1979 to 1982, a period of economic 
growth, most of the new unions worked within the terms 
of the licence granted to the m through registration to 
I 
create a new 'plural system' at the workplace. This may 
have been the opposite of what Wiehahn intended, and 
certainly the opposite of what SEIFSA wanted, but it 
marked a development for the black unions. In the words 
of Van der Merwe: 
By the end of 1983 (the unions) had entered 
into signed agreements, registered, and even 
joined industrial councils, and were 
participating with not a little-gusto at 
times in often-successful litigation in the 
courts. Many of their leaders hadýdeveloped 
into organised and effective workplace and 
industry negotiators, who through ý--their 
efforts .... enjoyed a high degree of 
political credibility and, leadership, in the 
black community. 
(Van der Merwe 1986, p. 3) 
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6.5 The Effect on Union Growth 
The 1979 dispensation had a dramatic effect on 
union growth rates. Within three years, the degree of 
unionisation among black workers doubled from 5.6 
percent to 10.3. Total membership'of all trade, unions 
increased by over forty percent, from 754,000 in 1979 to 
over one million in 1982 (see Table 6.2 overleaf). 
During this period, the two new, -black- union 
groupings, FOSATU and CUSA, achieved particularly rapid 
growth rates. FOSATU's membership grew spectacularly 
from some 24,000 in fourteen affiliates in 1979 to 
140,000 in sixteen affiliates in mid-1982, while CUSAIs 
numbers rose from 19,000 in eight affiliates to 55,000 
in eleven affiliates in the same period. The 
long-established mixed race TUCSA with, some sixty 
affiliated unions also benefitted significantly from the 
Wiehahn reforms, with membership rising from 283,000, to 
435,000 in 1979-1982. Meanwhile, membership of 
non-affiliated unions remained relatively static at 
around 300,000, while that of the exclusively white 
SACOL declined, from 138,000 to 125,000. 
But growth was not merelyýa matter of numbers, it 
was also a question of influencer, most clearly measured 
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Table 6.2 
ESTIMATES OF 
MEMBERSHIP OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS 
1979 and 1982 COMRarisons 
End 1979 End 1982 
U. nion Unions Members Unions Members Members 
Gro, . 2P-I-Mn 
(000"ST (0001s) Change 
SACOL 17 138 13- 125 -9.4 
TUCSA '60 283 63 435 +53.7 
FOSATU 14 24 16 140 +483.3, 
CUSA 8 ý19 11 55 +189.5 
Unaf f iliated 65 290, n/a 315 +8.6* 
TOTALS 754 1,070 +41.9 
Unionisation of 
organisable 13.2 18.4 
population* 
Unionisation of 
black labour* 5.6 10.3 
"Unionisation" is, I-expressed-as 'a percentage of the 
"organisable population", which is the total employed 
population, less those in the professional, administrative, 
agricultural and domestic categories. 
Sour-ces: 
The base -, data, -for 1979 estimates relied on Miller 1982 
("Trade Unions: A Directory", SALDRUF Cape Town) and the TUCSA 
Annual Conference Report and, Directory 1979. The 1982 *estimates 
are based on the author's own fieldwork and the information 
collected at the Industrial Relations Unit, UPE. 
For further'-estimates for 1983 and 1985,, see Table 9.2. 
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in the' growing number of recognition agreements. - In 
mid-July 1981, there were estimated to be-thirty-six; by 
the end of 1982 '-over 200; and by the end of 1984 
"probably more than 800 recognition- agreements in 
existence" (Piron and Le Roux 1986, p. 100). Such 
agreements varied considerably in scope and detail, but 
in essence they committed an employer -to 'accept the 
legitimacy of a union to represent its members on 
matters, usually specified, which are common to both 
parties. The inevitable result of this rapid growth of 
recognition agreements was to strengthen significantly 
plant bargaining'outside the-fra'mework of the existing 
industrial council arrangements. " This was precisely 
what SEIFSA had so strongly counselled its member firms 
against. Influence thus came from the opportunities 
local recognition gave the unions to determine jointly 
the conditions under which blacks-worked, and especially 
the chance for grievances to be 'aired through a 
procedure. 
The spread of 'influence' did not of course occur 
evenly across industry. Although some of the new 
unions, such as the Metal and Allied Workers Union from 
1982, attempted a systematic-strateg'y of recognition 
plant by plant within a particular industry, the process 
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resulted in much randomness. There was a marked upward 
trend when black union membership was aggregated 
nationwide (as shown in Table 6.2), and by 1983 black 
unions were represented at most employers in the. motor 
manufacturing and related trades, in metal manufacture, 
food processing, textiles, retailing and certain 
services. Nevertheless there was afragmentation in the 
pattern when the position was analysed plant by plant. 
6.6 The Accommodation Strategy 
The Wiehahn and Riekert reports were measures which 
set out to liberalise labour relations and the labour 
market. Yet they were also designed to keep control: 
total deregulation was never on the agenda. Together 
they represented the Iverligtel policy of seeking to 
co-opt urban blacks into the system, and were thus a 
change in direction from the exclusion policies pursued 
rigorously since 1948. What actually happened in places 
of employment would therefore determine whether this 
strategy of accommodation was being achieved. 
In the companies examined - and throughout the rest 
of South African industry - the major preoccupation of 
the black unions in these early post-Wiehahn years was 
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economistic. By*concentrating on grievances and winning 
some cases, they were able to build up a loyal 
membership, with credible organisations. Externally, 
the new federations established firm contacts with 
European and American labour movements on whose cash 
they largely depended for running costs (see Chapter 9 
for further discussion on the unions). In summary, the 
unions appeared to be intent on operating within an 
evolving labour relations system, to the relief of most 
of the employers in the survey, many of whom had feared 
the spectre of unmanageable disorder on the shop floor. 
7 It was therefore possible in 1983 at least 
tentatively to claim some success for the results of the 
Wiehahn reforms. Many employers were satisfied with the 
outcome of their strategy of accommodation. Many unions 
could point to the positive results of economism: real 
disposable income for many union members with permanent 
jobs had risen; strikes over wage issues were often 
successful; and there was less interference by the 
policy and security authorities in labour disputes. 
The employers' strategy of accommodating black 
unions (and the unions' acquiescence in it) rested on 
the twin assumptions that the government could continue 
high economic growth and guarantee political stability. 
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Economic growth would lead to higher earnings, more jobs 
and some amelioration through social spending policies 
of the lot of the disadvantaged groups. Political 
stability required the meeting of certain black 
expectations while retaining the crucial aspects of 
white power. Being 'accommodated' by employers 
inevitably meant following an economistic path. But 
economism itself allowed the unions a worthwhile role 
without forcing them to challenge the state when they 
were simply not ready for it. 
This is not to infer that the state authorities 
were disposed to make life too easy for the black unions 
in the post-Wiehahn period, far from it. ' Yet, -despite 
continuing provocation, ' including detentions and 
harrassment of union leaders and officials, the emergent 
unions managed to avoid - or at least postpone -a 
head-on clash with the government during their most 
formative period. 
By 1983, therefore, it seemed that the black 
unions had been incorporated with reasonable success 
into a rational process of labour relations at company 
level. The "new dispensation" could claim to have met 
its objectives. 
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CHAPTER 7 
EMPLOYER ATTITUDES TO CHANGE 
"A considerable number of Kafirs are employed at low 
rates of wages, but they have not yet obtained a 
reputation as good (workers). The white employer of 
black labour in South Africa does not allow that the 
Kafir does anything well. " 
Anthony-Trollope 1878 
South Africa V01.2 Chp. 5 
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Introduction 
Critics of South Africa have long argued the 
connection between apartheid as repressive social 
control and low pay for blacks in the economy. 
Companies may no longer openly admit to the view that 
"blacks do nothing well", but there is little positive 
sign that blacks have been advanced by their employers 
much beyond the ranks of the unskilled. 
This chapter considers in what ways and for what 
reason employer attitudes to blacks changed in the 
period of the new dispensation. The evidence is largely 
drawn from the case studies carried out in 1982. 
Section 1 considers the extent to which the twelve firms 
studied had allowed their black employees to take 
advantage of the post-Wiehahn reforms on freedom of 
association. Next, the "proactive" strategy to union 
recognition of Cadbury and Johnson & Johnson is 
discussed in Section 2, and the attitudes of the group 
head offices are evaluated. 
In contrast, Section 3 describes two "non- 
interventionist" approaches of the recognition, 
distinguishing between Barlow's pragmatism and Aberdare 
Cables' hostility. Despite being a subsidiary of 
Philips of Eindhoven, Aberdare had no international 
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reference-point, and thus no pressure. Section 4 deals 
with two firms, Ford and Volkswagen, that Inormalised' 
their industrial relations during the period: it 
contrasts the external pressures on them, and notes the 
special relevance in the process of change of the German 
Supervisory Board which contains trade union members. 
Section 5 discusses the unusual case of Barclays 
Bank, whose vulnerability to economic pressure in 
Britain meant that it 'couldn't win' in South Africa, 
despite conforming to the European code. Section 6 
summarises the changes made by the case study companies, 
and offers a four-fold explanation as to why a policy of 
accommodation seemed at the end of 1982 to be 
succeeding. - 
7.1 Freedom of Association 
Freedom of association was the most important 
principle enunciated by Wiehahn- The breach of that 
principle had caused South Africa to remove herself from 
the ILO back in 1964. By the late 1970s, it was the 
minimum reform demanded by critics both internal and 
external, and figured prominently in the European and 
Sullivan codes. once the Commission's recommendation 
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had been enacted in s. 78 of the Labour Relations Act, it 
became the benchmark against which the performance of 
companies could be clearly measured. 
The changes in industrial relations in the case 
study companies from pre- to post-Wiehahn reflect both 
the upward swing in membership and the divergent growth 
in patterns of recognition that were discussed in 
Chapter 6. These changes are summarised in Table 7.1 
(overleaf) and Table 7.2 (on p. 227). Table 7.1 lists 
the black unions recognised by the companies before 
1979, and Table 7.2 lists those recognised at the time 
of the inquiries in 1982. 
Prior to the Wiehahn reforms, only Ford and VW 
had had dealings with independent black unions. Three 
others had recognised TUCSA unions, though in only one 
company, Barclays, did this involve black employees 
being organised in a parallel union (see Table 7.1). By 
1982, however, three firms - Cadbury, Johnson & Johnson 
and Industex - had each granted local recognition to 
independent black unions. Only one of the 
internationally owned companies, Aberdare Cables, did 
not recognise a union (see Table 7.2). By 1982 also, 
two companies - Ford and Wilson Rowntree - had 
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Table 7.1 
BLACK UNION RECOGNITION IN THE CASE STUDY COMPANIES, 
Pre- Wiehahn 
a) Internationally owned Companies 
Comnanv union Affiliation 
vw NUMRW* FOSATU 
FORD 
WILSON 
ROWNTREE 
CADBURY 
JOHNSON 
JOHNSON 
INDUSTEX 
WELLINGTON 
INDUSTRIES 
ABERDARE 
CABLES 
NUMRW* 
UAW** 
swu 
FOSATU 
Independent 
TUCSA 
None 
None 
None 
TWIU 
None 
BARCLAYS SASBO 
Parallel union 
b) Barlow COMRanies 
XIDDLEBURG 
STEEL None 
PLASCON None 
TUCSA 
TUCSA 
TUCSA 
Type of Arrangement 
Industrial Council 
" Liaison Committee 
Industrial Council 
" Liaison Committee 
Informal recognition 
Industrial Council 
" Works Committee 
Informal Committee 
Works Committee 
Works Committee 
Industrial Council 
Works Committee 
Industrial Council 
Works Committee 
Works Committee 
Works Committee 
PALMIET None None 
Notes: See overleaf for the notes to Table 7.1 
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Notes to Table 7.1 on page 225: 
The National Union of Motor and Rubber Workers 
became the National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union 
(NAAWU) in 1982. 
The UAW (strictly the United Automobile and Allied 
Workers' Union) had close links with the NUMRW and 
was described by Maree as an "independent parallel 
union" (Maree 1981, p. 13). It later changed into 
MACWUSA. 
Sources: Company and union interviews 1982 
experience of more than one union competing to organise 
the same group of black workers. Ford chose to give the 
smaller challenger a modicum of recognition by granting 
it the right to make representations, which was a policy 
it had adopted towards African unions in pre-Wiehahn 
days. Rowntree, on the other hand, chose to beat off 
the independent union challenging its established TUCSA 
union (a decision examined further in Chapter 8). All 
companies with unions had in practice some form of local 
recognition that supplemented the industrial council's 
wage fixing role. 
The remaining three internationally-owned companies 
exhibited no significant degree of change in industrial 
relations in the pre- and post-Wiehahn periods. 
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Table 7.2 
BLACK UNION RECOGNITION IN THE CASE STUDY COMPANIES 
Post-Wiehahn (1982) 
a) Internationally owned COMRanies 
Comnanv Union Affiliation Type of Arrangement 
vW NAAWU FOSATU Industrial Council 
" Local negotiation 
FORD NAAWU FOSATU Industrial Council 
" Local negotiation 
ii) MACWUSA Independent Local negotiation 
WILSON* i) SWU TUCSA Industrial Council 
ROWNTREE ii) SAAWU Independent Not recognised 
CADBURY SFAWU FOSATU Industrial Council 
" Local committee 
JOHNSON & SAAWU Independent Local negotiation 
JOHNSON 
INDUSTEX NUTW FOSATU Local negotiation 
WELLINGTON TWIU TUCSA Industrial Council 
INDUSTRIES 
ABERDARE None Works Committee 
CABLES 
BARCLAYS SASBO TUCSA Industrial Council 
Parallel Union Committee 
b) Barlow Comp anies 
XIDDLEBURG None Works Committee 
STEEL 
PLASCON SACWU CUSA Works Committee 
PALXIET None Works Committee 
Sources: Interviews with companies and unions 1982 
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Wellington Industries in the Western Cape employed 
coloured labour rather than black and so was not 
directly affected by the reforms on freedom of 
association. Barclays continued its policies of dealing 
with the long-established Society of Bank Officials and 
its parallel unions, though by 1982 the union's separate 
sections were more integrated. Aberdare Cables 
successfully continued a works committee system, 
although a union was actively recruiting at the time of 
the inquiry. Two of the three Barlow companies had not 
faced demands for unionisation; but Plascon Paints had 
a signed recognition agreement with the SA Chemical 
Workers' Union, a CUSA affiliate. All three had a Works 
committee, including Plascon. 
By the early 1980's, it was often asserted that 
some employers were seeking to prevent black workers 
from effectively exercising their freedom to associate. 
Management, it was alleged, preferred to deal with 
"moderate" rather than "militant" unions and sought to 
channel union membership in the moderate direction. In 
1980, for example, the Motor Industries Federation, 
representing the repair side of the automobile industry, 
had issued its members with advice to "make absolutely 
certain that their black workers joined a (TUCSA) 
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union", a recommendation castigated by Douwes Dekker as 
"the most blatant example of collusion that has come to 
light" (cited in Business International 1980, p. 173). 
7.2 The "Proactivell Approach to Union Recognition-, 
Cadbury and Johnson & Johnson 
The case study companies developed their industrial 
relations strategies in different ways to cope with the 
new dispensation ushered in by the Wiehahn reforms. 
Two companies in particular, Cadbury and Johnson & 
Johnson, took active steps to accommodate the pressures 
for union recognition, thus taking what may be described 
as a "pro-active" approach. 
In the case of Cadbury, however, the company ended 
up with a union not of its first choice. In 1978, local 
management at the Port Elizabeth factory decided that 
there should be a multiracial union of moderate 
disposition, possibly an in-house union, to supplement 
the Works Committee. The advice of Professor Wiehahn had 
been solicited on this policy. After briefing shop 
floor and supervisory personnel on the implications of 
introducing a union, a vote in favour of joining was 
carried by the shop floor under the "clear guidance" of 
top management (Interviews: Cadbury 1982). Initially 
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registration of this in-house union was refused, but 
within a year it had gained registered status as the 
Sweet Manufacturing Union (SMU). By 1980 a full 
substantive agreement had been negotiated between 
Cadbury and the SMU in a proceedure modelled on the 
Cadbury UK - Transport and General Workers' Union 
agreement at Bourneville. 
However the independent Sweet, Food and Allied 
Workers' Union (SFAWU), an affiliate of FOSATU, began 
recruiting at the plant in 1980 and demanded recognition 
on the basis of its minority membership. ýManagement was 
at first divided on how to handle this challenge; but 
those managers who advocated outright opposition to the 
new union were persuaded on the wisdom of a more 
conciliatory course. In 1980 and 1981, the company was 
in dispute with a section of its workforce over the 
introduction of, a new night shift, and a number of work 
stoppages occurred. SFAWU, not unnaturally, sided with 
the disputants, some of whom were dismissed. Early 1981 
was "a moment of crisis" when a "full-scale inter-union 
war" might have broken out (Interview). The personnel 
department was, however, monitoring the rise in support 
for the challenger and the decline of the in-house 
union, using data from 'stop orders', the system of 
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deducting union dues from wages which was done for both 
unions. This evidence indicated that a new strategy was 
needed. 
In may 1981, the company agreed to hold a 
referendum using independent scrutineerse The two 
unions' targets were agreed in advance at thirty-five 
percent for full recognition and twenty per cent for 
partial recognition. In the outcome, SFAWU secured 50.6 
per cent of the total possible votes and SMU only 19.5 
percent. Recognition was withdrawn from the Sweet 
Manufacturing Union and winding up procedures were put 
into effect. By late 1982, the Sweet, Food and Allied 
Workers' had over sixty percent of the workforce in 
membership (Interviews: Cadbury; SFAWU 1982). Cadbury 
Schweppes' progress report on the application of the 
European Code of Conduct for the year 1981/82 was 
therefore able to claim: 
.... The company continues to follow the 
policy of freedom of association for all its 
workers. Consultation and collective 
bargaining with the organisation most 
representative of employees is part of 
overall policy ... A relationship of trust has developed between the union and the company 
over the past year. Meetings between 
management and shop stewards are held on a 
regular monthly basis and issues which could 
cause problems or tensions are discussed 
openly and frankly and are usually resolved 
with the minimum of delay. 
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(Cadbury Schweppes 1982, p. 2) 
Head office was kept informed of developments as 
they unfolded, , and remained 
in an advisory role. 
Initially perturbed at what was seen as the "gamble" of 
dismissals by local management during the night shift 
dispute, the international management were able to claim 
credit for the shift in policy. Yet it might have gone 
adversely for Cadbury. The disputes, stoppages rather 
than all-out strikes, had not attracted much media 
coverage outside Port Elizabeth, and there was therefore 
none of the glare of publicity that attended 'events 
happening simultaneously at Wilson Rowntree. The 
absence of pressure helped the personnel department's 
policy to win through and reassure doubters. 
Johnson & Johnson (J & J), the American owned 
pharmaceutical manufacturer in East London, moved 
cautiously over two. years from September 1979 before 
recognising SAAWU. Unlike Cadbury, there was no 
complication of two rival unions; the caution arose from 
SAAWU, Is tmilitant" image (discussed in Chapter 8). The 
company had made four attempts to establish a liaison 
committee in the 1970's, but none had lasted longer than 
three months. once SAAWU had established a presence in 
i& it the two parties negotiated a procedural 
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agreement. This "created the basis of working 
relations" between personnel managers and shop stewards. 
Only then was the matter of recognition put to a 
referendum. At the time of the ballot,, SAAWU had signed 
up fifty-six per cent of the workforce; but it secured 
an overwhelming ninety-seven per cent of the potential 
vote (Interviews: J&J; SAAWU 1982). 
The American parent was at first hostile to the 
formalisation of relations between its subsidiary and 
the militant black union, on the grounds that its 
world-wide "affirmative action" programme, known as "The 
Credo", was sufficient to ensure equal treatment between 
the races. It necessitated some lobbying from the 
subsidiary on the particular sensitivities of the local 
situation to bring about head office acceptance of the 
union arrangement. Representations were also made to 
the Sullivan organisation to tighten the guidelines on 
freedom of association and articulate more clearly the 
role of black unions in achieving this freedom. 
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7.3 The "Non-Interventionist" Approaches: 
Barlow Rand and Aberdare Cables 
As noted earlier, three-companies - Aberdare Cables 
in the Eastern Cape -and two -Barlow companies, 
Middleberg Steel and Palmiet - had not been-faced with 
demands for recognition,, ' nor had they made efforts to 
encourage unionisation among their employees. Works 
committees were in place in all three firms, and on the 
issue of unionisation they may be described as 
"non-interventionist". 
The' Barlow Rand Group Code of Employment- Practice 
was "first adopted in June 1978. The third, edition of 
February 1981 was less'specific on the question of 
unionisation than either the European code or the 
modified Sullivan principles. It-made reference to 
negotiating with unregistered unions "if 'meaningful 
numbers'of our black employees wish to be represented by 
them", "which is-what"had'happened at Plascon. Yet the 
objective of Barlowls policy-'is best'encapsulated in a 
quote from the Executive Chairman contained in the code: 
.... We believe that the- best road to industrial peace and stability lies in 
, negotiation at industry, or national level 
between employer organisations and fully 
representative - mixed unions, with 
supplementary negotiation on domestic issues 
at plant level between management and works 
councils, employee representatives being 
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drawn from all population groups. 
(Barlow Rand 1981) 
This begs the question whether such an aim was in fact 
achievable, given the state of politics in labour 
management relations in the post-Wiehahn period that 
were discussed in Chapter 6. But the example of 
recognition at Plascon illustrates that the Barlow Group 
does in practice depart from "the best road" when 
circumstances demand it. 
Aberdare Cables, on the other hand, claimed to be 
neutral about unionisation. However, an incident which 
occurred at the Port Elizabeth plant in October 1981 
suggests that Aberdare was in fact downright hostile to 
black worker aspirations. The company experienced a 
strike of about one-third of its manual workforce in 
sympathy with workers "dismissed for incompetence". 
Some returned after the company had issued an ultimatum, 
but a quarter remained on what was an unlawful strike. 
The strike leaders asked to meet works committee members 
but this was, refused by the firm. Allegations of 
"violent intimidation" by the strikers towards the 
majority of employees attending work were made, and - in 
a bizarre move - "the company spent R6,500 equipping its 
workforce with ink guns" to deter the strikers from 
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further provocative acts (Interview: Aberdare 1982). 
The guns were never returned to the company. 
After the strike, the Managing Director and 
Personnel Manager saw the Managing Director of the 
Eastern Province Herald to complain about "bias" in its 
reporting, though curiously the company stated that its 
policy during the strike had been to make "no comment" 
to the press so as not to inflame the situation 
(Interviews: Aberdare; and CHR). In 1979, controlling 
shares in Aberdare Cables held by the NKF Groep BV, a 
Dutch company, were transferred to Philips Electronic 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd. This is a South African registered 
company ultimately owned by NV Philips GF of Eindhoven. 
Aberdare did not regard itself as subject to the 
European code and consequently made no reports to 
Philips; nor was it ever asked to do so. At the time of 
the research, a FOSATU union was recruiting Aberdare 
employees into membership. The company had set the union 
a target of "fifty percent plus one" of the 600 semi- 
and unskilled workforce. Management would not however 
let recruiting take place inside the works: to do so was 
"a disciplinary offence" (Interview: Aberdare Nov 1982). 
The policy of lofty neutrality to the principle of 
freedom of association is seldom as benign in reality as 
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it appears superficially. 
7.4 "Normalisinct" Industrial Relations: Ford and 
once recognition is granted by an, employer,, it is 
in the nature of things that unions push for a tangible 
reward to demonstrate their effectiveness. As Chapter 6 
showed, the number of strikes in the post-Wiehahn period 
rose sharply, and many of these were disputes about 
wages. The buoyant economy of 1979-82 encouraged unions 
to press hard for annual pay claims; and the Port 
Elizabeth region, with its high concentration of motor 
manufacturing and allied firms, many of them -foreign 
owned, witnessed so much industrial conflict -that the 
president of the Midland Chamber of Industries could 
refer to it as "South Africa, 's major management-union 
battlefield" 
_(Financial 
mail, 3 Dec 1982). Two leading 
motor companies inthe case studies were Ford and VW1 
and it can be conjectured that if industrial relations 
in South Africa were to "normalisell - that is,, to become 
managed in the typical manner of Western multinationals, 
without resorting to the repressive intervention of the 
state then it is in these firms that the evidence 
would be found. 
Ford concentrated managerial responsibility for 
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union relations and the implementation of the Sullivan 
principles - into the post of Industrial Relations 
Director. In an attempt to achieve these aims and to 
build trust -with union representatives, he chose a 
highly public profile, using the local press as a medium 
through which to criticise government policy andýto urge 
the police and security authorities to stay out of Ford 
disputes. - But he also had to balance radical criticism 
with the need to change attitudes among conservative- 
minded white managers in the firm, particularly at 
supervisory level, to encourage acceptance of the new 
dispensation. This he interpreted as ensuring that the 
economic interests of the firm were not unduly damaged 
by industrial action, and that management were kept 
informed as much as possible on company strategy. The 
power of foremen to dismiss was removed (Ferreira 1980; 
Interview: Ford 1982). 
VW's advantage over Ford was that it had only one 
union, NAAWU, to deal with. This removed the need to 
build a public platform from which to communicate with 
dissident black workers engaged in a campaign on behalf 
of a rival union** 'But both firms experienced an upsurge 
in grievances over problems arising not only at work but 
also in the townships: over bussing, housing, policing 
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and education. This led to the need for regular 
intervention with the authorities on behalf of their 
employees; and also to the development of appropriate 
training programmes for white managers about the nature 
of problems encountered by blacks. In addition both 
firms engaged in industrial- relations training on 
counselling, grievance handling and disputes settlement 
(Interviews: VW and Ford 1982). 
Both companies had strikes over pay during 1981. 
In July and August 1982, NAAWU again called official and 
lawful strikes and engaged in "slowdowns" in both firms 
when negotiations broke down over its pay claim of R3.50 
per hour. At Volkswagen - described as "one of the best 
union organised factories in South Africa" by the 
International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF 1984, p. 37) 
- the strike was total. At Ford, most workers joined in 
but a dissident group continued working. The 
negotiating machinery was tested to the full. A 
settlement was produced, giving rises in basic pay in 
two stages to R2.20 and R2.30, a review of job gradings 
and new lay-off procedures. An orderly return to work 
ensued and there had been little police intervention. 
The costs of the strike to the employers could be 
measured in increased wages bills, and they reacted, as 
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most employers do, by insisting on higher productivity 
(Favis 1982). Investment programmes in automated 
technology were unveiled: in terms of labour costs, for 
these motor companies the 1982 strikes marked the end of 
the era where unskilled labour could be considered 
"cheap". VW announced the setting up of the largest 
black apprenticeship training programme in the country 
to meet its future skills needs. 
Valuable lessons in industrial relations management 
were learned from these experiences, both by 'the 
companies and by NAAWU, which felt it had established 
its credibility with members and employers (Interview: 
1982). Strengths and weaknesses were identified for 
further attention. It was possible to say unequivocally 
by the end of 1982 that Ms labour relations had 
Inormalised'. Ford was however still plagued by the 
running sore of inter-union rivalry with specific South 
African connotations (which are discussed in Chapter 9). 
The main union alleged that Ford was "all talk and 
little action" (Interview: NAAWU 1982), but it seemed to 
be managing the transition reasonably effectively in 
the circumstances. 
Where were the pressure points to bring about 
normalisation? Most of the ideas implemented in the 
240 
motor companies emmanated from within the firms 
themselves. The highly competitive nature of the 
vehicle market place was an important catalyst: adverse 
publicity for ineffective labour relations was not a 
product selling point, and the "awful spectre" of 
British Leyland in the UK during the 1970's was often 
cited as an undesirable precedent. But as subsidiaries 
of major multinationals, both had important overseas 
stakeholders to satisfy. Ford South Africa 'reported 
into headquarters regularly; critical questions were 
raised about Ford's South African operation at 
stockholders' meetings and in the US Congress. In VW's 
case, the pressure came from within the international 
company. Volkswagen's parent company in Germany is 
managed by a supervisory board which includes trade 
union representatives from IG Metal. The 
representatives of the supervisory board regularly 
visited the plant, and made a point of contacting NAAWU 
officials as well as company personnel. Because 
Volkswagen AG in Wolfsburg had direct connections to the 
International Metalworkers' Federation (to which NAAWU 
was affiliated), knowledge of affairs in the South 
African -subsidiary was widespread. In one other case 
studied, the Belgian owner of Industex also made it his 
business to meet his- firm's union officials. But 
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Volkswagen was the only company encountered by the 
author with such extensive direct connections between 
the multinational head office and the local union. it 
gave that stakeholder a degree of influence based on 
familiarity beyond that of all other firms which had 
conventional accountability via theýmanagement reporting 
system. 
7.5 The Company That "Couldnot Win": Barclays Bank 
Barclays South Africa conformed fully with the 
European code, yet in Britain the parent group became 
the major target of anti-apartheid campaigners as a 
symbol of business support for apartheid. This prompts 
the question: if adherence to the code - is a 
manifestation of constructive engagement, why did this 
occur? 
Barclays National in 1982 was fifty-eight percent 
owned by the UK parent, Barclays Bank International. It 
was by any standards a large bank: 23,000 staff, 1,100 
retail outlets and assets appraching US$ 12 billions. 
Barclays National employed over 3,000 blacks, but most 
of them as cleaners. The Bank exhibited a conservative 
attitude to black advancement of the minority it 
employed on clerical and managerial grades: it "didn't 
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believe in special treatment for any race group's 
(Interview: Johannesburg 1982). A few black managers 
had been appointed to branches in black areas, though 
there were a few senior black staff in City Centre 
offices. But on the issues of freedom of association, 
pay and desegregated facilities, the subsidiary was in 
full compliance with the code's minimum requirements. 
This interpretation was shared by Barclays' British 
union, the Banking, Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU 
1983; BIFU 1985). 
It was the role of Barclays as a lender that 
attracted criticism from the Anti-Apartheid Movement. 
Loans were made in the international money markets to 
the South African government and internally within the 
economy to many institutions including 'parastatals' 
such as Essacom, the Electricity Supply Commission, and 
SASOL, the 'oil- from-coal' project. As early as 
September 1980 Barclays issued a pamphlet entitled 
"Barclays in South Africa: The Case for Constructive 
Engagement" which attempted a defence of normal business 
activity and a rebuttal of some of the charges then 
being levied at the bank. However the establishment of a 
"Shadow Board" in 1981 by the "End Loans to South 
Africa" campaign, part of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, 
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allowed the disinvestment lobby to target Barclays UK 
more clearly. As Britain's second largest clearing bank, 
Barclays was visible on almost every High Street. The 
loss of business through withdrawn accounts built up 
sharply: at first these were mainly small personal 
accounts, but they later included large institutional 
accounts such as local authorities and trade unions 
(private communication to author, 1986). 
At headquarters level, Barclays felt hurt that the 
world was scornful of its efforts to promote non-racial 
staff relations and dismisive of its community aid 
programmes: "we realised that whatever we did, -we simply 
couldn't win" (Interviews: London 1983 and 1984). 
Headquarters, through the person of the Chairman, 
stepped-up'the number of public attacks on apartheid at 
shareholders' meetings from 1983 onwards. Ironically, 
Barclays National claimed to have lost business in South 
Africa as a consequence of the chairman's stridency. At 
his most outspoken in November 1985, Sir Timothy Bevan 
accused the South African government, of beingý "woefully 
slow in dismantling apartheid": he condemned the 
"violence and inhumanity" of the police, the "muzzling" 
of the news media, and described apartheid as "wrong, 
un-Christian and unworkable". The effect of this was 
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ruined somewhat when it emerged that three days before 
the speech was delivered, Barclays had been notified of 
the loss of the prestigious Oxfam account with a 
turnover of E43 millions a year solely on the South 
African connection (Press Reports: Nov 1985). 
Barclays is thus an unusual case of a company 
unable to use its adherence to the European code in 
defence of its position on constructive engagement. 
Head office was more radical than the subsidiary in its 
public attitudes towards the South African government, 
and became increasingly more so over the years. However, 
throughout the period of public scrutiny of the bank's 
role in South Africa, it was obvious that head office 
policy was driven by the pressure of lost business, a 
loss that finally outweighed any financial gain from the 
investment. Its moral statements were always 
interpreted in this light: once the bank recognised 
this, it realised it could "never win". 
7.6 COMRanv Performance and Constructive Engagement 
Table 7.3 overleaf summarises, on the basis of the 
inquiries, whether or not the case study companies 
were complying with the minimum performance standards of 
their respective codes' requirements in 1982. Most werer 
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Table 7.3 
PERFORMANCE OF THE CASE STUDY COMPANIES 
IN RELATION TO THE CODES OF CONDUCT 
in 1982 
Freedom-of Minimum Deseareqated 
Association(l) Pav(2) Facilities(3) 
European Code: 
Volkswagen Yes Yes Yes 
Wilson Rowntree No Yes Yes 
Cadbury Yes Yes Yes 
Industex/ Wellington Yes Doubtful No 
Aberdare Cables No Yes* No 
Barclays National Yes Yes Yes 
Sullivan Principles: 
Ford Yes Yes Yes 
Johnson & Johnson Yes Yes Yes 
Barlow Code: 
Middleberg Steel Yes Yes* Yes 
Plascon Paints Yes Yes Yes 
Palmiet Yes Yes* Yes 
Defini ions: 
The specific requirements of the Codes under the three headings 
vary. The notes overleaf on page 234 summarise the chief 
features of the codes in these three areas. The appendices 
contain the codes' full requirements. 
Yes* = Management claim on pay unverified. Other claims 
were checked with the unions or calculated from wages data. 
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Notes to Table 7.3 on previous page: 
(1) Freedom of Association. 
EEC code: "encourage collective bargaining" and 
recognise black unions "where they exist". 
Sullivan: firms should "acknowledge the right" of blacks 
to form or join a union". 
Barlow: prefers industrial councils, but accepts 
"negotiation with unregistered unions" if "meaningful 
numbers" wish this. 
(2) Pay. 
EEC: minumum wage should exceed "by 50 percent" minimum 
subsistence level . 
Sullivan: 1130 percent" (both codes stress equal work for 
comparable work). 
Barlow: "non-discriminatory remuneration" based on job 
evaluation. 
(3) Desectregation. , 
EEC: "everything possible to desegregate" and provide 
equal working conditions. 
Sullivan: "eliminate all vestiges', of discrimination" in 
work facilities. 
Barlow: "move positively towards integration" though 
"legal constraints and social attitudes" will affect 
speed of progress. 
at least in respect of three central issues covered by 
the code. Only Aberdare and Wilson Rowntree failed on 
the freedom of association test. on minimum pay 
Industex was working towards, but had not reached, the 
fifty percent supplement on top of the basic living 
level, nor had it yet achieved fully desegregated 
facilities. 
Yet on the whole, most of the companies studied had 
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accomodated the force of black unionism. The year 1982 
had begun dramatically enough for industrial relations: 
on 5 February, Neil Aggett, the Transvaal secretary of 
the African Food and Canning Workers' Union died in 
police detention. A nationwide protest of a half-hour 
stoppage was called by the unions, described as "fairly 
widespread" by The Cape Town Argus (11 Feb)ýand in the 
Eastern Cape as "completely successful" by FOSATU 
(Interview: Nov 1982). At Cadbury and Plascon white 
supervisors were reported to have honoured the 
demonstration: at other firms, senior management 
privately expressed support to the unions for the 
protest, and some business leaders protested publicly at 
Aggett's death. It is difficult to imagine that even 
these limited displays of labour - management accord 
would have happened in any previous epoch. 
There appear to be four main, reasons why an 
accommodation strategy by private sector employers and 
largely economistic behaviour by the unions dominated 
the labour scene in the early- post-Wiehahn years. 
Firstly, conditions for the development of collective 
bargaining were certainly propitious. Employers in 
large and middle-sized firms, as represented by the case 
study companies, were more sophisticated than in 
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earlier periods: they were more open to international 
influence from head offices that subscribed to the 
codes, and they could benefit from international 
experience elsewhere which had shown that capitalist 
management was able to live with trades unions. Within 
these companies, the need for management training in the 
techniques of industrial relations was accepted and 
sometimes being met, and as a result individual managers 
felt more comfortable under the new dispensation than 
many had imagined they might be. Lessons were still 
being learned and new problems encountered; but there 
was undoubtedly a general feeling of optimism. It can 
be assumed that in 1982 optimism abounded elsewhere, 
because there is reason to believe the case study firms 
were not untypical of firms of a similar size in South 
Africa. 
Secondly, employers recognised they could no longer 
hide behind the skirts of government policy which had 
formerly outlawed black unions. The responsibility for 
union recognition had been passed to them, and the 
outside world could - and did - judge them according to 
the way they acted. Several employers expressed the 
view that they were willing and able to take 
responsibility for their own employee relations: the 
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state should stay out of conflicts at work. A few 
firms, through the persona of a leading executive, went 
increasingly an the public record in their criticisms of 
the apartheid system. 
Thirdly, economic prosperity was such in the years 
1979-82 that employers could go some way in meeting the 
substantive demands of unions. In return for wage 
increases employers were able to -pay attention to 
matters of productivity of labour utilisation, which had 
seemed relatively unimportant in the 'cheap labourl era. 
Wages rose, but the absolute numbers in employment 
within particular companies began to decline. There was 
evidence that blacks were begining to receive training 
in order to help employers meet known skills shortages. 
Employers entering into a Inormalised' labour management 
relationship were therefore not acting out of 
philanthropy or idealism, but out of hard- headed 
business realism* 
And fourthly, many unions - though not all - were 
able to demonstrate their own effectiveness as resolvers 
or managers of certain grievances among their 
membership. They had tested the limits of their 
economic power base. (The unions' responses to the 
opportunities for change are discussed in chapter 9). 
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In short, these firms managed a transition in the 
intense glare of world interest, some successfully, a 
few less so. Most firms were confident that their 
achievements upto the end of 1982 validated the 
constructive engagement thesis. Yet the difference 
between being perceived to succeed or to fail on this 
test was not necessarily a large one, - as the case of 
Wilson Rowntree, the subject of Chapter 8, demonstrates. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE SAGA AT WILSON ROWNTREE 
"Companies should ensure that all their 
employees irrespective of racial or other 
distinction are allowed to choose freely and 
without any hindrance 'the type of 
organisation to repres'ent them". 
(EEC Code of Conduct, para. 'I a) 
IIWS Wonft Eat ... Rowntree's Sweetsill 
IlSpit out that Fruit Gump Chumlev 
(Handbill slogans urging a boycott 
of Wilson Rowntree products, 1982) 
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Introduction 
No other multinational in this study, nor possibly 
in South Africa as-a whole, has gained such adverse 
international publicity for its handling of labour 
relations as Wilson Rowntree. In a space of just five 
months from October 1980, the company experienced no 
less than seventeen separate work stoppages, apparently 
over its refusal to recognise the South African Allied 
Workers' Union. Because this case bears directly upon a 
central objective of the Wiehahn reforms and of the 
European code, it is discussed and analysed in this 
chapter. 
In Section 1, the Rowntree Mackintosh connection in 
South Africa is described: it notes the relevance of 
the Quaker origins of the firm to its present personnel 
policies; and the presence of concerned share-holders 
capable of discreet lobbying with the main board. 
section 2 compares the two unions competing to organise 
Rowntree's black workers, the long established but 
sleepy Sweet Workers' Union and the overtly militant 
South African Allied Workeis' Union. 
Section 3 presents the circumstances leading up to 
the first strike in October 1980; and Section 4 those 
surrounding the bigger conflict in February 1981 which 
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led to 500 workers being dismissed for striking and the 
escalation of the conflict to international attention. 
Section 5 reports the two aspects of the dispute that 
helped to keep the matter in the world's headlines, the 
boycott of Wilson Rowntree products in South Africa, and 
the heavy repression meted out to SAAWU officials and 
supporters by' the Ciskeian authorities. Finally, 
Section 6 examines the relevance of the case for the EEC 
code and for the principle of constructive engagement on 
which it is based. 
8.1 The Multinational and its-Subsidiary 
Wilson Rowntree (Pty) Ltd. is the 100 percent owned 
subsidiary of Rowntree Mackintosh Plc of York, United 
Kingdom, which first acquired its interest in Wilsons in 
1925. At the beginning of 1983, the total capital in 
the group was E411.2 millions, and it employed 20,000 
staff in the United Kingdom and in nine subs idiaries 
across the world. About 2,200 staff were employed at 
Wilson Rowntree (WR) in 1982, which was one-quarter of 
all non-UK staff in the group (Rowntree Mackintosh 
1983). There is considerableirony in the opprobrium 
which became attached to Rowntree because of its 
policies, because it has since its creation in 1862 
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built up a reputation not only for the quality of its 
confectionery, but also for its caring and concerned 
attitude towards its employees arising from the social 
convictions of its Quaker founder, Joseph Rowntree. 
Three trusts were established by monies from Joseph 
Rowntree: the Memorial Trust, the Charitable Trust and 
the Social Services Trust. In 1982, ninety percent of 
the Charitable Trust's investments and fifty percent of 
the Memorial Trust's were held in Rowntree Mackintosh 
stock (the Social Services Trust had no stock in the 
company). Between them the Memorial and Charitable 
Trusts accounted for 10.9 percent of the ordinary shares 
(Trust Reports 1982). This represents a sizable 
pressure point on the company by trustees holding dear 
the values of the founding father. In June, 1978, well 
before the conflict at Wilson Rowntree began, the 
Charitable Trust raised the South African issue with the 
parent company, and learned that management was "in 
favour of a multi-racial union" and "strongly opposed to 
a separate African union" (JRCT: - communication to the 
author). -Again, - in March 1980, and still before the 
first strike, the Charitable Trust approached the group 
with the suggestion that it should commission an 
independent audit of employment policies at Wilson 
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Rowntree,, with the Shell South Africa and Ford audit as 
possible*models. Rowntree Mackintosh declined. 
Before the disputes, there was agreement that WR 
operated its staff relations policies on the same 
principles as those in the rest of the group. These 
included: good wages and conditions; no discrimination 
on the grounds of race or religion; consultation with 
employees; procedures for handling workplace grievances; 
and the recognition of appropriate trade unions for 
bargaining purposes (Interviews: WR 1982; Rowntree 
Mackintosh 1983). There was no disagreement, from 
either participants in or neutral observers of the East 
London labour scene, with WRIs claim to be a "good 
employer", the legacy of its Quaker heritage. 
The factory and offices of WR are situated close to 
the city centre of East London, on the site where Thomas 
Wilson originally established his sweet factory in 1886. 
This location is of great significance to the dispute. 
The port grew in industrial importance from 1875 on the 
strength of being on the country's only navigable river, 
which afforded natural harbour facilities. It is still 
the main exporter for maize and wheat from the orange 
Free State and for Eastern Cape fruit. Since 1950 two 
industrial estates have been developed, and the 
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industries represented now include motor assembly, 
engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals in addition 
to the older port industries of milling, food processing 
and oil refining. However, East London and its 
hinterland form a 'white corridor' between the two black 
'homelands' for the Xhosa people, Ciskei to the west and 
Transkei to the east. Many of the black workers in East 
London's factories live in black townships 'across the 
Border', particularly Mdantsane in the Ciskei, some 
twelve miles away (Hirsch and Kooy 1982). These recent 
political creations appear to "squeeze" the white areas, 
and there is a belief held by some in white local 
government that the squeeze has stultified economic 
development, exacerbating the city's general difficulty 
in an economic recession of being relatively remote from 
the larger and more prosperous consumer markets of the 
Transvaal and the Western Cape (Interview: East London 
City Council, Dec 1982). Thus the phrase "the Border" 
has come to refer to the meeting point between the two 
nominally independent black homelands and the white 
corridor, though its name originally referred to the 
area's mid-nineteenth century role in the era of the 
"Kaffir Wars" as the eastern frontier of the Cape of 
Good Hope Colony. 
257 
8.2 The Rival Unions 
In 1942, WR first recognised the Sweet Workers' 
Union, which then represented all staff of whatever 
race. When unions were forced to segregate in 1956, the 
SWU dropped whatever African membership it had but 
continued with whites, coloureds and Asians. SWU was 
affiliated to TUCSA. Immediately prior to the strikes, 
the Sweet Workers' Union was very tiny, a fact of great 
significance. Miller records that in the 1970's 
-it 
never exceeded a total national membership of 750, and 
in 1979 had shrunk to a new low of only 298 - 222 
coloured and Asian and 76 white (Miller 1982, p. 108). 
Since the company employed about 670 in these race 
groups that year, the degree of organisation overall 
could have been no higher than forty percent of those 
eligible to join, and that assumes there are no SWU. 
members in firms other than Wilson Rowntree. If there 
were members in other firms, then the degree of 
unionisation drops accordingly. In, fact the SALDRU 
reports lists the'SWU as a member of two industrial 
councils - one for the sweet manufacturing in East 
London, the other for the same-industry in Johannesberg 
- which implies, but does'not actually prove, 'that it 
had de facto bargaining rights in at least one other 
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firm. But either way, the low recruitment record of the 
SWU at Rowntree gave substance to SAAWU's allegations 
that it was merely a "sweetheart union", a "Puppet -of 
company management" and that it was "not interested in 
the workers' interests but in seeing that they kept 
management happy" (quoted in AAM Broadsheet,, 1982). In 
1980, however, there was a sudden influx of blacks into 
membership, some 1,100 in number which had the effect of 
quadrupling SWU's size (Miller 1982, p. 108). Before 
this happened, relations between WR and its black 
emoloyees who accounted for about sixty percent of the 
workforce were handled by a liaison committee as 
provided for under the Bantu Labour Relations Act. 
SAAWU was undoubtedly the most radical black union 
to arrive on the labour scene and the most overtly 
political in its public pronouncements. It began when 
Drake Koka'a old union, the Black Allied Workers' Union, 
split in 1979, SAAWU being the new name for the Natal 
and Eastern Cape branches (see: Maree 1982 pps. 34 - 
49). - The bulk of SAAWU1's supporters live in Mdantsane, 
so the political catastrophes- in the Ciskei are 
inexorably a part of the union's life. In Maree's view, 
there are special historical circumstances in the 
Eastern Cape - even before the artefact of the Ciskei 
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was, created - that affect labour relations. The 
Africans are Xhosa people with no inter-tribal 
conflicts; they have generally higher educational 
attainments than the national average, because this is 
the area where mission schools were strong; and there 
are deep-seated strands of both black conciousness and 
ANC support (Interview: MareeýNov 1982). SAAWU thus 
had a fertile recruiting ground, and continued the old 
tradition of aiming both for industrial status as a 
trade union and broader support as a political movement. 
The SWU had become registered in November 1980 
under the terms of the Industrial conciliation 
(Amendment) Act of 1979. It applied for registration 
the previous year and from that point began recruiting 
black members, claiming 300 by July 1979 (WR). However, 
by May 1980 SAAWU also claimed 300 WR employees in 
membership out of a total of some 1,200 black workers 
(Morris 1982, p. 19). There is little doubt that SWU was 
technically ahead of SAAWU in the race to organise 
blacks at Rowntree. Yet the lead did not last long; and 
there is every reason to accept Morris's judgement that 
the Sweet Workers" union was "extremely tardy" in 
reacting to the new post-Wiehahn dispensation. It is 
true that for some while in late 1979 and early 1980 
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there was uncertainty about whether the new legal rights 
for African workers to join unions also applied to those 
technically classed as "frontier commuters", as were 
Rowntree's on their daily journey from the Ciskei. But 
it is equally likely that inefficiency on the part of 
the union delayed the change in its registration status. 
There is evidence that the springboard for action came 
not from the union but from WRIs management: the 1979 
Rowntree Mackintosh report to the Department of Trade 
(made under the provision of the EEC code) notes that 
blacks were being llencouragedllýto join the parallel 
branch of SWU. The company also stated that it was 
setting up industrial relations training in which the 
union would be "encouraged to intensify its recruitment" 
(Rowntree Mackintosh 1979). A former SAAWU shop steward 
also claimed that a production manager went round all 
departments at the time of SWU's application for 
registration to explain that the'union now wished to 
recruit blacks (CHR). 
By August 1980, SAAWU was claiming 700 supporters 
at WR. Confident in the belief that it was now well 
ahead of its rival, SAAWU therefore asked for a meeting 
with WR's management about recognition, and this took 
place on 4 September 1980. Management later stated that 
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it had initially viewed this first meeting as an 
exploratory one to determine common ground, but it 
served only to underline points of divergence: SAAWU 
rejected participation in the industrial council and 
wanted sole bargaining rights. This the company found 
completely unacceptable (WR). The company was thus 
convinced that it faced a clear choice between a 
registered union it had dealt with over almost forty 
years now with the capacity to organise blacks, and an 
intransigent unregistered group of political-radicals. 
Later that month, a 11confidential letter" was sent by 
the Chief of Security Police in the Eastern Cape to all 
employers warning them about black unions, and SAAWU in 
particular. The letter, which came to public, notice 
through a question raised in the South African 
parliament, apparently "contained tendentious 
information and innuendos about the undesirable 
political, connections of the union" and invited 
employers to call on the police for "assistance if 
needed" (CHR). There is at-least one senior manager in 
another East London company who remains convinced the 
inspiration for this missive actually came through close 
personal contacts between the police and Wilson Rowntree 
(CHR). The company strongly repudiates this allegation: 
it did however take the letter very seriously 
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(Interview: WR). 
One further disagreement emerged at the 4 September 
meeting which had wider implications. The union 
expressed opposition to the company's pension fund and 
medical aid scheme because it regarded them as "contrary 
to black cultural expectations. " This apparent rejection 
led the company to believe that SAAWU was not acting in 
the "real interests" of its members (Interview: WR). 
SAAWU, 1s "apparent rejection" of the principles of 
pension funds and medical aid schemes requires further 
explanation. During 1980 and 1981 much of South African 
industry was engaged in controversy over the 
government's proposed Preservation of Pension Interest 
Bill. The Bill's purpose was to build up an entitlement 
to retirement pensions by outlawing the practice of 
employees who terminated their employment from 
withdrawing their contributions made in that employment. 
But it is clear from the statements of workers and 
unions that many Africans regarded pension contributions 
not as a form of security for old age, but as a method 
imposed on them of deferring wages, receivable in times 
of financial hardship such as that brought on by 
unempl oyment. The impact of the Bill would be felt 
immediately by any worker made redundant. In the face 
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of worker resistance and employer concern about the 
effect of the resistance, the Bill was withdrawn by the 
government in November 1981 (SALB 1982, vol. 7, no. 4 &5 
pps. 6-9). The attitude expressed by SAAWUI's 
representatives on 4 September 1980 reflected the views 
of many senior union officers that pensions ought to be 
a matter for the state (SALB op. cit., p. 7). 
During the controversy over pensions, Wilson 
Rowntree, in common with many other employers, received 
many individual requests from current employees to 
withdraw from the fund, and these grew when the strikes 
started. There is irrefutable evidence that some of 
these requests were made under duress (Documents 
examined, Nov 1982). Workers withdrawing in this way 
lost that proportion of their pension contribution paid 
by the employer, and so lost money. WR issued a written 
statement to all employees about the nature of the 
pension fund which attempted to refute the allegation 
frequently heard that the fund was somehow accessible to 
the Ciskeian authorities. The pensions controversy 
raised fundamental issues about the employment of blacks 
by whites. on the one hand there is injustice 
perceived by the Africans in the belief that they are 
"being robbed of money now": while on the other hand 
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there is management incomprehension that workers should 
reject a genuinely beneficial policy designed to 
minimise hardship on retirement (and a scheme of which 
Joseph Rowntree of York had been a pioneer advocate). 
8.3 The Conflict Breaks Out 
The immediate cause of the first strike in October 
1980 is in itself of no real signifance: matters were 
deteriorating so rapidly across a broad front that 
another "cause" would surely have presented itself to 
trigger off a strike. That first strike was seen by 
SAAWU as something of a victory, but it-left unresolved 
the main grievance about union recognition that 
contributed to the spate of strikes in 1981, so the 
conflict of interpretation over its cause illustrates 
the deteriorating relationship. 
The SAAWU view is that some workers in the 
chocolate moulding section were objecting to the 
supervisory style of a foreman, but their protests were 
getting nowhere. In Morris's words: 
Having got nowhere they downed tools. 
Management threatened that if they did not 
return to work immediately they would have 
dismissed themselves. When they refused, 
fifty workers were told to leave and apply 
for re-employment on the Monday. They were 
however told that the original fifteen 
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q 
dismissed would not be re-employed. Within 
minutes the toffee department also downed 
tools. This then developed into a major 
conflict involving the whole factory striking 
in sympathy with the workers in the chocolate 
moulding department. After the bosses' 
deadline to return to work was ignored all 
the striking workers were paid off and sent 
home. They were told to collect their leave 
pay and pension money at their local police 
stations. 
(Morris 1982, p. 21) 
In fact the strike was only partial. Some blacks turned 
up for work, including "significant numbers" from the 
moulding department (Interview: WR); others drifted back 
before the three days were up (Morris op. cit. ). 
Management's view was that the strike was brought 
on simply by a matter of disciplining poor quality 
workmanship and poor attendance of "a particularly 
troublesome" group of employees in this section: 
We never knew the real reason for the strike. 
SAAWU put forward a changing series of 
grievances, all of which management undertook 
to examine when those involved agreed to work 
normally. 
(Interview: WR, Nov 1982). 
Management was now convinced that many employees were 
under intense pressure in the township, pressure often 
amounting to intimidation from SAAWU activists. 
The strike lasted three working days before the 
strikers resolved to return if all workers were 
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re-instated. When the strikers turned up on 29 October 
1980, they found a strong South African police presence 
outside the factory, with the officers communicating by 
'walkie-talkie' with management inside. The workers 
viewed the presence of the police as "sinister" (Morris 
p. 22), but management claimed there was a strong 
possibility of civil unrest: "there was no way the 
police would not have been in that area on that day if 
they were to do their duty" (WR). This incident served 
as sufficient evidence to link WRIs management and the 
police inexorably together, a belief held not only by 
SAAWU officials and its members at the plant but also by 
a small number of managers in other East London firms, 
journalists and academics (CHR). However WR and SAAWU 
agreed on a return to work and reinstatement, which 
Morris later claimed was I'de facto recognition" (1982, 
p. 22), though the company never accepted the legitimacy 
of -SAAWU"s elected works committee as a representative 
body. ý Later, criticism was levelled at SAAWU by its 
known supporters for its tactical failings in not 
consolidating the "victory" in this first strike by 
extending its organisational base to include coloureds. 
- Elsewhere in the city, the union did record a major 
success. In November 1980, ninety-five percent of 
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workers at Chloride voted in a ballot in favour of 
SAAWU, which was then granted recognition (Maree 1982, 
p. 36). But SAAWU also suffered setbacks: in October 
1980, the Minister of Manpower, Fanie Botha, visited 
the Eastern Cape-and in private "strongly discouraged 
employers from recognising unregistered unions" (CHR). 
There was also more unwelcome attention for SAAWU: it 
was, writes Maree: 
.... plagued throughout the year by harassment 
on the part of both the South African and 
Ciskeian states.... 128 NCI workers were 
charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act 
after they went on strike. They were found 
guilty of holding an illegal gathering 
outside their factory. Workers from Raylite 
and Wilson Rowntree were detained after 
strikes hit their plants. As a result 
several hundred workers at WR staged a brief 
stoppage to put pressure on the Ciskeian 
authorities to charge or release the 
detainees. 
(Maree 1982, p. 36/7) 
The five members of the SAAWU strike committee were 
arrested and detained for two weeks, though released 
without charges (Interview: SAAWU). 
8.4 The DisRute Escalates 
It was the major confrontation which began on 9 
February 1981- that escalated the affairs of Wilson 
Rowntree to international prominence. Again, the 
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ostensible causes of the confrontation - about whether 
changing the belt on a machine was "normal" or 
"abnormal" work for a group of three machine operators - 
is not of real significance. The three workers were 
told to leave the premises, and ninety-two others 
joined them in sympathy. Ten days later, with no 
resolution of the problem, the strike escalated ýwhen 
sixty-two more workers walked out. By 23 February a 
further 350 had joined in. The police were called to 
clear the premises of those refusing to work: some 504 
workers were now on strike - though still less than half 
the African workforce - and they were dismissed. 
A meeting called to resolve the strike was held on 
24 February 1981 at a local hotel. Little progress had 
been achieved, when at 5 o'clock news was received that 
the homeward-bound day shift workers had been given a 
"hostile reception" from strikers at the Mdantsane bus 
terminus. The effect on the meeting was "electric" - 
the meeting was disrupted and broke up in disorder 
(Interviews: WR and SAAWU)., Following this there were 
other allegations of violence directed at WR employees 
still working., In all there were twenty-five reported 
cases of violence, including two burnt out houses, five 
attempted house burnings, one burnt out car, and a 
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number of cases of houses being wired up to prevent 
entry or exit (Documents examined, Nov 1982). The 
supporters of SAAWU played down the importance of these 
incidents. A report of the Diocese of Cape Town Board 
of Social Responsibility, prepared for delegates at the 
Anglican Provincial Synod in 1982, stated: 
.... there have been clashes between the dismissed workers and scab labour in which 
several of the original workers were 
hospitalised. 
(BSR 1982, p. 2) 
But this anodyne comment was strongly refuted by the 
Clergy Chapter of the Archdeaconry of East London and 
Mdantsane. In a memorandum to the same Synod, the 
Chapter expressed itself "deeply disturbed" by the 
"completely one-sided" study material which gave "only 
the views'of SAAWU and its supporting groups". The memo 
put the onus for violence squarely on SAAWU supporters: 
During the strike action by SAAWU , members 
of the Sweet Workers' Union who refused to 
strike were ruthlessly hounded and beaten up 
and some of their homes were fire-bombed by 
SAAWU supporters. 
(Clergy Memo n. d., p-2) 
The five hundred dismissed workers were replaced by new 
black labour; management was clearly hoping matters 
would return to normal. 
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8.5 Boycott and Repression 
The Rowntree Trusts had been maintaining a discreet 
pressure on Rowntree Mackintosh's board. The board was 
well-briefed by its subsidiary managers, and was 
particularly concerned about the allegations of and 
evidence about intimidation. The chairman, Sir Donald 
Barron, in response to a telegram from SAAWU, stated in 
1981 that "it was not the company's policy to deal with 
a union which intimidates its members". The Financial 
Times criticised Rowntree Mackintosh in a leader 
claiming that "the central lesson is that labour peace 
will only come when management speaks to the real 
representatives- of the workers" (Financial Times, 10 
March 1981). Many other British newspapers ran stories 
on the East London disputes. However, at its annual 
general meeting on 10 June, Rowntree assured questioning 
shareholders that the difficulties were over: 
management's policy of encouraging a multiracial, not 
separatist, 
-union 
was begining to pay off. This was 
re-inforced in the company's 1981 EEC report which 
simply stated: 
During the course of the year attempts were 
made by SAAWU to attempt to supercede the 
representation of the Sweet Workers' Union. 
This led to factory disruption and employee 
harassment and 470 black employees left the 
company and were replaced. 
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(Rowntree Mackintosh 1981, p. 2) 
But the company also hinted that "sinister forces were 
at work, artificially keeping alive an issue which 
should be allowed to die a natural death" (CHR). Two 
years later Rowntree Mackintosh was still certain the 
matter was being orchestrated: 
Escalation of the strike to international 
level was the result of planning by SAAWU and 
does not reflect any level of trust or lack 
of it between management and shop floor'. 
(Written communication to author, June 1983) 
Two factors helped to keep the saga alive 
internationally, which- management believed to be 
evidence of IISAAWU planning". The first was the 
adoption of a boycott in South Africa of Wilson Rowntree 
products; the second the continuous stream of news 
stories about the detention of SAAWU officials and the 
allegations of complicity between the company and the 
police. 
In March 1981, a consumer boycott of Wilson 
Rowntree products was launched. This consisted of 
handbills- and stickers for distribution in the 
townships, cartoons caricaturing the dispute for use in 
"study material" by sympathetic youth, church and trade 
union groups, and pressure on black-owned retail 
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outlets not to display or sell the company's products. 
The Roman Catholic Justice and Peace commission wrote to 
all parish priests in the country in support of it. The 
boycott lasted well over two years before fizzling out. 
Eighteen months into the boycott, SAAWU claimed that it 
had "caused lost production" at WR (reported in The 
Financial Mail, 24 September 1982). An Anti-Apartheid 
publication claimed that: 
.... a confidential management consultants' 
report circulated inside South Africa 
suggests that the company has lost 25 percent 
of its business and the company has felt 
obliged to launch an unprecedented and 
expensive advertising campaign. 
(AAM Broadsheet, April 1982) 
However, on the evidence available to the author 
this claim seems unlikely. Any significant dip in sales 
was probably confined to the Eastern Cape. The company 
itself specifically rejected the idea that sales had 
been affected: although it conceded the boycott had been 
"well organised", it stated that the impact was 
"minimal". Full production had been maintained: in late 
1982, WR was one of the few firms in East London without 
short-time working, and financial performance "had been 
as good as expected" (Interview: WR). A senior manager 
in a major competitor stated that product demand 
throughout the industry did not reveal any impact of the 
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boycott (CHR). The national confectionary market 
remained "buoyant" in this period, so it would be 
difficult to isolate the effects of the boycott from 
other variables influencing the market (Financial Mail, 
24 September 1982). Finally, the annual report from 
the group made specific reference to the "strong 
performance" ' in South Africa in 1982 (Rowntree 
Mackintosh 1983). Nevertheless , the fact of the boycott 
and the reporting of it overseas drew attention to WRIs 
continuing difficulties, giving further ammunition to 
the group's critics. 
There can be no doubt that of all the black trade 
unions to gain prominence in the early 19800s, none has 
encountered such repression as SAAWU. Partly this has 
to do with its centre of strength being in East London 
and the Border, the resulting political turmoil 
surrounding the creation of the Ciskei 'homeland' in 
December 1981, and SAAWU's high profile as being the 
principal opposition to President Sebe, s rule. 
President Sebe is on record as saying: 
our intelligence forces have proved beyond 
doubt that SAAWU is a communist front 
organisation used by the South African 
Communist party to further its aims in Ciskei 
and South Africa. 
(Quoted in Eastern Province Herald, 13 Aug 1983) 
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The detentions, arrests and beatings of sAAwu 
activists, and the unexplained deaths of relatives and 
friends of some of the union's leaders, most if not all 
apparently at the hands of the Ciskeian authorities, are 
well documented (see: various editions of Focus, the 
news bulletin of the International Defence and Aid Fund; 
Green and Hirsch 1982). The suspected collusion between 
the Ciskei and the South African security forces and 
Wilson Rowntree appears to derive from statements made 
at the time when some of the strikers were first 
arrested. As the Board of Social Responsibility report, 
reflecting SAAWU opinion, put it: 
After large-scale detentions of the Rowntree 
strikers, Major General Charles Sebe, chief 
of Ciskei security, told their mamas who came 
to look for their husbands that he had 
detained them on the basis of a list received 
from Wilson Rowntree. 
(BSR Report 1982, p. 8) 
The company admitted that it had passed on a list of 
names to the South African Department of Manpower, but 
only after it was "required to do so by the Department" 
who were considering prosecutions for illegal strike 
action, though they were dissuaded from this course by 
the company (Interview: WR). It is possible only to 
speculate that the list eventually reached the Ciskeian 
security police, probably via the South African security 
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police; and if the company was the original source of 
names, no matter how circuitous was the route by which 
they reached the Ciskeians, it explains why the widely- 
held suspicions of 'collusion' existed. 
The company believes that claims about the extent 
of arrests and detentions of its former 'employees has 
been over-stated. In a written communication to the 
author, Rowntree Mackintosh stated: 
There was no large scale imprisonment of 
Wilson Rowntree strikers. Having made a 
detailed search of the many reports of 
arrests in the Ciskei in the months following 
the Wilson Rowntree dispute,,, and'prior to the 
Ciskei 'independence', we have been able to 
identify a total of 'forty-seven arrests 
involving Wilson Rowntree ex-employees. 
Fifteen men were arrested soon after the 
strike began for violence and assault on 
employees continuing to work; one of them was 
convicted and sentenced to three years in 
jail, the remainder were released within two 
days. A further thirty-four arrests were 
made subsequently on a variety'of occasions 
for 'riotous assembly'. All were released 
within a few days. 
(Rowntree Mackintosh to author, June 1983) 
Yet not 
allegatio 
Mdantsane 
referring 
to 150 
Despatc 
all arrests of former 
ns of violence. Two were 
Magistrates' Clourt for 
to the Rowntree boycott: 
days' imprisonment or a 
22 October 1982). The gr, 
employees involved 
found guilty in the 
displaying stickers 
they were sentenced 
R150 fine (Dail 
Oup did however admit 
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to being highly embarrassed by the allegations which 
were difficult if not impossible to refute (Interview). 
Public criticism of Rowntree Mackintosh in Britain 
mounted in 1982 and continued into 1983, in parliament, 
in the press and at trade union conferences. Prominent 
figures to join this criticism included the opposition 
leaders Michael Foot and David Steel and the TUC general 
secretary Len Murray. The Group responded in the only 
way it could: senior members of management took whatever 
opportunities came their way to put their case to 
politicans, trade unions, civil servants and other 
opinion-formers. In summary; they argued that Rowntree 
was not against unions per se and that their actions 
over the years proved this; that the circumstances in 
East London were unique in that local management was 
faced with a revolutionary movement, committed to the 
slogan "no normal unions in any abnormal society" which 
made "normal" industrial relations difficult; and that 
the level of violence and intimidation from SAAWU 
supporters was such that it could not give way. It was 
a matter of judgement about how to handle an 
extraordinary situation. The company made one minor 
concession to its critics: it agreed to consider the 
dismissed workers for employment when vacancies became 
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available. 
The company was on stronger ground rebutting 
allegations that it paid poverty wages. The wages and 
conditions of Wilson Rowntree employees at the time of 
the disputes were high by local standards for Africans 
in the East London area. In February 1981, the lowest 
grade monthly wage rate at WR was thirty-seven percent 
above the mimimum. living level for an average household, 
as defined by the UNISA Bureau for Market Research, the 
benchmark set by the EEC code. By November 1982, the 
lowest grade was about fifty percent above the MLL 
(author's calculations from company wages rate data and 
figures on living costs from UPE). By this latter date, 
it can be said that Wilson Rowntree were complying fully 
with the code's requirements on pay. 
It is difficult to believe that this, or indeed any 
defence, would do much to placate those critics who 
viewed the saga of Wilson Rowntree as part of a pattern 
of general repression against workers' organisations. 
In liberal business circles, let alone among radicals, 
Wilson Rowntree's name has become synonymous for "the 
closed approach" to black unions, to be adversely 
contrasted to "the open approach" of companies like 
Chloride (see for example: Business Alert Nos. 33 and 34, 
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1981; Heffer 1882). As The Financial Mail succinctly 
expressed it in 1982: 
Wilson Rowntree will remain the text-book 
example of the bad guys, no matter how 
justifiable its initial action may have been. 
(The Financial Mail, 24 Sep 1982) 
Time has however helped resolve the crisis in the 
company's favour. There were no major confrontations 
after February 1981; SWU was galvanised into action and 
recruited upto eighty-five percent of black employees 
into membership by November 1982; the composition of 
the elected shop stewards' committee at that time showed 
two ex-SAAWU stewards in post; and wages had risen 
faster than the rate of inflation for the beleagured 
Ciskei 'commuterst. In short, the problem has gone 
away. 
8.6 Rowntree and Constructive Engagement 
Throughout the disputes, the group was in very 
close touch with its subsidiary. Wilson Rowntree 
received full and public backing from Rowntree 
Mackintosh, even when the latter was under considerable 
pressure from concerned shareholders, notably the 
Trusts, to follow alternative courses of action. From 
interviews in East London and York, it is clear to the 
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author that managers at both locations' shared very 
similar if not identical attitudes to the problems and 
threats posed by the arrival of SAAWU. The fact that 
the two levels of management hung closely together can 
in retrospect be said to have kept the subsidiary alive 
and profitable; whereas a public disagreement, perhaps 
involving the dismissal of the two senior WR managers, 
might have led ultimately to the relinquishing of 
Rowntree's control. At any one time only a minority of 
all WR employees were actually in open dispute with the 
company; many of those not in dispute were probably as 
apprehensive of the force represented by SAAWU as top 
management. 
Yet the company was in breach of article 1(a) of 
the EEC code in not recognising SAAWU when it commanded 
much larger support among black employees than SWU. 
Altogether eight other East London employers did 
recognise SAAWU, including the British-owned company 
Chloride and the American-owned Johnson & Johnson. Each 
has been able to incorporate the union into its 
industrial relations system at the factory, with the 
result that the union behaves in conventional union ways 
to further workers' interests, no matter what its 
rhetoric may suggest (Heffer 1982). It is far too 
simple a judgement to assert, as the Anti-Apartheid 
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Movement has done, that what motivated Wilson Rowntree 
was solely the desire to keep its labour force servile 
for exploitative purposes. 
The long history of applying Rowntree Group 
personnel principles in East London demonstrates that 
paternalism was the objective, not exploitation. But by 
showing a clear preference for a docile union, and then 
rationalising that choice as evidence of its adherence 
to the principles of multiracial unions, the company 
appeared to many observers to be very naive. This was 
the crucial difference between this case and that of 
Cadbury Schweppes (discussed in Chapter 7): Rowntree 
sincerely believed an issue of principle was at stake, 
but Cadbury switched its policy pragmatically to avoid 
confrontation. Senior Rowntree management at both plant 
and group were quite out of sympathy with the strong 
elements of black nationalism that pervaded much of 
SAAWU's public utterances, and this view affected their 
judgement of whether or not to recognise the union. it 
was not simply a labour relations problem. Rowntree 
believed itself to be the victim of a conspiracy, with 
orchestrated disruption inside the factory and of a 
campaign of vilification outside it. 
Management gave SAAWU credit for orchestrating what 
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that repressed trade union was surely quite incapable of 
orchestrating. Although SAAWU's cause was-taken up and 
embellished by the various Anti- Apartheid forces, there 
is no evidence that points to "orchestration". Wilson 
Rowntree's management calculated that SAAWU could be 
resisted, while simultaneously maintaining the 
traditions of relatively good pay and benefits and the 
image of the "caring employer". They were genuinely 
surprised and personally hurt by outside criticism of 
the near impossibility of this; but they also discounted 
the possibility that such criticism might damage the 
company, because it came from radical sources not held 
in high esteem. In the event they won. But in 
achieving victory they have established in many minds 
that Rowntree's reputation for paternalism can be a mask 
for reaction and autocracy. 
SAAWU virtually disintegrated under the impact of 
repression. Its tactics in the period 1980-82, 
particularly the use of the strike weapon, were later 
described by a prominent supporter as "indiscriminate", 
alienating supporters and potential supporters alike who 
came increasingly to believe it "brought chaos and 
uncertainty into the lives of ordinary workers who 
merely wished to get on with the business of living". 
Its abrasive style did not endear it to other unions on 
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the surface of like mind: at first it was in close 
co-operation with the General Workers' Union and African 
Food & Canning Workers' Union , but by early 1983 the 
relationship between them and SAAWU was one of 
"alienation" (Interview: Johan Maree, University of Cape 
Town, Nov 1982). 
Certain parallels can be found between SAAWU in the 
1980's and those other radical organisations, the ICU of 
the 1920's and SACTU of the 1950's which were discussed 
in Chapter 2. There were similarities of leadership 
styles; all three took overt political stances; they 
were mass movements extending beyond those in paid 
employment; and above all, there was the state 
repression to which each was subjected. But at least 
SAAWU can claim more industrial successes than 'SACTU, 
judged by the number of recognition agreements it was 
able to achieve. 
Yet the most interesting lesson to be drawn from 
this saga is not about the fate of radical unions, but 
about the behaviour of a particular multinational 
employer. Throughout, Wilson Rowntree was wholly 
supported by its parent group, despite quite strong 
pressure on the latter from well-informed shareholders 
nurturing the founder's values, and from the British 
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unions, to distance itself from its subsidiary. There 
was not a chink of difference revealed, even though the 
sources of pressure were reinforced by unprecedented and 
highly unwelcome criticism in the media of a kind not 
usually experienced by a consumer product company. This 
monolithic solidarity undoubtedly helped to keep intact 
the group's investment in South Africa. 
Thus although the company committed a clear breach 
of what is the major clause in EEC code, no penalty 
could be imposed. This lack of any enforcement 
mechanism, by statutory sanction or public pressure, was 
noticed by officers of all South African black unions, 
including those not subject to the same level of 
repression as SAAWU nor even sympathetic to it. The 
"toothless" European code in consequence won no friends. 
Wilson Rowntree was not therefore the ideal case to 
advance the cause of constructive engagement. 
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CHAPTER 9 
p 
UNION APPROACHES TO CHANGE 
"The traditional history of the Trade Union 
Movement represents the period prior to 1824 as 
one of unmitigated persecution and continuous 
repressi on. Every Union that can nowadays claim 
an existence of over a century pos sesses a 
romantic legend of its early years. The midnight 
meeting of patriots in the corner of a field, the 
buried box of records, the secret oath, the terms 
of imprisonment of the leading officials - all 
these are in the, sagas of the older Unions... The 
story of theý repeal of the whole series of 
combination Laws in the 1824/5-, (is) the most 
impressive event -in the, early history of the 
movement'$. 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb 1920 
History of'Trade Unionism p. 64 
285 
Introduction 
It was argued in Chapter 6 that the new 
dispensation on black unions from 1979 led to a rapid 
spread of union membership. This factor, coupled with 
favourable conditions for the spread of collective 
bargaining, encouraged local recognition agreements, 
with the result that the unions making the greatest 
progress were those pursuing work-based economic 
objectives on behalf of members in the private sector. 
This chapter examines union attitudes during this first 
period in South African history with lawful black unions 
in action. It draws mainly on the survey work 
undertaken in the closing months of 1982, a time in 
South Africa analogous to the period in Britain when, to 
borrow the Webbs' phrase,, "romantic legends" were being 
forged. 
Section 1 examines the debate-on "workerism" versus 
"Populism" that began to emerge during the early 1980's. 
This debate was a metaphor for both style and strategy 
in union behaviour. Section 2 then presents the 
opinions of trade union officers from four union groups 
plus the independents who were asked to identify what 
divided their union group from the others, and what 
united it. FOSATUI CUSA and the independents are shown 
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to have ýsome significant affinities; TUCSA and the 
populist unions stand sharply alone from this loose 
grouping. 
Section 3 looks at the links the black unions were 
forging with international trade union organisations, 
and suggests reasons why these links were important at 
this time. The role of these overseas bodies as 
providers of funds is considered in Section 4: this 
suggest that without aid (well over ninety percent of 
income in CUSA's case) some of the new unions would not 
exist. The interests of the American government in 
providing funds are also analysed. 
The somewhat negative attitudes the unions formed 
towards the codes of conduct are discussed in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes the chapter by arguing that although 
economism had been initially successful, it gradually 
became apparent that another, more political approach 
was required to cope with the political repercussions of 
the economic downturn. 
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9'. 1 The Disunited Movement: 
"Workerism" versus "Populism" 
It' has 'been commonplace to describe the South 
African --labour movement as "divided" (Horrell 1969). 
Developments in the spread of black trade unionism after 
Wiehahn appeared on the surface to widen this disunity. 
The emerging picture was one of increasing 
fragmentation, despite the fact that in the period 1979 
- 1982, all unions recorded significant growth with 
total-black membership doubling (see Table 6.2). First, 
there was-the fact that three trade union confederations 
existed, ''with many unions not affiliated to any centre, 
implying wide differences of ideology. Second, the 
unions'-seemed-palpably divided on tactics and strategy, 
initially over whether or not to register and then over 
the'ideological strategy of "workerism" or "populism". 
Unions like SAAWU (in Chapter 8) were caught up in 
the maelstrom of political developments. This 
undoubtedly inculcated a negative attitude in many 
private sector employers towards that particular brand 
of politicised unionism. SAAWU, 1s situation encouraged 
it to embrace "populism". Populism rather than a solid 
industrial base had been the hallmark of the ICU in the 
1920's, and to-a lesser extent of SACTU in the 1950's 
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and the Black Allied, Workers' Union of the 1970's. In 
the 1980's, township-based union organisations espousing 
populism- rather than workerism again became a 
phenomenon. This was especially so in the Eastern Cape: 
East -London- had SAAWU; and Port Elizabeth the Motor 
Assemblyýand-Component Workers, ' Union (MACWUSA), and the 
General Workers' - Union (GWUSA). These unions were 
llpopulistll-inýthe sense that they articulated the broad 
grievances-of Africans in the townships. They saw the 
problems ofl., Africans in employment as part and parcel of 
the wider problems of Africans under apartheid and 
inseparable, from them. They consciously rejected what 
they termed-the-felitism' of unions primarily addressing 
grievances at the place of work. Not surprisingly, 
these township unions did not affiliate to a 
confederation: and they refused to register under the 
1979 Act. As unregistered and radical groups they were 
continually harassed by the authorities. MACWUSA 
conveniently rented an office directly across the street 
from the security police: as a union spokesman pointed 
out, this no doubt saved the authorities' travelling 
expenses whenever their officers arrested union 
officials! 
MACWUSA, the, larger of the two Port Elizabeth 
11 an 440.7 
township unions, was as its publicity material' claims 
"born at Ford in 1979". But its strength and source of 
its ideology at the time of the inquiry lay not in the 
factories, but in New Brighton and Zwide where the 
workers lived. It was impossible for this researcher to 
establish a membership: no actual records were kept, 
partly it was said for "security reasons". It did not 
engage in factory recruiting campaigns, but was 
"approached" by individuals who wished to join 
(Interviews: November 1982). In June 1982 it listed 
twenty firms in which it claimed to be organising 
members (Workers Voice, MACWUSA), but several of them 
already had agreements with FOSATU or CUSA unions. 
The "workerist" unions by contrast concentrated on 
recruitment at the factory with the object of achieving 
recognition for collective bargaining purposes. -FOSATU 
(and to a much lesser extent CUSA) unions were sometimes 
in competition on for members in particular companies on 
two fronts:, with TUCSA unions to the right flank, and 
with the township unions to the left. However, there 
appeared to-be'no cases where FOSATU and CUSA, the two 
emerging union centres, were in direct competition with 
each other. 'Both groups had ' built national 
organisations greatly assisted by an'informal agreement 
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not to poach on each other's established territory. 
9.2 sUrvey of Union Differences 
Many were the conjectures on the nature and origins 
of the differences between the union groups, and on the 
directions in which the unions were being propelled. In 
order to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5 the 
author attempted to measure the nature of this disunity 
as seen through the eyes of activists. Small groups of 
union members were each asked to identify what separated 
or what was common between their union or federation and 
others. opinions were gained from members of CUSA, 
FOSATU, MACWUSA and TUCSA and from two non-affiliated 
independent unions, all participants holding some kind 
of office in the respective union. At each session, 
once the objective - "to better understand ways of 
achieving labour unity" 
-- 
had been agreed with the 
participants, each officer made a note of his or her own 
views and then discussed them with colleagues. Where a 
difference of opinion emerged in the responses, the 
reasons for the difference was explored in discussion 
until a -consensus was achieved, a process that was 
usually easy. The respondents' principal comments are 
summarised in Table 9.1 set out on the next two pages. 
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Table 9.1 
UNION VIEWS ON DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNION GROUPS 
CUSA Views 
on differences with 
FOSATU: a) Territorial: CUSA mainly Transvaal, FOSATU 
mainly Eastern Cape and Natal; 
b) CUSA emphasises more decision-making for blacks. 
HACWUSA: a) CUSA competent, has track record in industrial 
relations; 
b) MACWUSA exploits community grievances; 
C) MACWUSA spreads lies about what other unions do 
to help community. 
TUCSA: a) TUCSA compromise with apartheid, no principles; 
b) TUCSA cannot be trusted to act for black rights. 
INDEPENDENT a) Territorial - Indep. unions mainly in western 
UNIONS: Cape; 
b) Similar attitudes to employers and industrial 
relations 
C) indep. unions more political. 
POSATU Views 
on differences with 
CUSA: a) FOSATU understands better the economic role of 
unions; 
b) CUSA no post-apartheid policies. 
24ACWUSA: a) MACWUSA naive and dangerous 'cowboys#; 
b) MACWUSA's actions cause workers to be cynical 
about unions being opportunists. 
TUCSA: a) TUCSA black sections poorly-organised and ripe 
for takeover; 
b) a few good black leaders in TUCSA unions, but 
generally leadership is white. 
INDEPENDENTS: Differences largely historic, but no clash 
on longterm policies. 
\continued overleaf 
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MACWUSA Views 
on differences with.... 
CUSA: a) CUSA weak organisation in Eastern Cape; 
b) CUSA not involved with the people. 
FOSATU: a) FOSATU leadership out of touch with members, 
b) FOSATU want to replace TUCSA as establishment; 
c) FOSATU no real concern for community problems. 
TUCSA: TUCSA represents white domination. 
ZINDEPENDENTS: Independents have no community base. 
TUCSA VieWS 
on differences with 
CUSA: CUSA represents black apartheid. 
FOSATU: a) FOSATU has good negotiators; 
b) Very left politics and courting repression. 
24ACWUSA: MACWUSA is not a union at all, simply an 
irrelevance. 
INDEPENDENTS: officials very left wing and out of touch 
with worker needs. 
Independent Union Views 
on differences with.... 
CUSA: a) CUSA probably doing necesssary job;, 
b) Black orientation, not non-racial. 
FOSATU: No real differences with this group. 
XACWUSA: MACWUSA are wreckers. 
TUCSA** No possibility of TUCSA offering effective 
overall leadership to democratic movement. 
sources: Summary of discussions held separately with 
representatives of each union group during 1982. The groups 
comprised: CUSA 7 officials; FOSATU - 3; MACWUSA - 7; TUCSA - 
2; Independents 2. Where individual differences were revealed 
within the one group, these were further discussed until a 
consensus was reached. 
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These results confirm that there was reasonably 
close affinity seen between the FOSATU unions and the 
General Workers' Union. CUSA and FOSATU were seen as 
separated from each other rather than divided by an 
orientation of the former towards black consciousness 
and the latter towards the "non-racialism" usually 
associated with the ANC. Officers of both groups, 
however, were anxious to play down the labels of "PAC-" 
or 11ANC- orientation". on the grounds these were too 
clearcut. In any case, it, was pointed out, black 
consciousness is a variant of African nationalism, not 
something divorced from it. This is evidence of the 
blurring of PAC and ANC distinctions in the 1980's, a 
distinction much sharper in the previous decade, as 
black politics moved towards a new force (the UDF was 
launched the year following the inquiry). it was, 
however, noticeable that FOSATU officials in the survey 
were much more growth-minded and recognised the need to 
put continuous resources into the recruiting activity. 
one senior CUSA official remained critical of FOSATU's 
"obsession" with formulating economic strategy in a 
post-apartheid world which he felt deflected the union 
away from its immediate mission* (This officer also had 
decidedly anti- communist views which he somewhat 
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imposed on other group members). Although CUSA, FOSATU 
and the independents had areas of different emphasis, 
the strong message from respondents was that they 
perceived shared common interests. 
The survey confirmed, as expected, far wider 
differences in relations between FOSATU and CUSA on the 
one hand and TUCSA affiliates on the other. In the eyes 
of the two emerging groups, TUCSA had inescapably 
acquired the reputation for expediency because of its 
vacillations over African union membership in the 
1960's. It could not shake off the perception, 
originally formed in the 1970's, that its parallel 
unions were something of a sham -a view reinforced by 
Lewsen's research which showed that in that decade the 
black unions had one official for every 300 members, 
whereas the parallels could marshall only one for every 
2,300 (Lewsen 1976, p. 34). In this researcher's 1982 
survey, the FOSATU officials in particular were careful 
to distinguish between TUCSA as a federation, which was 
seen clearly as without a future, and its members both 
in mainstream and in parallel sections, who were seen as 
future allies in a more united labour movement. 
TUCSA officials were acutely aware that FOSATU 
posed a serious long-term threat. They expressed 
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admiration for, its work with employers, but were 
convinced that its increasing political pronouncements 
would eventually lead to state- repression. TUCSA 
respondents gave, the researcher the impression that such 
an outturn would not be so undesirable, from TUCSA, s 
point of viewlif repression of FOSATU left -the black 
union field freer for TUCSA's affiliatesl to organise. 
These fears were laid bare at the annual conference in 
September 1982-by its, president,. Anna Scheepers, who 
reportedly: 
--complained of a "vicious attack" against the industrial councils by the emerging 
unions, arguing that this was done through 
ignorance or for "obscure" political 
motives ... She also attacked the emerging 
unions for "highjacking" workers who are 
members-of established unions, instead of 
confining their' activities to recruiting 
unorganised workers. 
(Financial Mail 1 Oct 1982, p. 54) 
There seemed to be little evidence for this latter 
allegation, and the Financial Mýilýadded that it: 
.... would be treated with derision by many 
emerging unions who claim that TUCSA has used 
the closed shop to obtain black membership 
with little effort, I 
All in all, . there, seemed, 
little prospect of diminishing 
disunity here. 
But the most bitter and outspoken criticisms thrown 
up by the survey were made by FOSATU, CUSA and the 
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independents against MACWUSA. This populist union had 
angered the larger groups by its behaviour in the 
Eastern Cape automobile disputes of 1981 and 1982. it 
had "ostentatiously" stayed at work when NAAWU was on 
strike, and then "spread lies" in the townships about 
how NAAWU "was only interested in its coloured 
membership" (Interview: NAAWU, Nov 1982). By contrast, 
MACWUSA's executive committee were certain that they 
alone had the "true understanding" of township feelings. 
It was clear that the recent history of Port Elizabeth 
had left a wide gulf between workerist and populist 
movements, which would be difficult to bridge. 
9.3 The International Connections 
The interviews with unions confirmed that unions 
desired affiliation to international trade union 
organisations as an important touchstone of their state 
of development. In turn, international organisations 
were keen to reciprocate and encourage participation 
from South Africa. SACTU's drift into exile and into 
the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions was 
described in Chapter 2. This connection had seemed a 
strength in the mid-1970's when it enabled SACTU to be 
given observer status at the ILO on the grounds that it 
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was the only legitimate representative of the mass of 
South-African employees. But once it became clear that 
the re-emergence of'black unions owed little to SACTU's 
memory and nothing to its influence, its claim to sole 
representation wI as seriously challenged (Douwes Dekker 
1980b, p. 43). The stage was set for Western union 
connections to be used as 
-emblems of 
black union 
maturity. 
The'first*and often the most effective connections 
established were with international trade secretariats, 
the co-ordinating bodies for individual national unions 
which recruit members in a particular economic sector. 
The largest secretariat is the International Metal 
Workers' Federation, which first established a regional 
council for South Africa in 1975. In 1982 it expelled 
two because of theirracist policiesi but by 1984, the 
IMF'had ten South African-unions affiliated - from among 
TUCSAI FOSATU, CUSA and non-federated'unions - with a 
combined membership of near 200,000 workers (IMF 1984, 
p. 17). ' Such a co-ordinating body provides'a forum for 
determining common policies-in the broad-based metal 
sectors. By involving unions from more than one 
federation, the work of the secretariat can transcend 
the fractious nature of relations between internal trade 
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unions. Additionally; ' cis has been seen in the'case of 
Volkswagen, a trade secretariat can-provide helpful 
leverage on' parent companies of ý multinational 
subsidiaries, ' and useful research information" to its 
affiliates (Interview: NAAWU 1982). 
The second level of connection is with the 
international co-ordinating body of trade union centres. 
With SACTU affiliated to the WFTU, ninety percent of 
whose members are in the Communist countries of Eastern 
Europe, ' this'left only the Brussels-based International 
Confederation of Free'Trade Unions, ''which'split from the 
World Federation in 1949 and has been its cold war rival 
ever since. 'TUCSA was an ICFTU affiliate from the late 
1950, ls. " In the 19601s, the ICFTU also briefly admitted 
into membership FOFATUSA, which as noted in Chapter '2 
was' a br6akaway'of six African unions from SACTU that 
eventually I folded under extreme government''hostility. 
TUCSA continued to'receive ICFTU visits until it again 
debarred Africans from affiliation in 1969 and had to 
relinquish ICFTU membership (Douwes Dekker 1980b, p. 43). 
These experiences probably taught the ICFTU to be more 
cautious in reacting to post 1973 events, though it kept 
developments in South Africaclosely monitored, and was 
active though unsucessful in pressing for the 1977 
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European code to be tougher on employer non-compliance. 
However, in 1982 it admitted CUSA to membership after a 
two-year campaign for entry, conditionally on CUSA 
accepting that the ICFTU might also recognise and fund 
other centres. It wanted the larger FOSATU grouping in 
membership (Interviews: ICFTU Brussels, Feb 1980 and 
Feb 1983). 
9.4 The Funding Dependency 
The prize to be gained for affiliated status with 
the ICFTU was greater access to cash from the Western 
trade union centres. That willing donors existed is not 
in doubt: the challenge was to find the mechanism by 
which the money could be transferred. The ILO would 
have been willing to fund labour projects inside South 
Africa, the researcher was assured, but was hamstrung by 
its policy of recognising SACTU as its sole worker 
organisation (Interview: ILO Geneva, Feb 1983). 
Instead, it was confined to underwriting a large project 
worth US$500,000 on migrant labour supply, based on the 
work of Bohning (1981). 
The CUSA accounts for 1981 show that well over 
ninety percent-of its income was derived from "grants" 
which totalled R109,593 (CUSA 1982). Information on 
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FOSATU's overseas funding for that year-is less precise, 
but is unlikely to have been lower than seventy, percent. 
In the following year, 1982, the ICFTU chanelled nearly 
three times that amount (R300,000) to CUSA, plus R57,000 
to the Media Workers' Association, an independent black 
union, and R37,500 to FOSATU (Interview: ICFTU Brussels, 
Feb 1983). 
Without overseas cash, CUSA would simply not have 
existed: its affiliation fees were only four percent of 
its income. There are costs in recruiting,, but further 
costs occur 'once employer recognition, is granted: 
servicing the ,, agreements, -training negotiators and 
educating members tax even the best- organised unions. 
Significantly, ''-when the South African government 
invoked thelronically named Fund'Raising Act to ban the 
overseas I financing of' "undesirable" 'anti-apartheid 
organisations-, in 1982, CUSA emerged largely, unscathed 
(CHR)ý, This selectivity in favour of CUSA was probably 
connected, with -the influential sourcetrom, which its 
money-came: --by this"stage; the government was possibly 
sophisticated enoughýtoýdistinguish between those black 
organisations it thought, promoted stability and those it 
believed,, to be inherently'destabilising. 
The ICFTU acted as the conduit for cash from West 
301 
Germany, theýScandinavian countries, Britain,, Canada, 
Australia, -Denmark,, the Netherlands, and the- United 
Statesý, `_ Its- activities 'are 'as much- a part of 
constructive-engagement-as the codes, for multinational 
4 subsidiaries. 
The AFL/CIO has decades of experience of funding 
labour organisations in South and Central America for 
political reasons. it had established an 
African-American Labour Centre (AALC) in 1964, initially 
with interests in West Africa. The AALC was modelled on 
the US unions' experience in Latin American countries, 
where they had endeavoured to promote unions as 
stabilising factors in close collaboration with the 
State-'-department. By'1976,., the AALC had offices in 
Botswana; and in February, 1981, announced a, plan to set 
up inside the Republic of South Africa'. It-had long been 
suspected that the, AALC was funded by the American 
security service, -the CIA (Baskin-1983b). An AFL/CIO 
delegation visted, South Africa in-September 1982,, led by 
Irving Brown,, aýCIAýagent "at least since the 1940's" 
(Baskin-p. 51). -The -, delegationlls promise to open a 
branch of the AALC in'South Africa was received as a 
threat by most of the black unions, who were universally 
hostile to the idea. --(The delegation addressed a 
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meeting of trade unionists in Port Elizabeth -at which 
the researcher was present: -at the end of 'his 
presentation,,, the leader declared''that the visitors-were 
"very honoured-to be here in South America'11- It was a 
blunder- from-'which recovery' to-credibility' proved 
impossible). This total lack of enthusiasm for the 
AALC idea' was fed back to the ICFTU who were able to 
dissuade the Americans from proceeding with it. By 
early 1983, the AFL/CIO was "back in the 
_ICFTU 
co-ordinating committee", pushing its funds into the 
ICFTU general South African pool rather than attempting 
an independent initiative (Interview: ICFTU Brussels, 
Feb 1983). 
- In --fact,, the bulk of American money,, originally 
earmarked for the AALC but eventually passed to the 
ICFTU, originated not'in theAFL/CIO but in the United 
States Treasury. - It was part ofýthe State Department's 
constructive, engagement policy- towards"South Africa 
(Interviews:, ýState Dept. Washington D. C., March 1983). 
The -criticism of Baskin and 'others therefore seems 
misplaced: it, implies a covert operation for sinister 
purposes,, whereas the United States government's 
funding of South African unions, though indirect, was 
overt - it was announced in the Congress (who voted the 
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funds), - commented on in the press, and obviously known 
to the AFL/CIO. That fact might not have made the money 
any more acceptable to radical trade unionists, but it 
probably helps to explain why the South African 
government left the ICFTU donations largely untouched. 
9.5 The Unions and the Codes 
The union officers surveyed expressed ambivalent 
attitudes towards the two principal external codes of 
conduct. On the one, hand, there was a considerable body 
of criticism, the most significant of which was a 
resentfulness at employers giving credit for 
improvements in employment conditions to the existence 
of the codes. One officer expressed it thus: "When we 
protest about our conditions, , we're regarded as 
troublemakers;, 'when we win something, they say it's 
because of the codes". Unions pointed out that they had 
never been consulted about the contents of the codes, or 
asked to comment on the progress claimed in individual 
companies (NAAWU's experience in Volkswagen, referred to 
in Chapter 7, is unique in this respect). 
On the other hand, a small number of union officers 
had found that the codes provided a yardstick by which 
they could judge employer performance. Local newspapers 
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might print stories of companies, being in breach of the 
codes, and that could be helpful -in publicising -a 
grievance. of those officers with experience or 
knowledge of both the European and Sullivan codes, --the 
clear preference was for Sullivan. --This was, not so 
much because -it sought to combat racism by stressing 
equal employment and training opportunities or any other 
positive virtue; - but rather because-it seemed to give 
employers more trouble in meeting the moving targets. 
The recommended minimum wages payments were 
regarded as very, low, - but accepted with a shrug of 
inevitability. The typical income differentials between 
skilled workers, mainly white, and semi- and unskilled 
workers, almost entirely black, are huge by any 
standards. Even in the motor manufacturing companies, it 
was claimed that pay rises at the lower end were barely 
keeping pace with inflation; and increases were also 
going to those already relatively well paidl thus 
keeping differentials apart. As Schlemmer has pointed 
out, whatever additional benefits in the form of higher 
wages black workers receive from work cannot be 
"translated into life-style rewards" because of the 
limited opportunities in quality ýof life in the 
townships (Schlemmer 1983, p. 7). 
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In general, the codes wereý irrelevant- for the 
day-to-day work of union officers: recruiting new 
members; offering guidance and advice to those in 
trouble; listening to complaints they knew in their 
hearts they could not begin to address. Few had ever 
seen a completed company report, even where they had 
recognition and bargaining rights, a small fact but one 
which added to the underlying distrust by black trade 
union officers of white initiatives. 
9.6 unions and Politics 
These residual feelings of impotency in the sample 
of officers underlined the limitations of the unions' 
sucessful economistic behaviour. Since no mechanism 
existed to rectify black workers' grievances as citizens 
- over housing, education, health and welfare, and 
political' rights" - it was on the surface -likely that 
trade unions, perceived-as successful in'bargaining with 
employers',, -, -would be sucked in to this arena whether or 
notýthey wished to be. As'Van Zyl had prophetically put 
it: ' 
In the long term we, must'realise that unless the 
political framework within which urban blacks 
"operate is changed so that blacks get another 
outlet for their political aspirations, the 
whole system of industrial relations will be put 
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under intolerable strain and may collapse. 
(Van Zyl 1984, p. 46) 
The onset of recession; already'discernible at the 
time of the interviews and' abundantly clear by 1983, was 
accompanied by both rising inflation and unemployment, 
seriously weakened the unions' power base in the 
economy. Early in 1984, there was a further wave of 
strike action in the motor vehicle, chemical and mining 
industries, when unions sought to protect earlier wage 
increases being entirely eaten up by inflation, but 
success for this by now fairly traditional economistic 
response was not obvious. Membership--increased still, 
as Table 9.2 overleaf illustrates (using 1985 data, that 
for 1984 not being available), but there were 
uncertainties as to how a paper membership could be 
effectively mobilised. 
Up to the middle of 1984, because reforms in labour 
affairs were greatly ahead of any other area, the black 
unions were centre stage in the action directed at 
undermining ; apartheid. However, the 1984 tricameral 
constitutional proposals illuminated the blacks' 
political impotence more gla ringly than any other single 
political event. -It also illuminated the weakness of 
307 
Table 9.2 
MEMBERSHIP OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS 
(Estimates) 
1982, 1983 and 198S Comp arisons 
End 1982 End 1983 
-1 
End 1985 
Union Uns Mbrs Uns Mbrs Mbrs Uns Mhr s Mb= 
Grouping Chancie _ Chancie 
SACOL 13 125 11 115 -8.0 9 100 -13.1 
TUCSA 63 435 57 478 +10.9 45 340 -28.9 
FOSATU/' 16 140 17 130 -7.2 
COSATU 
CUSA 11 55 13 120 +118.2 
Unaffiliated n/a 315 n/a 330 +4.8 
TOTALS 1#070 
% Unionisation 
of organisable 18.4 
population* 
% Unionisation 
of black 10.3 
labour* 
33 450 
12 130 
n/a 430 
11450 
24.1 
12.8 
+246.1 
+8.3 
+29.4 
+23.6 1#173 +9.6 
17.8 
10,0 
Note: 
Unionisation is expressed as a percentage of the 
forganisable populationf, ý which is the total, number employed, 
less those in the professional, administrative, agricultural and 
domestic categories. Membership, figures are in thousands. 
Sources; 
The 1982 estimates are based on the author's own fieldwork, 
plus information collected at the Industrial Relations Unit, UPE 
(see note on table 6.2). The 1983 estimates are revised using 
Cunningham 1984; with a further revision for the 1985 estimates 
based on Lewis & Randall-1985, though for COSATU membership, the 
lower figure published in the Financial Mail 6 Dec 1985 is used. 
308 
black political leadership, banned and repressed as much 
of it was, and the limitations of trade union leadership 
in 'meetingý this new crisis. The frustration at-the 
obvious implication -that 'black priorities were 
irrelevant to the white authorities resulted in a shift 
in focus ýof black-political agitation away from the 
factories and onto the streets of the townships. What 
little progress there had been on setting up provincial 
and local government for blacks in the 1980s was 
effectively terminated by militant blacks who were 
totally opposed to any form of co-operation with the 
regime. The collapse of councils, with the attendant 
violence and intimidation on individuals accused of 
collaborating, created a vacuum of power in the township 
which was rapidly filled by young 'comrades' who were 
not obviously susceptible to discipline from established 
black groups, the unions, the churches, or the UDF. 
Economic decline had undermined the possibility of 
further successes for the unions' economistic policies; 
political developments pointed to the need for new 
strategies if unions were to consummate their earlier 
gains. 'Reform' was stopped in 1984 in its tracks: the 
government detained without charge or trial several 
leading trade unionists, including Chris Dhlamini of 
FOSATU and Phiroshaw Camay of CUSA. 
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The detail of this could not have been foreseen in 
the closing months of 1982. Yet there was an 
unmistakable sense of foreboding among some union 
officers that the economism of the early Wiehahn years 
had, reached its zenith. - Trade, union power-in-the, work 
place had been--tested and waseýfound to have-its limits. 
Some other policieswould have to be-found for the more 
difficult years ahead. --, 
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CHAPTER 10 
EVALUATING THE CODES OF CONDUCT 
"The manifestation of international concern and 
conscience has not deterred South Africa from 
continuing and increasing its wicked ways of 
oppression. Sad to say, it has actually been 
reinforced in its determination to pursue this 
destructive policy in recent years because it has 
enlisted a new ally the American corporate 
capitalist community and its gargantuan offspring, 
the multinational corporation. They claim to be a 
$$progressive force" for change in alleviating the 
economic misery of the black African. The grim 
reality is that this has been little more than a 
rhetorical ruse for maximising corporate profit 
margins at the-expense of economic and social, 
-justice for blacks in South Africa$'. 
Congressman Ronald V. Dellums 
Foreword to E. Schmidt (1980), p. vii 
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Introduction 
The genesis of the two principal -codes was outlined 
in Chapter 3, which argued, that they were designed for 
political purposes. If they were to be 'successful, 
businesses had to realise and accept the case for 
constructive engagement by putting them into effect. The 
purpose of this chapter is to determine how effective 
the codes have been in the process of change: whether 
they are perceived to have had an impact, or whether the 
nature of the relationship between goverments and 
businesses makes the latter, in the cynical phrase of 
Congressman Dellums, "accomplices in apartheid". 
obviously it is one thing to take the political decision 
to adopt the codes in European and North American 
capitals, but quite another to implement them in 
subsidiary companies many thousands of miles away. The 
requirement to adhere to the terms of the codes 
therefore represented a new factor in the normal pattern 
of control a head office asserts over its subsidiary. 
Section 1' examines -the- setting of theý codes, ' 
targets; this, confirms the conjecture -that they are 
primarily drawn up in the interests of the countries 
from where they emanate. Section 2 examines where the 
primary information in the reports came from, and asks 
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why, the-rate of, response for British firms under the EEC 
code increased while that of American firms under 
Sullivan declined. It, suggests that the former is 
explained by the EEC code's relatively simple report 
form and its static nature, and the latter by Sullivan's 
increasing complexity and uncertain goals* Section 3 
considers the monitoring arrangements for the two codes, 
and concludes that each proved inadequate but in 
different ways. 
Section 4 identifies one dissatisfaction with the 
codes to stem from the lack of penalties for 
non-respondents or for those performing below the 
required levels. Section 5 examines the outcomes of the 
codes in three substantive areas: union recognition, 
minimum pay, and desegregation. It argues that the 
codes can claim some successes in thejast -two areas. 
Finally, Section 6 reviews the part , the- codes-. have 
played in the constructive engagement process# 
concluding that the expectations of ardent proponents 
were often too high, given the nature of the companies 
through which the policy was meant to work. 
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10.1 Setting the Targets 
Some five percent of the country's black African 
workforce are employed in about 1,000 multinationals (UN 
1985). The targets of improved employment practices on 
behalf of these workers were defined by the codes' 
originators, and it was noticeable that the European 
guidelines were static for many years, whereas the 
Sullivan targets were moving annually. 
The EEC guidelines in fact remained unchanged from 
their inception in 1977 to 1986. This led to criticism 
from several quarters. Associated British Foods, which 
owned fifty-two percent of the Premier Milling company, 
stated in its return for 1979: 
... ABF finds 
it surprising that the EEC code 
seems to ignore the job creation and 
maintenance responsibilities of English 
companies with South African subsidiaries and 
concentrates almost entirely on the wages and 
conditions of those Africans who are employed 
- even when their interests as envisaged by 
certain of the code's requirements, could be 
a factor which contributes against the wider 
interests of Africans in the maintenance and 
promotion of a high level of employment. 
(ABF Report 1979, p. 8) 
This theme was taken up in 1980 by the Secretary of 
State for Trade, John Knott, who told the House: 
... If a company gives good fringe benefits 
and has set about achieving good industrial 
relations, it is to be commended, even though 
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some might question its performance over 
wages. Such a company is much more to be 
commended than a company that pays good wages 
but does none of these other things. 
(Hansard 27 June 1980, Col. 1027) 
The black unions claimed that they were not consulted on 
the content of the codes, and their objections were to 
do with "management attempts to dictate ýthe framework 
and priorities of industrial relations" (Whisson 1981). 
In November 1985, the Community agreed to a revised 
code, but only after months of disagreement between the 
member governments following the Council of Ministers' 
"agreement in principle" of July (Document 2-447/1985). 
The changes agreed reflected to some extent the new 
concerns of Western governments dominating the economic 
agenda in the mid-1980s. They were designed to 
encourage black businesses through such mean as 
subcontracting; to provide assistance to black employees 
who wished to set up their own businesses; to provide 
greater support for black trade unions; to bring about 
better education, training and career development for 
blacks; and to promote more involvement by companies in 
community projects. 
Sullivan from its inception reflected the 
paternalistic concerns of American managers, generally 
known under the generic title of 'human resource 
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management'. Criticised from the outset for omitting to 
stress the recognition of black unions (Schmidt 1980), 
the principles 
-were 
amended in 1980 to include a 
reference to the unions, but the Eighth Report of 1984 
acknowledged that: 
... a number of companies, while supporting the principle of freedom of association, 
prefer to communicate directly with employees 
whether a union is present or not. 
(Sullivan Report 1984, p. 26) 
Sullivan has laid much greater emphasis than the EEC 
code on financial support for non-work projects - 
schools, transport, housing# health and recreational 
expenditure, which are-more usual areas of interest for 
American employers than-for European. ' As a result of 
consultations with signatories and opinion inside South 
Africa, including black leaders, the Sullivan 
Organisation announced the Fourth Amplification of 
Principles in November 1984. From this date too, 
Sullivan urged the leaders of American subsidiaries to 
become more active in publicly criticising apartheid 
policies. 
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10.2 Supplying the Data 
No matter which eminent persons are consulted in 
setting the targets, the reports originate in the 
personnel departments of subsidiary companies. They may 
be compiled, as Barber (1980) suggested, by local 
company officers with little sympathy for or 
understanding of the policy's overall political 
objective, though no respondent manager in the 
researcher's survey admitted to such views. 
The UN report (1985) estimated that, in 1982, a 
total of 318 individual company reports were filed under 
the external codes (see Table 10.1 overleaf). Two 
hundred and twenty four of these came from European 
subsidiaries, with Britain and West Germany supplying 
eighty-five percent between them. There were 
ninety-three reports under the Sullivan principles, and 
just one under the Canadian code. - However, less than 
half of all the companies with subsidiaries made returns 
that year. The trends in response rates over several 
years reveal contrasting patterns between British and 
American companies. Taking the eight reporting years 
1978 to 1985, British companies with an equity of fifty 
or more percent in a South African subsidiary increased 
their response rate from 74.2 percent to 100 percent 
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Table 10.1 
COMPANIES REPORTING UNDER THE CODES IN 1982 
No. of Companies 
With Ecruitv of 
Ten Percent or 
More in--South 
African Subsidiary 
Euroipean Code: 
No. Of Companies 
Reporting 
Belgium 6 5 
Denmark 3 2 
France 20 7 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 142 51 
Greece - 2 
Italy 7 2 
Netherlands 17 -16 
United Kingdom 364 139 
Sullivan PrinciRl6s: 
United States 396 93 
nt. o 
Canada -21 1 
Raom. rce: 
Based on United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(UN 1985) 
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(see Table 10.2 overleaf). On the other hand, the 
response rate of Sullivan signatory companies for the 
five years 1980 to 1984 showed a decline from 90.0 
percent to 64.9 percent (Table 10.3 on page 321). 
The comments of managers who had completed, these 
reports go some way to revealing why these response 
rates varied. The European reports "take an hour at 
most" to fill in, one Cadbury's manager claimed. The 
data is usually to hand; and there is no independent 
verification of their accuracy. Evidence was produced 
early in the life of the European code that reports 
could be used for disinformation, which Otten claimed 
amounted to "blatant attempts to deceive" (1985, p. 65). 
FOSATU affiliates compared the code reports on union 
recognition with their affiliate unions' actual 
experience, and found wide discrepancies at Ever Ready, 
Revertex, Cadbury Schweppes and Raleigh Cycles (Rogers, 
1980 p. 20). The allegation that women employees receive 
much lower pay than the quoted minimum rates which apply 
only to men has frequently been made (Otten 1985, p. 65). 
Large companies often subcontract low-wage services such 
as cleaning and catering to locally-owned contractors, 
thus removing many low paid employees from their 
\continued on p. 322 
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Table 10.2 
NUMBER OF BRITISH COMPANIES REPORTING 
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CODE 
12-month period to 30 June in: 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
. 
1982 1983 
. 
1984 1985 
Category A 147 153 142 141 137 142 137 135 
Cat. A Cos. 
reporting 74.2 91.5 93.7 90.1 94.9 97.9 100 100 
Category B 16 19 14 13 11 9 13 15 
Others 21'- 33 28 36 34 30 21 22 
TOTALS 184 205 184 190 181 182 171 172 
Companies Not 
Reporting 47 19 18 13 13 12 10 3 
Notes: 
"Category All companies are those which hold an equity 
Of 50 percent or more in a South African company 
employing at least 20 people. 
"Category B11 companies are those holding an equity of 
between 10 and 50 percent in a South African company 
employing at least 20 people. 
Companies not falling into A or B are classified as 
"Others". 
a9mr-ce: 
British Government Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI 1986, para. 4) 
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Table 10.3 
SULLIVAN SIGNATORY COMPANIES: 
SUMMARY OF REPORTED PERFORMANCE 
12-month period to 30 June in: 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
No. of Subsidiaries 
held by Signatories 110 
No. Units Reporting 100 
Response 90.9 
Willing to Recognise 
Black Union 
Paying Below 
Recommended Minimum 34(a) 
All Facilities 
Desegregated 80 
1 Loa It. -es : 
103 122 145 151 
101 93 99 98 
98.1 76.2 68.3 64.9 
99 98 100 100 
16 (a) 19 (b) 10 (b) 2 (b) 
95 99 99 100 
In 1980,49 units (36%) recognised black unions. 
Comparable figures have not been published in 
subsequent years. 
(a) The recommended minimum is defined as less than 
25 percent above the relevant MLL (or SLL). 
(b) The recommended minimum is defined as less than 
30 percent above the relevant MLL (or SLL). 
SLO-urces: 
Based on data provided in Sullivan Reports 
(third report, 1980; eighth report, 1984). 
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\from p. 319 
computation of pay statistics. Barclays National Bank 
(Barnat) in Johannesburg allegedly'did this in 1981 
(Interview: Barnat Johannesburg, Sep 1982), although it 
was later emphatically denied by head office (private 
communication to the author, 17 Jan 1984). 
In marked contrast, the Sullivan reporting 
mechanism has evolved into a complex format. "Filling 
this in is going to be no easy matter", one manager in 
an American subsidiary commented as we examined the 
uncompleted fifty-page questionnaire. In 1982, as a 
result of the Purnell Report (1981), Sullivan had 
introduced the requirement that all reports must be 
counter-signed by the firm's auditors after confirmation 
of the figures. "Let's be frank", the respondent 
manager stated: "our auditor's don't care whether we 
advance our black employees or not. But they do know 
about checking figures: so if we say we released blacks 
for skills training for forty-one employee days, or that 
we paid R15,000 to the Industry Training Centre, then we 
have to prove it with paperwork". There is still scope 
for disinformation, however, even in an audited system 
(Sherman 1984). Not all questions are quantitative: 
several rely on statements of intent, such as a 
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theoretical "willingness" -to recognise unions. A Ford 
official is on record as stating that "many signatories 
pay only lip service to the employment code", and 
another that "You have to remember who signed the 
principles: we didnOt sign the principles, the home 
office did" (Myers 1979, p. 84). 
The fact that the requirements under the European 
code were static probably explains why the response rate 
in Category A British companies increased: the act of 
filling in the return was routine. On the other hand, 
the continually moving targets of Sullivan, as well as 
the sheer complexity of the reporting format, may 
explain the drop in response rate. Ford specifically 
mentioned a "disincentive" built into to the Sullivan 
system: companies are not rated by any absolute 
standard, but in relation to each other. A company may 
drop a rating category from one year to the next, 
because other companies may have reported specific 
improvements in that year. The EEC code0s 1985 changes, 
mentioned In Section 1 above, - were also designed to 
standardise reporting procedures. - 
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10.3 Monitoring the Information 
Neither code is subject to legal enforcement, a 
defect often cited as a weakness by critics in the trade 
union movement. But even assuming there had been a 
willingness on the part of the codes' progenitors to 
make them enforceable - and there is no evidence to that 
effect whatsoever - there would have been the problem 
that no single legal entity exists for the multinational 
corporation as a whole. This is the impediment of 
"extra territoriality": the notion that no one country 
can assert powers over a legal entity registered in 
another country, a fact that would render action under 
international law virtually impossible. Also, by their 
nature the codes lacked the precision usually associated 
with legal documents. Legal enforcement never seemed a 
practical option to the authors of the EEC code (Hurst 
1981). 
Within the EEC, every multinational with interests 
in South Africa as defined in the code is in theory 
liable to report. The pattern before 1985 of what 
actually happened to these reports varied widely between 
countries. The governments of the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom issued annual reports summarising the 
returns received by them. Denmark issued an annual 
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press release on the same basis (UN' 1985, p. 22). 
Individual company reports are in theory available for 
public inspection in each of these three countries. In 
Germany, however, a long dispute ensued as to who should 
be the monitor of the returns. German company reports 
are collated not by the Federal Government but by the 
chief. employers' organisation, the Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie (Hermle 1981, p. 55). They are not 
made available to the public. The EEC however now 
issues annually a summary of all member government 
reports tol the Political Affairs Committee of the 
European parliament, especially after the parliament 
criticised the "totally inadequate" monitoring which had 
allowed European companies "to wriggle out" of their 
commitments (The Guardian, 9 Feb 1983). The European 
parliament also passed a motion in favour of making the 
code mandatory, but the suggestion was not taken up (Th-e 
Guardian, 22 June'1983). 
Only those companies which are signatories to the 
Sullivan Principles -a number never approaching even 
one-half of the American companies known to the US 
Consulate General to be trading in the Republic - are 
requested to make annual reports. The number of 
signatories in any one year has varied: in 1983, it 
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became a compulsory requirement an signatories to make a 
financial contribution to the Sullivan office, and 
"primarily as a result of this", twenty nine companies 
were dumped from the list for failing to pay the charge, 
and a further seven in 1984 (Sullivan Report 1984, p. 5). 
The returns submitted by signatories are analysed 
by the consulting group of Arthur D. Little, who prepare 
the annual reports. No details are available on 
individual companies. By the third report in 1979, 
Arthur D. Little had developed a points rating scheme 
for grading signatories, partly because it'would: 
... improve the credibility of the Principles 
and the signatory effect and make it less 
likely that companies would "use" the 
Sullivan Principles as a shield from public 
opinion without making a good faith effort to 
implement them. 
(Sullivan 1983) 
Since then the consultants have worked with 'task 
forces' of subscribers to determine what weight to give 
each factor. The advantage of the points rating method 
is that account can be taken of the great diversity in 
size and type of business activity undertaken by 
signatories in setting targets. In this way, it is 
claimed, fairness and equity are achieved between 
signatories (Sullivan Report 1984, p. 6). on the other 
hand, the fact that companies are competing for ratings 
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against each other leads to what Hofmeyer (1982) termed 
"the bricks-and-mortar syndrome": prestigious building 
projects that look photogenic in glossy corporate 
publicity publications, rather than projects that can 
only be described in words. Otten believes that: 
... there is reason enough (and ample 
evidence) to believe that some companies 
tailor their social responsibility programmes 
to projects most likely to score high points 
on the Arthur D. Little questionnaires. 
(Otten 1985, p. 71) 
The survey of companies suggested''that it is 
Sullivan which is taken, more seriously: 'it is a complex 
process to fill in, a-return., its statistical information 
must be, -independently verified, and, according to the 
respondents, 'the parent company, usually-expects to be 
able, to -report- a good rating-, to the stockholders" 
meeting. r on' the other hand, many of the targets are 
regarded as elusive because they are not fixed; 
performance of one company can be downgraded by what is 
happening elsewhere; and some objectives, though worthy, 
are remote from the needs and interests of blacks as 
employees. The EEC code has suffered from a variety of 
reporting procedures, from the lack of independent 
checking and from a widespread belief among unions that 
disinformation is easy and rife. 
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10.4 The Non-Compliance Problem 
A further difficulty militating against the codes 
being accepted as effective attempts at constructive 
engagement is the problem of non-compliance. The lack of 
legal compulsion meant that those companies which failed 
to submit reports, or those that did so but were 
deficient in terms of one or more of the codes' 
requirements, potentially faced only moral pressure to 
conform. Each report of the British government listed 
companies believed to be eligible to report but which 
have not done so. The government has communicated with 
non-reporters and-the number has gradually been reduced 
(the numbers not reporting are given in, Table 10.2, 
p. 302). By 1985, non-reporters were down to three: 
Siebe, Sun Alliance and London Insurance, and Trusthouse 
Forte (DTI 1986). 
The arguments against the blacklisting of 
companies which default on the requirements were, set out 
by the Secretary of State, of Trade in 198o in a debate 
in the House of Commons; and "had not changed" up to 
August 1985 (letterý from DTI to the researcher,, 20 
Augustý 1985)-. ý Some days before the 1980 debate, Th_e 
observer had published an article alleging payment of 
wages by British firms to blacks at a level well under 
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the code's minium recommendation. The previous Labour 
administration had, in the words of its former Secretary 
of State, John-Smith: -- 
... done more than simply. collect information-_ from British companies. They evaluated the 
information which they received, using their 
own sources to check the accuracy of some of 
the information ... and published the names of 
those they did not believe were paying wages 
at the-level set out, in the code. 
(Hansard 27 June 1980, Col. 1017) 
Information disclosed to government had been the basis 
of The observer story, and the then current Conservative 
Minister, John Knott, riposted to Smith: 
... The pillorying in certain newspapers of 
certain, companies for their. wages levels to, 
the exclusion of all other working 
conditions. -.. has set back the objectives of 
the code to a greater extent than any action 
that I may have taken in refusing to publish 
what, by its nature, would be an inaccurate 
and misleading list of names. 
(Hansard 27, June 1980, Cols. 1027/8) 
The Sullivan Report for 1984 lists 1'22' non- 
signatory companies employing ten or more people,, a list 
which "is known to be incomplete" (Sullivan Report 1984, 
p. 42). The list presumably includes the thirty-six 
struck off for non-payment of subscription. A Bill to 
make a modified version of Sullivan mandatory for all 
us corporations was passed by the House of 
Representatives in 1983, but it failed to gain the 
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approval of a Joint Congressional Committee and so 
lapsed in 1984 (UN 1985p' p. 22). The principles remain 
a private undertaking for which reporting companies now 
pay : there is thus little prospect of securing complete 
compliance. 
10.5 The Substantive Outcomes' 
The British reports show an increase in the' number 
companies formally recognising black unions (see 
Table 10.4 overleaf). From seven in 1980, the figure 
rose to fifty-eight in 1985, with a further thirty-two 
declaring informal links. As a consequence,, the number 
of companies with in-house liaison or consultative 
committees is declining, though it still exceeded the 
number recognising unions in 1985. Apart from one year 
(1980), the Sullivan Reports have been silent on details 
of union recognition. But based on the details then 
supplied it can be inferred that the proportion of US 
corporations recognising unions is probably similar to 
that of British firms at around forty percent of 
reporting units. - It is, however, a moot point whether 
this degree of recognition would have occurred without 
the codes. A MAWU spokesman, Bernie Fanaroff, suggested 
that recognition in multinationals is no more common 
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Table 10.4 
BRITISH COMPANIES"IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS'PERFORMANCE, 
12-month period to 30 June in: 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Number of 
Category A 
Reports 109 140 133 127 130 139 137 135 
In-house Liaison 
or Consultative 
Committees 83 102 99 91 99 77 93 76 
Formal Recognition 
of Black Trade 
Unions 79 12 29 41 58 
Informal dealings 
with Black Trade 
unions 79 29 28 32 
Willingness to 
Recognise (with 
or without 
conditions 37", 38,55 43 
Formal Recognition 
of established 
unions 8 ý9 9 13 10 8 11 
note: 
See definitions on Table 10.1. p. 300. 
_source: 
British Government Department'of-Trade and In dustry 
(DTI*-1986,, para. 7) 
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than in domestic companies (quoted in The Sunday Star 
Johannesburg, 31 March 1985). In Chapter 6, the number 
of recognition, agreements by the end of 1984 was 
estimated at 800 (Piron and Le Roux 1986, p. 100). About 
130 were with multinationals, a rate above the domestic 
average, but certainly no higher than, for indigenous 
companies in similar sectors of the economy. 
on pay and wage structure, by 1984 95.5 percent of 
the Category A British firms claimed to have accepted 
the principle of equal pay for equal work. All the 
Sullivan companies reporting claimed to have introduced 
-7 it. The numbers of blacks paid at or below the higher 
PDL appeared to be reducing over the years of the 
mid-1980's to 2.0 percent of American units (see Table 
10.3, p. 303) and 7.6 of British firms (see Table 10.5 
overleaf). Sullivan reports also showed that percentage 
pay increases for blacks exceeded-those for whites in 
the reporting companies each year between 1979 and 1984, 
so some narrowing must have taken place. Companies are 
urged to adopt either the Johannesburg Chamber of 
Commerce's Minimum Living Level calculation (MLL) or the 
University of Port Elizabeth Institute for Planning 
Research's Household Subsistence Level (HSL) as a base 
on which to pay a supplement. Both calculations are 
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Table 10.5 
BRITISH COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
'PAY OF AFRICAN WORKERS 
12-month period to 30 June in: 
1978 1979,1980 1981 1982 
. 
1983 1984' 
. 
1985 
Number of 
Category A 
Reports 109 140 133 127 130 139 137 135 
No. African 
workers (000s ) 98 105 118 129 134 113 104 95.8 
paid below 
Lower Datum- 
Level 2.5 21111.3 1.8 0.9 
paid below 
Higher Datum 
Level ý13 19 19 88 5-2 -'7.6 
Fote: 
"Catagory All companies are, -those which 
hold an equity 
of 50 percent or more in a South African company 
employing at least 20 people. 
source: 
British Government Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI 1986, para. 9) 
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based on the lowest possible sum on which an "average 
sized" family could survive in various locations without 
actually starving. L'They allow nothing, for recreation or 
entertainment. But however low basic wages levels may 
seem to be to whites in South Africa or abroad-,,, they 
, --, represent some kind of crude market rate, given the high 
"ievels 
of unemployment and the desparate clamour for 
what few vacancies are notified (Kantor and Rees 1982). 
It is therefore unlikely that wages could be increased 
"much at the lower end, except in relation to specific 
productivity improvements. 
In a third major area, that of desegregation, 
--.,,, --, -American companies under 
Sullivan appear to be well 
ahead. The 1985 Sullivan Report makes the claim that 
reporting companies are fully in compliance with 
both I'de jure" and I'de facto" desegregation; and with 
--, equal and fair employment practices on medical, pension 
and insurance plans. By contrast, less than thirty 
percent of British companies were fully desegregated 
(see Table 10.6 overleaf). All the evidence, including 
the views of -ýfirms surveyed in this research and 
presented in Chapter 7, points to the reason for this 
discrepancy lying in the different cultural values of 
managers -of American, and-British firms bring to the 
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Table 10.6 
BRITISH COXPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
DESEGREGATION 
12-month period to 30 June in: 
-1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Number of 
Category A 
Reports 127 130 139 137 135 
Policy on 
Desegregation Stated -97,80 107 ill 128 
Total Desegregation 22 27 36 37 40 
Desegregation at the, 
Workplace 94 110 115 117 
Desegregation of 
Canteens 16 17 17 50 
Desegregation of 
Toilets 24 43 41 54 
companies mentioning- 
contraints: 
- of Law & Government 
Policy 40 23 33 32 40 
- of Customs, 
Attitudes & Practice 11 13 6 45 
. Note: "Category All compa nies are those which hold-an equity 
of 50 percent or more in a So uth A frican company 
employing at least 20 people. 
Information for 1978,1979 and 1980 not availableý 
Source.: 
British Government Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI 1986, para. -15) 
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question of desegregation, as hypothesised in Chapter, '4. 
American business leaders, it was asserted, are more 
sensistive to the need for corporate action in this 
area, given the fairly recent history of adopting such 
policies at home. 
10.6 The Codes as Agents for Change 
it is possible to discern four competing 
perspectives on the usefulness or otherwise of the 
codes. Firstly, there is the "optimistic', perspective: 
that held by those firmly in favour of the codes who 
believe much has been achieved that would not have been 
possible without them. Secondly, there is the 
"disillusioned": those who believe the codes have not 
lived up to expectation for a various reasons, a view 
held by people who are disappointed in some way at the 
outcomes. Thirdly, there is the "sceptical": the 
perspective of people who from the outset were dubious 
about some of-the high expectations set for the codes. 
And fourthly, there are the "antagonists": the 
perspective of those who are downright hostile. 
The research-survey suggests that the number of 
those with the "optimistic" perspective, has dwindled 
somewhat as"the' years have gone on,, with former 
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adherents becoming "disillusioned". Yet it is possible 
to speculate on some successes for the codes. On 
desegregation in the workplace, perhaps more than any 
other area, the sustained pressure of Sullivan touched a 
cultural chord in American corporations that transcended 
the South African inertia on this issue. No government, 
not even South Africals, can remain immune from 
international pressure on a matter which, while 
important, does not in the final analysis threaten their 
survival. On wages, too, the degree of attention to the 
problem of low pay in a multinational is heightened to a 
degree not found in any other country. Even if the 
consequences of increasing pay at the bottom served to 
highlight the need for better labour utilisation, the 
codes probably interfered at the margin in the crude 
market rate to the advantage of a few lowly paid 
workers. The codes were certainly one' factor which 
influenced the Wiehahn recommendations, though they 
were by no means the most important. They spawned 
similar internal codes, notably those of UF/SACCOLA and 
the Barlow Rand group. All of this can be regarded with 
comfort by the British and German governments, their 
employers-* organisations and interest groups such as 
UKSATA (now renamed BICSA)f who were perhaps supreme 
among the "optimists". For all these parties, the 
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alternative policy of economic sanctions was'and remains 
quite unacceptable 
However, "optimists" are on much thinner ice in 
arguing that they made much material contribution to the 
recognition of black unions. The gains made since 1979 
have been largely the unions' own efforts, using the 
legal framework created by the Wiehahn reforms. The 
South African government, having chosen to experiment in 
the labour field, has not taken advantage of the 
capacity it undoubtedly retained to inflict repression 
on the unions. Examples of harassment, and worse in a 
few cases, have continued where the government believed 
overt political activity stepped outside the terms of 
the, dispensation. The codes at least served to 
intensify the spotlight of international publicity on 
the - reform process. Those- taking the second 
perspective, the '"disillusioned" - for' example, 'the 
Western international 'trade union movement, and the 
European parliament - mayýat this point argue that if 
there had been better monitoring of performance, or 
legal compulsion-on defaulters, or more enthusiasm for 
action, the codes, ýmight have made a' greater impact, 
because their credibility-would have been higher. These 
criticisms'cannot be, dismissed:, -'-it must not be forgotten 
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that these interest groups, as well as governments, had 
a, stake in constructive engagement and in making the 
codes- work effectively. Certainly in the case of the 
international trade union movement, their reputation was 
partly on the line, for the codes allowed them to 
increase their influence with the emerging unions by 
legitimising their role. 
Turning to the fourth "antagonistic" perspective 
next, 'it is clear that whatever happened the codes never 
could satisfy the ANC, Anti-Apartheid-and others who did 
not accept the constructive engagement thesis in the 
first place. ' Matters of procedure or' substance' as 
discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter are 
niceties palpably 'irrelevant to the thoroughgoing 
revolution in South African society that these interests 
self-evidently require. The "antagonists" were surely 
right in pointing to, the limits reformed employment 
practices1within firms could contribute to the ending of 
apartheid in society, but wrong in implying that because 
of this they were not worth pursuing. They make now 
take some comfort from claims_ that constructive 
engagement is in demise: and particularly from the Rev. 
Leon Sullivan's alleged distancing of himself from the 
business of the codes and his reported advocacy of 
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I'disinvolvement" as a more appropriate action for 
American firms (The Economist, 13 June'1987, quoted by 
Craig-Smith 1987, p. 3). 
This leaves us with the third perspective, the 
"sceptical". Some, like the present author, accepted 
the constructive engagement thesis because the 
alternatives doing nothing at one extreme, or 
fullscale economic sanctions at the other - seemed 
unlikely to bring, about the desired change. Yet' there 
was nevertheless some scepticism about the 
multinationals' capacity to carry out the political 
policy. Could this heterogeneous collection, over one 
thousand -in number, act-together sufficiently to 
deliver what-was required-of them? 
This s cepticism, rested on three assumptions about 
the nature of multinationals, assumptions which contrast 
sharply to those held by adherents to the optimistic 
perspective. The first of these three assumptions relied 
on Tugenhadt's observation (discussed in Chapter 4) that 
there are two areas of operation in multinationals where 
local discretion is usually paramount: obeying local 
laws and customs, and the details of labour relations 
(Tugenhadt 1971). To be successful the codes had to 
overcome this powerful decentralising tendency. 
340 
The second assumption followed from this: that 
leverage available to home governments on multinational 
subsidiaries has its limits, and is often much less than 
assumed. In a revealing passage in his book on 
multinationals, Professor Raymond Vernon of Harvard 
writes: 
... contrary to the common impression, large US controlled enterprises are remarkably- 
reluctant to invoke the support of the US 
government ... This seeming passivity, even 
when their treaty rights are being impaired, 
reflects the basic fact that business leaders 
feel most comfortable when they are holding 
the US government at arm's length 
I (Vernon 1972, p. 152) 
Vernon-*s -view is- that businesses see government 
positively only as a trade-promoting agency. Brookes and 
Remmers argue that multinationals have an advantage over 
one-country firms by having achieved, through their 
global operations:, 
a certain independence of the constraints 
of national governments. Attempts to assert 
this independence on the one hand, ý and to 
limit it on the other, lie behind many of the 
problems between companies and countries. - 
(Brooke and Remmers 1970, p. 243) 
Both views are-reinforced by Katzenstein (1978), who 
showed that-business leaders see-themselves as driven by 
market domination needs-and are , actually deeply 
suspicious - of. politics, politicians 'and political 
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II 
objectives. 
As a consequence of this distance between 
businessmen and politicians, the third assumption was 
that multinationals, although they are capable of 
planning on a world scale for marketing purposes, have 
with notable exceptions surprisingly ill-developed 
political antennae. Nolan (1985) has argued how poor 
most American businesses are at what he calls "political 
surfing" in choppy seas; and the research by Doz (1986) 
has established that as multinationals became larger and 
more integrated, they generally become much less 
responsive to home or host country needs. Gellerman 
states simply that "managers are bad at ethical choices" 
(1986, p. 65). 
The notable exceptions to this generalisation are 
those firms in politically sensitive businesses, of 
which oil is the prime example, where business survival 
and growth over decades has necessitated the developing 
of consumate political skill. It is not theref6re 
surprising that those multinational companies in this 
study which have distinguished themselves as paragons of 
constructive engagement in the South African case are 
precisely those located in oil, chemicals and motor 
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manufacturing. 
However, we have also noted that wages, benefits 
and conditions of employment of African workers in most 
foreign firms operating in other sectors have also 
improved marginally faster than might otherwise have 
been the case. This is perhaps further evidence that the 
labour -codes have exerted greater pressure on-the 
subsidiaries of multinationals, than their natural 
tendencies to be independent could-resist. 
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CHAPTER, 11 
FROM MOBILISATION TO REVOLUTION? , 
"Deep in every discussion of collective action 
stirs the lava of a volcanic eruption: collective 
action is about power and politics; it inevitably 
raises questions of right and wrong, justice and 
injustice, hope and hopelessness; the very setting 
of the problem is likely to include judgements 
about who has the right to act,, and what good it 
does. 19 
Charles Tilly 1978, p. 5 
"To put it bluntly, if the Pretoria regime adopts 
a sufficiently ruthless and brutal policy at home, 
it may well be able to suppress black rebellion 
well into the twenty-first century. " 
R. W. Johnson 1977, p. 314 
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Introduction 
This dissertation has been a study of power: the 
power of governments, of employers and of trade unions 
to influence the course of events. It has concentrated 
on the potential capacity of collective action to erupt, 
as depicted by Tilly, balanced against Johnson's claim 
of the possibilities-of state repression. These- two 
opposing forces were encapsulated in Figure 5.3 on the 
possibilities and limits of'. worker mobilisation. 
The purpose of this final chapter is to consider 
whether in the South African context the black trade 
unions are a revolutionary or a stabilising force. it 
does so by returning to the four-propositions that were 
asserted as hypotheses in Chapter 5. These were: 
i) that trade unions have grown partly 
through developing their own competent 
leadership; 
ii) that the unions are"the only legitimate 
voice of a people otherwise politically 
impotent; 
iii) that they are resilient organisations, 
capable of withstanding industrial setbacks 
and a certain level of repression; and 
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iv) that the expectation that they can 
spearhead the breakdown of the' apartheid 
system is too high. 
section 1 examines the creation of COSATU in 1985 
as a potentially important reconciler of thel"workerist" 
and "populist" strands of union opinion. Section 2 
considers whether there are any lessons to be learned 
from the collapse of TUCSA, which might indicate., how 
durable the new union grouping is likely to be. Sections 
1 and 2 therefore together test the first two 
propositions outlined above. 
Section 3 then examines proposition iii) above, by 
considering the radical stance of COSATU on sanctions 
and disinvestment and the effect of this policy on the 
unions' relations with employers. Finally, Section 4 
reviews the evidence that suggests the unions are 
unlikely to mobilise sufficiently to topple the 
apartheid system unaided, which is the assertion, in the 
fourth proposition. 
I 
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11.1 Trade Union Leadership and Politicisatio 
By the end of 1985, the black unions had moved 
towards regaining some-lof-the initiative for black- 
leadership that was, seriously challenged during the' 
unrest in the townships in the period 1984 - 1985., They 
had become much more overtly political by -every test: 
conference resolution, leadership speeches, campaigning, 
and open affiliation to new political groups. The main 
vehicle for a more politically oriented union movement 
has been the creation of the Confederation of- South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the rise of the new 
organisation provides evidence on the first two 
hypotheses. 
At its birth in Durban in November 1985, estimates 
of its combined membership varied from 400,000 
(Financial Mail, 6-Dec 1985) to 600,000 (COSATU itself). - 
Either figure is however sufficient-to make-it one, of 
the largest single'union federation South- Africa has 
ever seen. - At its -, formation, -, COSATU -comprised 
thirty-three affiliates, and, had brought together the 
old FOSATU unions and-the independents, -groups which 
were identified -in this''research as , being close in 
spirit. - -", -The, -bulk -of 'affiliates- therefore 
had 
established, their reputations as', bargaining agents with 
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employers in the-early part of the 1980's. Only CUSA 
unions stayed outside the new confederation. 
COSATU also included erstwhile township unions such 
as MACWUSA and SAAWU., : The purpose of this broad 
combination was to formalise the political aspects of 
trade unionism, because in the words of the federation' 
general secretaryl Jay Naidoo: 
.... Experience has taught us that it is not 
enough to simply concern ourselves with 
factory issues. Non-political unionism is 
not only undesirable, it is impossible. And 
this basic truth has become increasingly 
clear to the organised worker movement .... We do not see COSATU as a political party but we 
do believe COSATU has a responsibility to 
voice the political interests and aspirations 
of the organised workers and also more 
broadly of the working class. 
I (Naidoo 1986, p. 34). 
COSATU sees itselff as did the ICU and SACTU before 
it, as part of the "liberation struggle", seeking an 
alliance with others of similar persuasion to avoid 
isolation as a result of what Naidoo calls "the danger 
of workerism". These allies include "the unemployed,, 
the rural -poor and the militant black youth", 
"democratic forces" from the white population, and the 
ANC. -, COSATU has-set itself the objective of working 
more closely with township-based community organisations 
to further their joint aims. There can be little doubt 
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that ýthe -unions can -add a greater degree of 
organisational expertise and sense of structure to these 
community organisations. 
Although COSATU has established contact with both 
the ANC and SACTU, it should not be inferred that'COSATU 
is neccessarily controlled by these external, bodiesý 
The correspondent of the Financial Mail who attended 
COSATU's foundation meeting noted -the, relative 
youthfulness -not just of delegates but also of leading 
officials, which confirmed the impression of, the present 
author duringýhis work with some of the black unions in 
1982. Such is the great pride and sense of ownership 
over what had already been achieved that it is naive and 
misleading to assume that these men and women are 
anyone's poodle. Indeed, though older exiled or jailed 
leaders are strongly revered by the new generation, it 
is the new generation which seems firmly in control of 
the liberation movement inside the country. 
The lessons of consolidation in the COSATUý period 
suggest that trade union leadership has learnt from its 
experience and is adaptive; and that the unions. have 
broken free from the constraints of economism under the 
pressure of events. - The first two propositions appear 
therefore to be vindicated. 
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11.2 MobilisinqLabour Power 
Without doubt, ' it is frustration at the perceived 
political impotence of blacks which has -pushed unions 
into this more overtly political role. There 'is no 
evidence that It'has' yet resulted in- abandoning' the 
industrial responsibilities through which most COSATU 
affiliates first established their credibility. ', Whether 
or not COSATU succeeds in the'long term will depend 
largely on balancing the industrial 'and I political 
aspects of its work while maintaining broad agreement on 
central, principles. 
It was a failure to agree a united view on 
political matters that has terminated the life of the 
oldest trade union centre, TUCSA. As late as the end 
of 1982, it contained within its ranks more black 
members than all other federations and independents put 
together, yet its demise was often predicted (Mohammed 
1983; Van der'Watt 1983). It was TUCSA, s perennial task 
of trying to maintain its broad church by compromise 
thAt eventually proved its undoing. Its vaguely 
reformist stance is- in stark 'contrast to the new 
committed politics of leading black*unions in COSATU. 
It is probably little comfort to its former officials 
that TUCSA's legacy can be seen in the fact that the new 
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federation has adopted similar organising principles. 
But the major advantage that COSATU enjoys over the 
old TUCSA unions lies in the undisputably higher level 
of commitment from members. This is not to suggest that 
members will blindly follow leaders whatever the cause. 
But it is does arise from the nature of the new unions: 
struggling- for existence, ' rooted in the 'communities, 
sensitive to workers' broader needs, organisations 
mainly of blacks in a'white-dominated power structure. 
This propensity to act by the membership is thus 
undoubtedly much higher than for other trade unions 
which exist at present, unions who have not needed to 
engage in , struggle' for over fifty years. Thus, the 
third proposition about the high level of mobilisation 
also appears to be verified. 
11.3 The Black Unions and Employers 
This thesis has chronicled the shift of black 
unions-to political activity after a period of time 
predominantly spent in economistic behaviour. Such a 
shift at some time was entirely predictable: -experience 
of all-union, movements shows that'representing workers" 
interests is -not simply a question of relations with 
employers 
-but 
indisputably involves political matters - 
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housing and transport, -health and security,,, education 
and old age pensions, and, at the bottom line, citizens, 
rights. 
The progressionýto political awareness by 'unions 
has been followed by virtually every trade union 
movement in the -industrialised world. It was, as 
Chapter 2 showed, the path pursued vigorously by white 
unions in 'South Africa earlier in this century. The 
satisfying of workers' rights anywhere is ultimately 
political-, 'and cannot be done through relations with 
employers alone. 
But the timing of the shift to political action has 
not been chosen by the unions. It has come about 
directly as a result of the seemingly catastrophic 
decisions by the government over the constitution and 
their stark message of black exclusion. It is important 
to remember that, certainly in the overwhelming number 
of cases, individual black unions never intended to 
abandon their industrial work and substitute it for 
political activity, but rather to add political 
campaigning to their established industrial role. 
However, as several senior business leaders have 
observed, the state of emergency from 1986 - 
representing the re-emergence of the clearly 
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non-accountable security forces - involved detentions of 
union officials on a scale that made the maintenance of 
'normal' labour relations very'difficult., 
It is the black unions' attitudes towards sanctions 
and disinvestment generally, that'illustrates the major 
difficulty, perhaps even 'paradox. - of attempting to 
reconcile elements 'of economistic behaviour in which 
employers are involved, with an articulated opposition 
to the present South African government. COSATU has 
advocated external sanctions against the Republic,, and 
urged foreign disinvestment, presumably in the full 
knowledge that-substantial damage to'the economy would 
do little for its members'- employment'' prospects. 
"Economism" requires a vigorous defence of'' jobs, 
campaigning against factory closures and- redundancies. 
The Ford Motor Company's decision in 1985 to run down 
its -South African operations'was, bitterly contested by 
union officers 'On the grounds that its motives were 
business inspired and not political. A Ford shop 
steward was reported'asobserving: 
.... If Ford was pulling out to contribute to things-politically, then it's OK, but- it's 
for making money and it's unacceptable. 
(cited in Green 1986, p. 74) 
The resulting anger in this case was channelled against 
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the employer. But this may not always happen. If 
disinvestment for political purposes became widespread, 
the unions would need to work hard to ensure that 
subsequent short-term anger was not directed at them. 
COSATU's stance on sanctions and disinvestment 
shows that radical postures are no longer the sole 
prerogative of the 'comrades' or the exiled ANC. it 
probably facilitated the unions' regaining of the centre 
ground in African politics it appeared to lose at the 
height of the urban unrest. It is a measure of how far 
the unions have come to shake off the prohibition on 
political campaigning intended by the framers of the 
1979 legislation. It illustrates the fine balancing act 
the unions are now engaged in - between their union 
aspirations and the interests of the black community on 
the one hand, and the position of employers and the 
state on the other. The skills needed to stay upright 
are of a very high order. 
11.4 The Black Unions and Apartheid 
The tension in the relationship between the 
government and the black unions is substantial and 
makes prediction risky. There is little doubt that in 
acting with such speed on Wiehahn, the government 
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stumbled blindly into labour reform with little idea of 
where it was all heading. Labour reform may have been, 
in Spence's phrase (1984) less of a "tangled web" than 
political reform, but its nature and direction is still 
not certain. 
Recent history, it can now be concluded, has been 
shaped not by a conspiracy or masterplan, but by the 
interplay of leading personalities and the grasping of 
limited opportunities by organisations. Wiehahn 
personally, and several informed observers, recognised 
at the time that reform would encourage open expressions 
of conflict between employers and unions., The 
assumption was 'that conflict could be regulated in 
manageable ways. By and large this has happened, but 
there has often been ill-disguised frustration on the 
part of the Department of Manpower, the National 
Manpower Commission and the Industrial Court, charged 
with achieving regulation, when provocative actions by 
the security police have exacerbated labour disputes and 
fanned the fires of discontent. Labour difficulties, 
manifested by strikes, have allowed the political far 
ý01 It'' -- - right' to-, cry: "We'told you's .. It 
is thus 'still 
possible that there may be some'rolling 'back of the 
labour reforms. 
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It is central to the argument to realise that the 
risks the unions are now incurring in politicising their 
role are overwhelmingly not of their own making. They 
are the victims of circumstance. Yet the risks are real 
indeed. The unions have shown a capacity to mobilise 
blacks for collective action on a scale unprecedented in 
the history of the dominated race. But will that 
collective action succeed finally in promoting 
revolution? or will it incur some form of reaction, 
possibly by legislation intended to reduce the unionsO 
rights; or even repression aimed at crushing the unionst 
as in former decades when union action was perceived as 
a threat to the state itself? 
The likelihood is that the longer the present trade 
union movement exists, the less the state can truly 
repress. But it must never be overlooked that the power 
advantage fundamentally lies with the potential 
suppressor rather than putative challenger of the 
political status quo. Legal restrictions must be a 
strong possibility. 
Those favouring political change in South Africa 
who have seen the unions as a battering ram capable of 
reducing the gates of apartheid to matchwood by 
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industrial muscle may be asking"for more'than unions or 
their members can deliver. The "challenge to the state", 
the ultimate policy, will probably remain putative. 
Rather, what the 1980's have illustrated is that the 
black trade unions abhor the anarchy of township 
violence; that '-they can be a stabilising force with 
employers; and that they represent a cohesive 
organisation , making a serious bid -for, ., political 
leadership among the disenfranchised community. If they 
can continue to do-this without courting'the full might 
of state repression, then whenever and by whatever route 
South Africa's politics eventually change, the unions 
will have greatly strengthened their hand at future 
negotiating tables. 
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Appendix I a) 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMPANIES WITH SUBSIDIARIES# 
BRANCHES OR REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(Adopted by EEC Foreign Ministers in November 1977) 
1. Relations within the Undertaking 
(a) Companies should ensure that all their employees 
irrespective of racial or other distinction are 
allowed to choose freely and without any hindrance 
the type of organisation to represent them. - 
(b) Employers should regularly and unequivocally inform 
their employees that consultation and collective 
bargaining with organisations which are freely 
elected and representative of employees are part of 
company policy. 
(c) Should black African employees decide that their 
representative body should be in the form of a 
trade union, the company should accept this - 
decision. Trade unions for black Africans are not 
illegal, and companies are free to recognise them, 
and to negotiate and conclude agreements with them. 
(d) Consequently, the companies should allow collective 
bargaining with organisations freely chosen by the 
workers to develope in accordance with 
internationally accepted principles. 
(e) Employers should do everything possible to ensure 
that black African employees are free to form or to 
join a trade union. Steps should be taken in 
particular to permit trade union officials to 
explain to employees the aims of trade unions and 
the advantages of membership, to distribute, trade 
union documentation and display trade union notices 
on the company's premises, to have reasonable time 
off work to carry out their trade union duties 
without loss of pay and to organise meetings. 
Where works or liaison committees already operate, 
trade union officials should have representative 
status on these bodies if employees so wish. 
However, the existence of these types of committees 
should not prejudice the development or status of 
trade unions or of their representatives. 
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2. Migrant Labour 
(a) The system of migrant labour is, in South Africa, 
an instrument of the policy of apartheid which has 
the effect of preventing the individual from 
seeking and obtaining a job of his choice: it also 
causes grave social and family problems. 
(b) Employers have the social responsibility to 
contribute towards ensuring freedom of movement for 
black African workers and their families. 
(c) In the meantime employers should make it their 
concern to alleviate as much as possible the 
effects of the existing system. 
3. Pay 
(a) Companies should assume a special responsibility as 
regards the pay and conditions of employment of 
their black African employees. They should 
formulate specific policies aimed at improving 
their terms of employment. 
(b) However, pay based on the absolute minimum 
necessary for a family to survive cannot be 
considered as being sufficient. The minimum wage 
should initially exceed by at least 50 percent the 
minimum level required to satisfy the basic needs 
of an employee and his family. 
4. Waae Structure and Black-African Advancement 
(a) The principle of "equal pay for equal work" means 
that all jobs should be open to any worker who 
possesses suitable qualifications, irrespective of 
racial or other distinction, -and that wages, should 
be based on a qualitative job evaluation. 
(b) The same pay scales should be applied to, theýsame 
work. The adoption of the principle of equal pay 
would, however, be meaningless if black African 
employees were kept in inferior jobs. Employers 
should therefore draw up an appropriate range of 
training schemes of a suitable standard to provide 
training for their black African employees. and 
should reduced their dependence on immigrant white 
labour. 
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S. Fringe Benefits 
(a) In view of their social responsibilities, 
undertakings should concern themselves with the 
living conditions of their employees and families. 
(b) For this purpose company funds could be set aside 
for use: - 
* in the housing of black African personnel and 
their families; 
* in providing their employees with assistance in 
problems they encounter (with the authorities) 
over their movement from one place to another, 
their choice of residence and their employment; 
* in pension matters; 
* in education matters; and 
* in improving medical services, in adopting 
programmes of insurance against industrial 
accidents and unemployment, and in other 
measures of social welfare. 
6. Desegregation at the Place of Work 
Insofar as they are free to do so, employers should 
do everything possible to abolish any practice of 
segregation, notably at the workplace and in 
canteens, sports activities, education and 
training. They should also ensure equal working 
conditions for all their staff. 
7. ReRorts on the ImRlementation of the-Code of Conduct 
(a) Parent companies to which this Code is addressed 
should publish each year a detailed and fully 
documented report on the progress made in applying 
this Code. 
(b) The number of black African employees employed in 
the undertaking should be specified in the report, 
and progress in each of the six areas indicated 
above should be fully covered. 
(c) The governments of the Nine will review annually 
progress made in implementing this Code. To this 
end, a copy of each company's report should be 
submitted to their national government. 
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Appendix I b) 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMPANIES WITH SUBSIDIARIES# 
BRANCHES OR REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA** 
(Revised by EEC Foreign Ministers plus Spain and 
Portugal in November 1985) 
Preamble 
This Code is addressed to all companies from the 
European Community which have subsidiaries, branches or 
representatives in South Africa. 
The aim of the Code is to make a contribution towards 
abolishing apartheid. None of the provisions of this 
Code should be interpreted as leading to discrimination 
between various racial communities in South Africa. The 
dispositions concerning black employees have the sole 
objective of putting them on a equal footing with,., the 
other employees. 
1. Relations within the Undertaking 
(a) Companies should ensure that all their employees 
irrespective of racial or other distinction are 
allowed to choose freely and without any hindrance 
the type of organisation to represent them. 
(b) Companies should pay particular attention to black 
trade unions and be prepared to recognise them. 
(c) Companies should be prepared to sign recognition 
agreements with representative black trade unions 
within tho'company and allow collective 
bargaining, including the signing of collective 
agreements, in accordance with internationally 
accepted labour standards. Employers should 
regularly and unequivocally inform 
their employees that consultation and collective 
bargaining with organisations which are freely 
elected and representative of employees are part of 
company policy. 
(Author's note: Passages in the revised code that 
contain a significant variation or addition on the 
original version are printed in bold] 
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(d) Companies should do everything possible to inform 
their employees within the company of their social 
and trade union rights. 
Employers should make every effort to ensure 
that black African employees are free to form or to 
join a trade union. Steps should be taken as a, 
matter of course to allow trade union officials to 
explain to employees the aims of trade unions and 
the advantages of membership, to distribute trade 
union documentation and display trade union notices 
on the company's premises, to have reasonable time 
off work to carry out their trade union duties 
without loss of pay and to organise meetings. 
Employers should encourage trade union members to 
take part in trade union training programmes. 
Companies should do everything possible to 
establish a climate of confidence in their 
relations with their employees and should in 
particular make available to the text of the Code 
of Conduct of the Euopean communities and inform 
them, in an appropriate language and in places to 
which they normally have access, of what the 
company is doing to implement the Code. 
In companies where works or liaison committees 
already operate, trade union officials should have 
representative status on these bodies if employees 
so wish. However, the existence of these types of 
committees should not prejudice the development or 
status of trade unions or of their representatives. 
Migrant Labour 
(a) The policy of apartheid leads. to the use of migrant 
labour which robs the individual of the basic 
freedom to seek and obtain the job of his choice: 
it also causes grave social and family problems. 
(b) Employers have the social responsibility to 
contribute towards ensuring freedom of movement for 
black African workers and giving them the 
opportunity to lead a family life. 
(c) Employers should endevour to alleviate the effects 
of existing regulations I in particular by 
facilitating the regular renewal of contracts of 
employment and making it easier for the families 
of employees to settle near their companies. 
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3. Pay and Vage Structure 
(a) Companies should assume a special responsibility as 
regards the pay and conditions of employment of 
their black African employees. In this context, 
they should refer to the data of the University of 
South Africa (UNISA). They should formulate 
specific guidelines aimed at improving their terms 
of employment. Pay based on the "supplemented 
living level'$ for the average-sized family must be 
considered as the absolute minimum necessary. (In 
this context, it is to be recalled that the 
previous text of the Code of Conduct mentioned that 
"the minimum wage should exceed by at least 50 
percent the minimum level required to satisfy the 
basic needs of an employee and his family". ) 
Nevertheless companies should make every effort to 
exceed this level when fixing wages. In their 
reportsthey should supply the required 
, explanations and, in particular, give an account of 
their wage scale and the possibilities of progress 
in this context. 
(b) The principle of equal opportunities for all 
employees ought to be fully respected. 
The principle of "equal pay for equal work" means 
that all jobs'should be open to any worker who 
possesses suitable qualifications, irrespective'of 
racial or other distinction, and that wages should 
be based on a qualitative job evaluation. The same 
pay scales should be applied to the same jobs. 
4. Training and Promotion of Black Employees 
(a) The principle of equal pay would, however, be 
meaningless if black African employees were kept in 
inferior jobs. Employers should therefore draw up 
an appropriate range of training'schemes of a 
suitable standard to provide training for their 
black African employees, and should reduced their 
dependence on immigrant white labour. 
(b) companies should ensure that, their supervisiory and 
management jobs and those requiring high technical 
qualifications are open to their black African 
employees. Companies should# if possible, or4anise 
ocupational training programmes for their black 
employees. Companies should# if possiblej help 
their black employees to take advantage of other 
399 
educational and occupational training programmes 
outside their places of work. Where required, 
companies should set up or use educational 
facilities to enable their black employees to 
benefit from more specialised training. 
(c) Companies should make every effort to eliminate in 
practice the de facto restrictions or based on 
custom on apprenticeships for black employees 
(sic). They should make ensure that 
employees of different racial groups can take 
part in training programmes without any form 
of segregation. 
5. Fringe Benefits 
(a)- In view of their social responsibilities, 
companies should concern themselves with the 
living conditions of their employees and families. 
I 
(b) For this purpose company funds could be set aside 
to provide benefits over and above those currently 
provided according to South African legislation: 
providing complete social protection schemes for 
employees and their families (health, accidents 
and unemployment insurance and old age pensions); 
ensuring that employees and their families have 
the benefit of adequate medical care; 
* in the education of members. of their families; 
involving the accommodation of black African 
staff and their families, in particular by 
helping them to buy their own housing; 
* providing transport from home to work and back; 
providing their employees with assistance in 
problems they encounter with the authorities 
over their movement from one place to another, 
their choice of residence and their employment; 
* providing leisure facilities. 
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6. Desegregation at the Place of Work 
(a) Employers should do everything possible to abolish 
any practice of segregation, notably at the 
workplace, in canteens, in education and training 
and in sports activities. They should also ensure 
equal working conditions for all their staff. 
(b) Along with the advancement of their black 
employees, companies should directly support 
inter-staff contacts, and help employees from 
different racial groups to get to know each other 
better and integrate more fully. 
Companies should encourage sporting activities in 
which employees from different racial groups take 
part as mixed teams in mixed competitions. 
7. Encouragement of Black Businesses 
As far as they are able# companies should, in the 
framework of their activitiest encourage the setting up 
and expansion of black busineses by sub-contractingp 
providing assistance for their black employees to setup 
their own companies and preferential# priority treatment 
in customer - supplier relations. 
---_------------ 
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IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE 
1. Criteria for Implementation 
(a) A detailed and fully documented report should be 
prepared by all companies which have a controlling 
interest in a South African company employing black 
workers. 
(b) In other companies where there are European 
interests, whether significant or not, the European 
shareholders should make every effort to ensure 
that the principles of this code are implemented 
and that a report is produced. 
Drafting of Reports 
(a) Reports shall be drafted by 
the uniform criteria agreed 
These reports shall be sent 
South Africa or directly to 
authorities of the country 
made public. 
companies according to 
by EEC countries. 
either to Embassies in 
the national 
of origin, and should be 
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(b) Reports shall cover the period I July - 30 June and 
be sent to national authorities by the end of 
September* The authorities will then draw up 
national reports to be available by the end of the 
following March, and submitted to national 
parliaments. A summary report will be prepared by 
the Presidency-in-office of the Community and 
presented to the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee of the EEC before the 
summer recess. The national and joint reports 
shall be public. 
3. Co-ordinating Implementation 
The Xember States will consult regularly on the 
implementation of this Code, in particular through their 
representatives in South Africa. To this effect, the 
latter will draw up an annual report which will be taken 
into account when the summary report is drafted. This 
report will also address the impact of the Code in the 
economic and social context of South Africa and in 
particular the views of the relevant trade union and 
employers, circles concerning its content and 
implementation. 
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Appendix II (a) 
THE SULLIVAN STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 
OF UNITED STATES FIRMS WITH AFFILIATES IN 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
(Adopted in March 1977) 
Each of the firms endorsing the Statement of 
Principles have affiliates in the Republic of 
South Africa and support the following 
principles: 
1. Non-segregation of the races in all 
eating, comfort and work facilities. 
2. Equal and fair employment practices for 
all employees. 
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or 
comparable work for the same period of time. 
4. Initiation and development of training 
programmes that will prepare, in substantial 
numbers, blacks and other non-whites for 
''supervisory, admin- istrativeo technical and 
clerical jobs. 
5. Increasing the number of blacks and other 
non-whites in management and supervisory 
positions. 
6. Improving the quality of employees' lives 
outside the work environment in such areas as 
housing, transportation, schooling, recreation 
and health facilities. 
We- agree to further implement these 
principles. Where implementation requires a 
modification of existing South African working 
conditions, we will seek such modification 
through appropriate channels. 
We believe that the implementation of the 
foregoing principles is consistent with 
respect for human dignity and will contribute 
greatly to the general economic welfare of all 
the people of the Republic of South Africa. 
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ppendix 11 (b) 
THE SULLIVAN STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 
OF UNITED STATES FIRMS WITH AFFILIATES IN 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
(Fourth Amplification November 1984) 
Principle 1: Non-segregation of the races in all 
eating, comfort and work facilities: 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will 
proceed immediately to: 
Eliminate all vestiges of racial discrimination. 
* Remove all race designation signs. 
Desegregate all eating, comfort and work 
stations. 
PrinciRle 2: Equal and fair employment practices for 
all employees 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will 
proceed immediately to: 
Implement equal and fair terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Provide non-discriminatory eligibility for 
benefit plans. 
Establish an appropriate and comprehensive 
procedure for handling and resolving individual 
employee complaints. 
Support the elimination of all industrial racial 
discriminatory laws which impede the 
implementation of equal and fair terms and 
conditions of employment, such as abolition of 
job reservations, job fragmentation and 
apprenticeship restrictions for blacks and other 
non-whites. 
Support the elimination of discrimination against 
the rights of blacks to form or belong to 
government registered and unregistered unions and 
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acknowledge generally the rights of blacks to 
form their own unions or be represented by trade 
unions which already exist. 
Secure rights of black workers to freedom of 
association and assure protection against 
victimisation while pursuing and after 
attaining these rights. 
Involve black workers or their representatives in 
the development of programmes that address their 
educational and other needs and those of their 
dependents and the local community. 
PrinciRle 3: Equal pay for all employees doing equal 
work or comparable work for the same 
period of time. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will 
proceed immediately to: 
Determine the extent to which upgrading personnel 
and/or jobs in the upper echelons is needed, and 
accordingly, to implement programmes and to 
accomplish this objective in representative 
numbers, ensuring the employment of blacks and 
other non-whites at all levels of company 
operations. 
Assign equitable wage and salary ranges, the 
minimum of these to be well above the appropriate 
minimum economic living level. 
Principle 4: Initiation and development of training 
programmes that will prepare blacks and 
other non-whites for supervisory# 
administrative and technical jobs. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will 
proceed immediately to: 
Determine employee training needs and 
capabilities and identify employees with 
potential for further advancement. 
Take advantage of existing outside training 
resources and activities, such as exchange 
programmes, technical colleges and similar 
institutions and programmes. 
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Support the development of outside training 
facilities, individually or collectively - 
including technical centres, professional 
training exposure, correspondence and extension 
courses, as appropriate for extensive outreach 
training. 
Initiate and expand inside training programmes 
and facilities. 
Principle-5: Increasing the number of blacks and 
other nbn-whites in management and 
supervisory positions. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will 
proceed immediately to: 
Identify, actively recruit, train and develop a 
sufficient and significant number of blacks and 
other non-whites to ensure that as quickly as 
possible there will be appropriate representation 
of blacks and other non-whites in the management 
group of each company at all levels of 
operations. 
Establish management development programmes for 
blacks and other non-whites as needed, and 
improve existing programmes and facilities for 
developing management skills of blacks and other 
non-whites. 
Identify and channel high management potential 
blacks and other non-whites into management 
development programmes. 
PrinciRle--6: Improving the quality of employeeso 
lives outside the work environment. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will 
proceed immediately to: 
Evaluate existing programmes, and/or develop new 
ones as appropriate, to address the specific 
needs of blacks and other non-white employees 
in the areas of housing, health-care, 
transportation and recreation. 
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Evaluate methods for utilising existing in- 
house medical facilities, or expanding or newly- 
establishing them, to improve medical care for 
all blacks and other non-whites and their 
dependents. 
Participate in the development of programmes that 
address the educational needs of employees, their 
dependents and the local community. Both 
individual and collective programmes should be 
considered, in addition to technical education 
(including such activities as literacy education, 
business training, direct assistance to local 
schools, contributions and scholarships). 
support changes in influx control laws to provide 
for the right of black migrant workers to normal 
family life. 
Increase utilisation of and assist in the 
development of blacks and other non-whites owning 
and operating business enterprises (including 
distributors, suppliers of goods and services, 
and manufacturers). 
Increased Dimension of Activities outside the Workplace 
Use influence and support the unrestricted rights 
of black businesses to locate in the urban areas 
of the nation. 
Influence other companies in South Africa to 
follow the standards of equal rights principles. 
Support the freedom and mobility of black workers 
to seek employment opportunities wherever they 
exist and make possible provisions for adequate 
housing for families of employees within the 
proximity of workers' employment. 
Support the ending of all apartheid laws. 
With all the foregoing in mind, it is the objective of 
the companies to involve and assist in the education and 
training of large and telling numbers of blacks and 
other non-whites as quickly as possible. The ultimate 
impact of this effort-is intended to be of massive 
proportion, reaching and helping millions. 
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THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES 
Periodic ReRorting 
The signatory companies of the Statement of Principles 
will proceed immediately to: 
Report progress on an annual basis to Reverend 
Sullivan through the independent administrative 
unit he has established. 
Have all areas specified by Reverend Sullivan 
audited by a Certified Public Accounting firm. 
Inform all employees of the company's annual 
periodic report rating, and invite their input on 
ways of improving the rating. 
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Appendix III 
THE BARLOW RAND GROUP 
CODE OF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE 
(February 1981) 
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THE BARLOW RAND GROUP 
CODE OF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE 
First issued June 1978 
Revised January 1980 
Revised February 1981 
"Barlow Rand 
acknowledges its corporate 
responsibility to contribute to the 
prosperity-and progress of all 
the peoples in Southern Africa" 
The Barlow Rand Group Code of Employment Practice was 
first issued in June 1978. The second issue, published 
in January 1980, was substantially the same in content 
but contained revisions made possible by changes in 
legislation arising from the first report of the Wiehahn 
Commission. 
This third edition again retains the basic features of 
the original Code, but embodies policy modifications on 
the question of negotiating rights and deals for the 
first time with the monitoring of the performance of 
group companies relative to the commitments made in the 
Code. 
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[I Introduction 
The 
Barlow Rand group's primary objectives are to maintain its 
record of growth and to increase its return to shareholders. 
At the same time it acknowledges its corporate responsibility to 
contribute to the prosperity and progress of the peoples in South 
Africa. 
The group recognizes that the achievement of these two objectives will 
very largely be dependent upon the well-being, the training and the 
most effective use of its greatest single asset-its people. This was 
recognised in the Barlow Rand corporate brochure issued at the time 
of its 75th jubilee year in which the aim is stated: 
"Of ensuring as far as it is in our power to do so, the security, well- 
being and future of all the men and women of all races in our group 
and engendering in them a*sense of pride in the achievements and 
attitudes of the group. " 
The managements of the compardes comprising the group are 
committed to these objectives and particularly undertake: 
1. To assist employees to develop their skills and enable them to 
use these skills to the full, thus ensuring their job satisfaction and 
ability to contribute to the group's aims. 
2. To develop and maintain open lines of communication and 
personal contact. 
3. To promote and preserve at all times the dignity and self- 
esteem of employees. 
4. To imp . rove the quality of fife of employees both in working 
and home conditions. 
5. To measure on a regular basis their progress towards 
fulfilment of the commitments made in this Code. 
it is recognized that there are limiting factors which can inhibit 
companies from fully achieving some of these commitments. The 
group must operate vAthin the law and legally enforceable industrial 
agreements. It nevertheless pledges itself to work for changes in any 
laws or attitudes that result in discrimination against any employees in 
the work situation or prevent the achievement of the objectives listed 
above. 
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14ý 
Group 
Employment 
Principles 
The 
introduction dealt with general group commitments. This 
section of the Code sets out the specific policies and practices which 
managements of group companies undertake to implement. 
Selection and promotion 
Within the diminishing constraints imposed by law and by legally 
enforceable agreements, people wiU be appointed or promoted solely 
on the basis of their ability to meet the requirements of the post to be 
filled. Group policy wiH be to promote from within the group, and 
not necessarily from within the company where the vacancy has 
arisen. 
Training and development. 
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Companies will undertake the training and development of employees 
to improve their work performance and prepare them for levels of 
responsibility commensurate with their abilities. This will ensure that 
the necessary skills will be available to secure their own and the 
group's progress. 
As many of the group's employees enter its ranks with a minimum of 
formal education, training in literacy and numeracy will be offered to 
enable them to form a foundation for the development of their basic 
skills. 
Technical, supervisory and management training will be provided 
both from the group's resources and by appropriate outside agencies. 
As part of the group's responsibility of augmenting the flow of skilled 
manpower in Southern Africa, the C. S. Barlow Foundation will 
continue to provide financial support for education, and particularly 
technical education. 
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Remuneration 
Employees will be remunerated on a non-discriminatory basis and 
performance, the demands of the job and experience will be the main 
criteria for determining salaries and wages. 
"Non-disaiminatory remuneration implies a fully integrated salary 
and wage structure and our companies are committed to working 
towards this goal" the Executive Chairman of the group said in his 
1979 statement to shareholders. Enlarging on this in his 19so 
statement, he said: 'We have embarked on a major job evaluation 
exercise throughout the group to determine the inherent worth of jobs 
and to establish equitable remuneration structures that take no 
account of the race or sex of the incumbents. This is a considerable 
exercise in a group of our size but significant progress has already 
been made. For historical and other reasons, various wage gaps have 
developed in South Africa and we are committed to working towards 
their elimination in our group as soon as possible. " 
All permanent and migratory employees will qualify for paid annual 
leave, the duration of such leave being governed by length of service, 
seniority and statutory provisions. 
The group will neither acquire nor establish any business that depends 
for an acceptable financial return on wages and conditions of service 
which are lower than group standards. 
Retireznent benefits and retivnchment 
Every permanent employee will qualify to belong either to a pension 
or provident fund to which the employer company will contribute. 
Supplementary retirement benefits will be provided for employees 
with a minimum of 10 yea& continuous group service if they have 
not been members of funds for the full period of their employment. 
Companies will endeavour to provide continuity of employment. If at 
any time retrenchment becomes unavoidable, every effort will be 
made to place the affected employees within the group. If placements 
cannot be made, the hardships suffered by the employees concerned 
may be mitigated by ex gratia payments. The quantum of payments 
wiH be governed by length of service within the group, the adequacy 
or otherwise of pension fund retrenchment benefits and the quality of 
service rendered. 
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Negotiating rights 
"On the important question of negotiating rights, " the Executive 
Chairman of the group said in his 1979 statement to shareholders, 
"the basic requirement, as we have always maintained, is that there 
should be no difference in the rights available to the various 
population groups and we are pleased that this has come about. " He 
added: 'We believe that the best road to industrial peace and stability fies in negotiation at industry or national level between employer 
organisations and fully representative mixed unions, with 
supplementary negotiation on domestic issues at plant level between 
managements and works councils, employee representatives being drawn from all population groups. " 
In his 1980 statement the Executive Chairman noted that the 
registration of unions was proving to be a slow and cumbersome 
process and said: 'Whilst we would ideally like to deal with registered 
unions in an industrial council structure, we believe that until 
voluntary registration is made easier and more attractive, we shall have to continue negotiating with unregistered unions if meaningful 
numbers of our black employees wish to be represented by them. " 
We beheve that works councils will play an important part in in-COMpany consultation and negotiation, especially in those group 
companies which are not subject to industrial council agreements. The 
effectiveness of works councils will be enhanced by the training of its 
members and demands, requests and suggestions will be fairly and 
promptly dealt with. 
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Integration of fadfities 
Work areas will be fully integrated. The group's policy is to move 
positively towards the integration of other facilities but it recognizes 
that legal constraints and social attitudes will influence the rate of 
change. 
Quality of life 
Companies will concern themselves with the quality of life of 
employees within and outside the working environment. This involves 
a general awareness of employees' needs and aspirations and a 
willingness to help them to achieve a satisfying life. 
Specifically, companies will assist employees under certain 
circumstances to acquire or improve homes. Where employees live in 
group hostels, companies will strive to achieve acceptable and 
continually improving standards of accommodation. 
In regard to the education of the dependants of employees, companies 
wiU provide financial assistance when it is feasible and necessary to 
do so. 
Monitoring of performance 
Companies will annually make formal presentations to the Executive 
Chairman of the group, reporting on their progress towards the full 
implementation of the Code and producing plans indicating how they 
propose to eliminate any gaps that may still exist between their 
current employment practices and the commitments made in the code. 
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P'l Conclusion 
le 
group will take cognisance of changes in the industrial relations 
situation and in laws and social attitudes that have a bearing on 
employment practices, and will amend the Code from time to time so 
that it represents the most enlightened practice attainable in prevailing 
circumstances. 
Parts of the Code relate specifically to the situation in South Africa, 
where most of the companies of the group are located. However, all 
companies of the group are committed to the basic principles 
underlying the Code, namely equitable treatment of employees and 
the elimination of discrimination. 
